User:Anarchangel/Sandbox/Guantanamo detainees

• Note Wikipedia:Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Sultan Sari Sayel Al Anazi

"Guantanamo" gets 134,000 hits on Google News. Are we to believe that this is because of the architecture of the internment facility there? Or perhaps the guards, or their uniforms? A score or two of Gitmo prisoner articles have been deleted, first on the basis of an outdated interpretation of the WP:PRIMARY rule that forbad all primary sources, and now an invocation of GNG that clearly contradicts the facts. Guantanamo prisoners have always been notable, and are a clear case for WP:IAR to bypass the contradiction with GNG. The article, like all Guantanamo prisoner articles, has been savagely cut, from a 32k article down to only 2k bytes,

Either the sincerity or competence of this notability-based deletion nomination is in question. Offering the inclusion of the article's subject in a list as a consolation prize to inclusionists is incompatible with the basis of the nomination, as list components must be notable in their own right. Which is it? Is this article notable, or is its inclusion in a list and therefore on WP altogether still threatened? Anarchangel

X: notability is not inherited

Not inherited from what, exactly?

An American base in Cuba is something of an anomaly, I will concede. But 134K? I think it is Gitmo that inherits notability from its inmates? Hmm, how might I test that? Let's see, coverage before the year 2001 might be good. 10,000 hits for the over 98 years between 1/1/1903, the year the base was founded, and 9/11/2001, the year, you know, that thing, happened. Google hits for the less than 11 years between 9/11 and today now total 136,000. I won't be arguing that these numbers are extremely accurate, I guess. Like it matters. Around 100 a year to well over 10,000 a year. Gitmo prisoners are 100 times as notable as their prison? Anarchangel

• Wikipedia:Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Mohammed Nasim (Guantanamo captive 849)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Articles_for_deletion/Log/2010_December_22#Mohammed_Nasim_.28Guantanamo_captive_849.29

• Mohammed Hashim
• Mohammed Nasim (Guantanamo captive 849)
• Nasrullah (Guantanamo detainee 886)
• Rahmatullah Sangaryar
• Abdul Razzak Hekmati
• Abdul Ghani (Guantanamo detainee 934)

User:Anarchangel/Sandbox/Guantanamo detainees 2

• Abdul Bagi (detainee)
• Bismullah (Guantanamo detainee 968)

Restored to WP

• Wikipedia:Abdul Hafiz (Guantanamo detainee)
• Wikipedia:Norullah Noori

Separately AfDd

• Abdul Ghafour (Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin leader)
• Azimullah (Wikipedia:Azimullah) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Articles_for_deletion/Azimullah_(detainee)

1. 1 part II

• Sultan Sari Sayel Al Anazi
• Abdullah Muhammed Abdel Aziz
• Muhammad Ali Hussein Khenaina
• Asim Thahit Abdullah Al Khalaqi
• Mohammed Abdullah Taha Mattan
• Abdul Rahman Mohamed Saleh Naser
• Salah Bin Al Hadi Asasi
• Abdulah Alhamiri

all at Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Log/2012 June 30

User:Anarchangel/Sandbox/Guantanamo detainees 3

• Rami Bin Said Al Taibi
• Abdullah Hamid Mohammed Al-Qahtani
• Said Muhammad Husayn Qahtani
• Khalid Malu Shia al Ghatani
• Jabir Hasan Muhamed Al Qahtani
• Abu Ubaydh Al Tunisis
• Mohammed Abdel-Rahman al-Rashed
• Abdullah Muhammed Abdel Aziz
• Sa ad Ibraham Sa ad Al Bidna
• Fahd Salih Sulayman Al Jutayli
• Mohammed Abdel-Rahman al-Rashed
• Sultan Radi al-Utaibi
• Ahmed Owaidan Al-Harbi

Abdulah Alhamiri

Wikipedia:Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Abdulah Alhamiri

Abdulah Alhamiri (عبدالله الحميري) is a citizen of United Arab Emirates and former student of Portland State University. He is best known for the time he spent in extrajudicial detention in the United States's Guantanamo Bay detention camps, in Cuba. His Guantanamo Internment Serial Number was 48. He was born on October 25, 1979, in Al Ain, United Arab Emirates.

Summary of Evidence memos were prepared for Abdulah Alhamiri's first and second annual Administrative Review Board hearings on February 23, 2005 and February 10, 2006. The two memos were identical, except the 2006 memo had one additional final factor favoring continued detention. The following primary factors favor continued detention

a. Commitment

1. Approximately two weeks after September 11, 2001, detainee was taken to the front lines in Kabul, where he manned an observation post and constructed defensive positions.
2. The detainee stated that he does not like the American Government.
3. The detainee stated that Jihad is the duty of all Muslims and that if an Imam orders it then he would fight.
4. The detainee made it very clear that he would kill Americans if they came against Islam.

b. Training

1. Detainee received small arms training at a camp in Omarsaif and served as an interpreter for the camp physician.

c. Connections and Associations

1. The detainee was linked to various individuals suspected of being members of al Qaida.

d. Intent

1. The detainee stated that any Muslim who allies himself with an American forfeits Islam and paradise.
2. In June 2001 the detainee left the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and traveled to Afghanistan to conduct his personal Jihad.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. Detainee was a student at Portland State University and left the United States to help the Taliban build an Islamic State in Afghanistan.

The following primary factors favor release or transfer

N/A

Second annual Administrative Review Board

The Summary of Evidence memo drafted, on February 10, 2006 was identical to the one drafted for his first annual Administrative Review Board on February 23, 2005, except that one more factor was added to the sub-section titled "Other Relevant Data":

The detainee continued to refuse to speak or answer questions posed to him during interviews.

Third annual Administrative Review Board

Third annual Administrative Review Board hearing

The Department of Defense published documents from the captives' third annual Administrative Review Board hearings on January 9, 2009. A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Abdullah K Al Hamairi's third annual Administrative Review Board on May 15, 2007. The three page memo listed nineteen "primary factors favor[ing] continued detention" and one "primary factor favor[ing] release or transfer".

Board recommendations

One January 9, 2009, the Department of Defense published two heavily redacted memos, from his Board, to Gordon England, the Designated Civilian Official. The Board's recommendation was unanimous The Board's recommendation was redacted. England authorized his continued detention on September 17, 2007.

Writ of habeas corpus

A writ of habeas corpus was filed on Al-Hamiri's behalf, following the United States Supreme Court's June 12, 2008 ruling in Boumediene v. Bush, which overturned the provisions in the Detainee Treatment Act and Military Commissions Act, which had closed captives' access to habeas corpus.

Repatriation

On November 26, 2008 the Department of Defense published a list of the dates detainees left Guantanamo. Al Hamari was repatriated on August 1, 2008, along with another man, ISN 1165.

Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

Administrative Review Board hearings

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

References

External links

• The Guantánamo Files: Website Extras (3) – “Osama’s Bodyguards” Andy Worthington

Salah Bin Al Hadi Asasi

Wikipedia:Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Salah Bin Al Hadi Asasi

Salah Bin Al Hadi Asasi was held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detention camps, in Cuba. His Guantanamo Internment Serial Number is 46.

As of Nov. 13, 2009, Sayf Bin Abdallah had been held at Guantánamo for seven years 10 months.

Identity

Captive 46 is named inconsistently on different official documents issued by the US Government:

• Captive 46 is named Salah Bin Al Hadi Asasi on the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.
• Captive 46 is named Sayf Bin Abdallah on the official list of all the captives released on May 15 2006.

Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive. During the period July 2004 through March 2005 a Combatant Status Review Tribunal was convened to make a determination whether they had been correctly classified as an "enemy combatant". Participation was optional. The Department of Defense reports that 317 of the 558 captives who remained in Guantanamo, in military custody, attended their Tribunals.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

There is no record that Salah Bin Al Hadi Asasi chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

Allegations

A Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his Tribunal states:

a. The detainee is associated with al Qaida and the Taliban.

1. Originally from Menzil Tunisia, the detainee relocated to Turin, Italy in 1997.
2. In February 2001, the detainee was recruited to fight the jihad in Afghanistan by Noor-Deen, a known al Qaida recruiter, at the Via Berreti mosque in Turin.
3. In July 2001, the detainee traveled the route provided by his recruiter from Milan, Italy to Kabul, Afghanistan, via Tehran, Iran; Mashad, Iran; and Herat Afghanistan.
4. Once in Afghanistan, the detainee sought out the Taliban and requested to be placed on the front lines.
5. The detainee received training on the AK-47 rifle from the Taliban in Jabul Sabr.
6. The detainee worked for the Tunisian Al Qaida faction in Afghanistan.

b. The detainee participated in military operations against the United States or its coalition partners.

The detainee was assigned to a Taliban commander and deployed to Jabul Sabr, a mountain outpost north of Kabul.

Third annual Administrative Review Board hearing -- 2007

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for his third annual Administrative Review Board in 2007.

Board recommendations

On January 9, 2009, the Department of Defense released two heavily redacted memos, from his Board, to Gordon England, the Designated Civilian Official. The review board convened on June 7 2007. The Board's recommendation was unanimous. The Board's recommendation was redacted. The Board's recommendation was forwarded to England on September 9 2007. England authorized continued detention in October 2007.

References

External links

Template:wikisource was released

Abdul Rahman Mohamed Saleh Naser

Wikipedia:Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Abdul Rahman Mohamed Saleh Naser

Abdul Rahman Mohamed Saleh Naser is a citizen of Yemen held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detainment camps, in Cuba. Naser's Guantanamo detainee ID number is 115. American intelligence analysts estimates that he was born in 1980, in Ma'rib, Yemen.

Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

To comply with a Freedom of Information Act request, during the winter and spring of 2005, the Department of Defense released 507 memoranda. Those 507 memoranda each contained the allegations against a single detainee, prepared for their Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The detainee's name and ID numbers were redacted from all but one of the memoranda. However 169 of the memoranda had the detainee's ID hand-written on the top right hand of the first page corner. When the Department of Defense complied with a court order, and released official lists of the detainee's names and ID numbers it was possible to identify who those 169 were written about. Abdul Rahman Mohamed Saleh Naser was one of those 169 detainees.

Allegations

a. The detainee is associated with the Taliban:

1. The detainee arrived in Afghanistan in Jan Template:sic 2001 from Yemen via Syria and Iran.
2. The detainee went to Afghanistan to "fight".
3. The detainee received military training in Afghanistan.

b. The detainee participated in military operations against the United States or it coalition partners.

1. The detainee fought against the coalition at the Kabarak line.
2. The detainee spent six months with a fighting unit at Khavjeh Gar Template:sic.
3. The detainee's unit was captured by Dostum's Northern Alliance forces at Mazir-E-Sahriff Template:sic.

Transcript

There is no record that Naser chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

Administrative Review Board hearing

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

The factors for and against continuing to detain Naser were among the 121 that the Department of Defense released on March 3 2006.

The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee decided to go to Afghanistan after hearing and speaking with Sheik Al Zindani Template:sic.
2. Abd Al Majid Zandani Template:sic was an active supporter of Usama Bin Laden Template:sic. Zandani was involved in raising funds and recruiting volunteers for the Bin Laden organization. Zandani is also a religious and legal expert for Usama Bin Laden.
3. Executive Order 13224 designates Shaykh Template:sic Abd Al Majid Al Zindani Template:sic as a person who commits, threatens to commit, or supports terrorism.
4. The detainee arrived in Afghanistan in Jan 2001 from Yemen via Syria and Iran.

b. Training

The detainee received training from Emir Abdul Salam on the Karabak front lines, along with forty other troops.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's immediate commander was Turab al Najdi.
2. Abu Turab Al Najdi attended the Khaldan training camp in Afghanistan, and worked with the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines.
3. Abdul Salam served as a commander at the front lines for Abdul Hadj Al Iraqi, an al Qaida commander who worked for the Taliban government.
4. An audiocassette tape from Abd Alsalam Template:sic addressed to Abd Alhadi, contained a greeting from Usama Bin Laden Template:sic to his commanders, specifically Alhadi and Alsalam. Usama Bin Laden also stated on the tape that there would be a second and third very painful strike against America similar to that witnessed on 11 September 2001.

d. Intent

1. The detainee went to Afghanistan to "fight".
2. The detainee fought against the coalition at the Kabarak line.
3. The detainee spent six months with a fighting unit at Khavjeh Gar.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee's unit was captured by Dostum's Northern Alliance forces at Mazir-E-Sharif Template:sic.
2. The detainee has been cited for numerous incidents of failure to comply, guard harassment, assault, and inciting of disturbances during his detention.

The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

• The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.
• The detainee denies seeing Usama Bin Laden Template:sic while in Afghanistan. The detainee stated that if he were released, he would return home to the family farm and get married.

References

Asim Thahit Abdullah Al Khalaqi

Wikipedia:Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Asim Thahit Abdullah Al Khalaqi

Template:Infobox War on Terror detainee Asim Thahit Abdullah Al Khalaqi is a citizen of Yemen, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detention camp, in Cuba. His Guantanamo Internment Serial Number is 152. Joint Task Force Guantanamo counter-terrorism analysts estimate Al Khalaqi was born in 1968, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

As of December 4, 2009, Asim Thahit Abdullah al Khalaqi has been held at Guantanamo for seven years 11 months.

Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were usually held in a trailer.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Asim Thahit Abdullah Al Khalaqi's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 4 November 2004. The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. The detainee was associated with al Qaida and the Taliban:

1. The detainee arrived in Afghanistan in late 2001 from Yemen via Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
2. The detainee is associated with the Jama'at al Tabligh.
3. The Jama'at al Tabligh, a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization, is being used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists including members of al Qaida.
4. The detainee is associated with the Jaish e Mohammed Islamic Fundamentalist Group.
5. The Jaish E Mohammed Islamic Fundamentalist Group is a terrorist organization associated with al Qaida and the Taliban.
6. The detainee completed paramilitary training.
7. The detainee may have stayed in a guesthouse in Afghanistan.

b. The detainee engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners:

1. The detainee was at the front lines in Bagram.

Transcript

Al Khalaqi chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

Testimony

Press comments

On July 12, 2006 the magazine Mother Jones provided excerpts from the transcripts of a selection of the Guantanamo detainees. Al Khalaqi was one of the detainees profiled. According to the article his transcript contained the following exchange:

al khalaqi:	Are these evidence or accusations?
tribunal president:	They are in the form of both...
Al Khalaqi:	I'm sorry, I just don't understand. How does it fit the two pictures or definitions? For example, if I say this table is the chair and the chair is the table and they are the same thing, does that make sense?
tribunal president:	No, that doesn't make sense. But this process makes sense to me and hopefully it will make sense to you, because you're the one who's going to have to provide us with evidence and tell us that you did or did not do these things as listed on the summary of evidence.
Al Khalaqi:	So I just answer the accusations. But I'm going to call it accusations. I'm not going to call it evidence.
tribunal president:	Very well, you can call it as you wish.

Habeas corpus submission

Al Khalaqi is one of the sixteen Guantanamo captives whose amalgamated habeas corpus submissions were heard by US District Court Judge Reggie B. Walton on January 31, 2007.

On June 12, 2008 the United States Supreme Court ruled, in Boumediene v. Bush, that the Military Commissions Act could not remove the right for Guantanamo captives to access the US Federal Court system. And all previous Guantanamo captives' habeas petitions were re-instated.

On 2008 July Civil Action No. 05-CV-999 was re-filed on Asim Ben Thabit Al-Khalaqi behalf. His was the sole case in 05-CV-999.

First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Asim Thahit Abdullah Al Khalaqi's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 29 June 2005. The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Asim Thahit Abdullah Al Khalaqi's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 4 April 2006. The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a 3 x 5 meter trailer. The captive sat with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor. Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.

Administrative Review Board hearing

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

References

External links

• Who Are the Remaining Prisoners in Guantánamo? Part Three: Captured Crossing from Afghanistan into Pakistan Andy Worthington, September 22, 2010

Mohammed Abdullah Taha Mattan

Wikipedia:Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Mohammed Abdullah Taha Mattan

Template:Infobox War on Terror detainee Mohammed Abdullah Taha Mattan is a Palestinian currently held in the United States's Guantanamo Bay detention camps, in Cuba. His Guantanamo Internment Serial Number is 684.

As of October 11, 2009, Mohammed Abdullah Tahamuttan has been held at Guantanamo for eight years four months.

Military Commissions Act

The Military Commissions Act of 2006 mandated that Guantanamo captives were no longer entitled to access the US civil justice system, so all outstanding habeas corpus petitions were stayed.

Boumediene v. Bush

On June 12, 2008 the United States Supreme Court ruled, in Boumediene v. Bush, that the Military Commissions Act could not remove the right for Guantanamo captives to access the US Federal Court system. And all previous Guantanamo captives' habeas petitions were eligible to be re-instated. The judges considering the captives' habeas petitions would be considering whether the evidence used to compile the allegations the men and boys were enemy combatants justified a classification of "enemy combatant".

Protective order

On 15 July 2008 Kristine A. Huskey filed a "NOTICE OF PETITIONERS’ REQUEST FOR 30-DAYS NOTICE OF TRANSFER" on behalf of captive 684 and several dozen captives. The petition would prevent the Department of Defense from transferring him out of US jurisdiction without giving his attorney's thirty days notice. The Department of Defense had transferred some captives to countries where they were subsequently subjected to abusive treatment—even though they had active habeas corpus petitions.

2006 annual Administrative Review Board

A three page Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for his annual Administrative Review Board. The three page memo listed ten "Primary factors favor[ing] continued detention" and five "Primary factors favor[ing] release or transfer". According to the memo:

• Tahanmatan had participated in the Tablighi Jamaat religious group since he was fourteen.
• Tahanmatan had traveled to Pakistan on a religious exchange in October 2001.
• Tahanmatan is alleged to have considered traveling to Afghanistan, even though the Tablighi Jamaat leadership prohibited travel there, because it was too dangerous.
• Tahanmatan did not travel to Afghanistan. He was arrested with sixteen other men in a "guest house in Faisalabad", which was "was used by a senior al Qaida operative.
• Tahanmatan father had been alienated from his brothers for twenty years. Tahanmatan believed this alienation might have been because his uncles had been associated with Hamas.
• Tahanmatan was alleged to have seen Afghan refugees and Arabs who had fled Afghanistan.
• Tahanmatan disputed that he had ever personally been involved with any militant groups.

Medical records

On March 16, 2007 the Department of Defense published height and weight records for all but ten of the captives held in Guantanamo. Mohammed Abdullah Taha Mattan is one of the ten men whose height and weight records were withheld. The Department of Defense has not offered an explanation for why no records for those ten men were published.

References

External links

• Who Are the Remaining Prisoners in Guantánamo? Part Six: Captured in Pakistan (2 of 3) Andy Worthington, October 6, 2010

Muhammad Ali Hussein Khenaina

Wikipedia:Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Muhammad Ali Hussein Khenaina

Muhammad Ali Hussein Khenaina is a citizen of Yemen held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detention camps, in Cuba. His Guantanamo Internment Serial Number is 254. Joint Task Force Guantanamo counter-terrorism analysts report he was born in Ktaph, Yemen.

As of November 14, 2009, Muhammed Ali Hussein Khnenah has been held at Guantánamo for seven years five months.

Identity

Muhammed Ali Hussein Khnenah was named inconsistently on various Department of Defense documents:

• Muhammad Ali Hussein Khenaina on the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 10 December 2004, and on the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for Muhammad Ali Hussein Khenaina's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 1 November 2005, and on five official lists of captives' names.
• Muhammed Ali Husayn on the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his second annual Administrative Review Board, on 2 July 2006.
• Mohammed Ali Hussain Khanina listed as alternate name by the New York Times.

Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor. Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.Template:POV-section

Initially the Bush Presidency asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush Presidency's definition of an enemy combatant.

Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Muhammad Ali Hussein Khenaina's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 10 December 2004. The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. The detainee is associated with al Qaida:

1. The detainee traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan from Yemen, on or about August 2001, via Karachi and Quetta, Pakistan.
2. The detainee is associated with an al Qaida recruiter.
3. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan and he was aware of an individual whose purpose for going to Afghanistan was to train in an al Qaida training camp.
4. The detainee was captured by Pakistani authorities at the Pakistan/Afghanistan border.

Transcript

There is no record that Muhammad Ali Hussein Khenaina participated in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

Administrative Review Board hearing

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat—or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Muhammad Ali Hussein Khenaina's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 1 November 2005. The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Muhammed Ali Husayn's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 2 July 2006. The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

The following primary factors favor continued detention

a. Commitment

1. The detainee went to Afghanistna to teach the Koran in Arabic, however, he says he did not actually teach the Koran.
2. Initially, the detainee stated he lost his passport at the guest house he was staying at in Kabul, Afghanistan; then the detainee admitted to giving his passport to the manager of the guest house for safe keeping.
3. The detainee was at the guest house on 11 September 2001 when he heard about the attacks. He was concerned about retaliation by the Americans and wanted to get out.
4. Prior to Ramadan 2001, the manager of the guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan arranged for the detainee to travel to Logar, Afghanistan, and then to Khost, Afghanistan. The detainee stayed at the home of an Afghan. After staying at the house for about one and a half weeks, the detainee decided to leave with a group of five Arabs and an Afghan guide.
5. The Afghan guide took the detainee and five other Arabs through the mountains by foot foot where they met another 19 fleeing men and joined their group.
6. The group continued to the Pakistan border where they were detained by authorities, jailed for approximately two weeks and handed over to United States authorities.
7. On 3 January 2002, the detainee was transferred from Pakistani control to United States military custody.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan with a person that had previously spent time in Afghanistan and offered to help the detainee with his travel.
2. The detainee stayed in a guest house in the Karti-Barwan area of Kabul, Afghanistan. The manager of the guest house arranged transportation for guests to a Taliban training area 35 minutes north of Kabul, Afghanistan.

c. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was captured with 8,530 Pakistani Rupee Notes.

The following primary factors favor release or transfer

a.	The detainee claimed he was not in Afghanistan to participate in jihad.
b.	The detainee claimed that he did not have a weapon while in Afghanistan.
c.	The detainee denied being associated with the Taliban while in Afghanistan.
d.	The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.
e.	The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
f.	In reference to the 11 September 2001 attacks, the detainee stated that he felt it was a crime and that it was wrong that so many innocent people were killed.
g.	If released, the detainee would return to Yemen and marry a cousin who has been betrothed to him and never leave again.

References

Sultan Sari Sayel Al Anazi

Wikipedia:Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Sultan Sari Sayel Al Anazi

Template:Infobox WoT detainees Sultan Sari Sayel Al Anazi is a citizen of Saudi Arabia, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detention camps, in Cuba. His Guantanamo Internee Security Number is 507. American intelligence analysts estimate that Al Anazi was born in 1974, in Sakaka, Saudi Arabia.

Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a 3 x 6 meter trailer. The captive sat with his hands cuffed and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor. Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Sultan Sari Sayel Al Anazi's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 27 September 2004. The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. The detainee is associated with al Qaida:

1. The detainee traveled from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan via Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan in July 2001.
2. The detainee's name was found on a list of "Trust Accounts" for al Qaida mujahidin found in raids on al Qaida safe house in Pakistan, 11 September 2002 through 1 March 2003.

b. The detainee participated in military operations against the United States or its coalition partners.

1. The detainee fled to the Zubair Center in Tora Bora in November 2001 and was wounded in an air strike.
2. The detainee was captured by coalition forces while convalescing at an unknown location after fighting in the Tora Bora region.

Transcript

Al Anazi chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal. On March 3 2006, in response to a court order from Jed Rakoff the Department of Defense published an eleven page summarized transcript from his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

Opening statement

Al Anazi acknowledged traveling to Afghanistan. He said he traveled to Pakistan, as a tourist, and as one of a group of Tablighi Jamaat pilgrims. He said he not originally intended to go to Afghanistan at all. But this group decided to enter the Afghanistan border area to help the local Afghans learn how other people practiced Islam. They traveled to Afghanistan prior to the attack of September 11, 2001, but were not able to cross the border before the American bombings started. Many of his fellow pilgrims were killed during the bombing in which he was injured.

Al Anazi denied participating in any hostilities. In response to the allegation that he participated in military operations, he said:

"This is simply not true; I never fought in the Tora Bora region or anywhere else in Afghanistan for that matter. I have no expertise in military weapons or tactics. In fact, I dislike the military altogether and I have no desire to join. I dislike fighting in general."

Al Anazi denied being captured by coalition forces. He said that he sought out American or coalition soldiers to whom he could surrender, so he wouldn't be killed by accident.

Testimony

In response to questioning from the Tribunal's officers:

• Al Anazi denied receiving military training in Afghanistan or Pakistan.
• Al Anazi denied traveling to Afghanistan to engage in Jihad.
• When Al Anazi was asked why decided to travel with the Tablighi Jamaat teachers he responded:

  "For tourism and to learn about the Muslim religion. Also, I am ill with a term called magic and demons or magic and the devil. When someone from Jamaat al Tibliq would stand over me and read from the Koran, the demon would be cast out."

• Al Anazi said he could not explain how his name would end up on an al Qaeda list.
• When asked to describe the "Zubair Center" Al Anazi explained that his interrogators must have misunderstood him. Zubair was not the name of a place. It was the name of the leader of his group of Tablighi Jamaat pilgrims.
• Al Anazi told his Tribunal that no one in his group had ever carried any weapons.
• Al Anazi said he had not planned to join in an Tablighi pilgrimage when he first traveled to Pakistan. He met them in a Mosque, was impressed by their scholarship, and decided to join them when they left the mosque a few days later.
• Al Anazi said that he had his passport with him when he surrendered. He told his tribunal that the Afghans he surrendered to stole his passport, his wallet, his watch, even his shoes.
• Al Anazi replied that he worked as a bus driver in Saudi Arabia, and he paid for his travels out of his savings.

Witnesses

Al Anazi had wanted to call other detainees as witnesses. But he couldn't because he didn't know their full names.

Administrative Review Board hearings

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Sultan Sari Sayel Al Anazi's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 2 May 2005. The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

The following primary factors favor continued detention

a. Commitment The detainee traveled from Saudi Arabia; Bahrain; Karachi, Pakistan; Quetta, Pakistan; Kandahar, Afghanistan; Jalalabad, Afghanistan and finally Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee met a member of the Islamic-based organization, Jamaat Tabliq Template:sic, who convinced him to travel to Afghanistan. Jama'at Al Tabligh, a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization is being used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists including members of al Qaida. The detainee stated he had no specific reason for traveling from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan but felt he needed a change in his life. He eventually decided to go to Pakistan, explaining he had already been in most of the Arab speaking countries (Egypt, Syria and Lebanon). b. Connections/Associations The detainee's name was found on a list of "Trust Accounts" for al Qaida mujahidin found in raids at al Qaida safehouses in Pakistan, 11 September 2002 and 1 March 2003. Due to the detainee's associations with known al Qaida operatives the detainee's name has been preauthorized for placement in appropriated United States government agency watch lists. The detainee's name and telephone number were on a list recovered from a safehouse raid associated with suspected al Qaida in Pakistan. The leader of the detainee's group at Tora Bora was named Zubair. Zubair was a member of the Jama'at Al Tablique and was killed in Tora Bora by bombings from U.S. Forces. c. Intent The detainee came to Afghanistan to train but all of the camps were closed when he arrived. The detainee has made anti-American statements claiming that there should especially be a jihad in America until all Americans are dead or Muslim. This is because America supports the Jews and infidels. He has also stated that it is every Muslim male's duty to go fight the jihad and be Mujahadeen. The detainee plans to go back to Saudi Arabia if released and join the army just for the training and quit. d. Other Relevant Data The detainee fled to the Zubair Center in Tora Bora in November 2001 and was wounded in an air strike. The detainee was captured by coalition forces while convalescing at an unknown location after fighting in the Tora Bora region. While imprisoned at Sarapuza prison in Afghanistan the detainee collaborated with other prisoners to hide money in mattresses and bed frames in his prison cell.

The following primary factors favor release or transfer

a.	The detainee insisted he never went to Afghanistan because of a fatwa or to fight a jihad. He was not recruited nor did he received financial or logistical assistance in traveling from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan. He stated he never received military training, he does not know any Taliban or al Qaida members and he has no knowledge of Taliban or al Qaida training.
b.	When asked about the September 11, 2001 attacks the detainee stated that the killing of innocents, particularly women and children, is against the teaching of Islam. He also stated that if you have an enemy you fight that enemy specifically. You do not make war against civilians.
c.	The detainee stated he never made the statement about a jihad in America. There must have been a misunderstanding because he did not believe in killing someone simply because he was not Muslim.
d.	The detainee allegedly commented a Muslim's duty to jihad and his desire to kill nonbelievers and Americans. Template:sic The detainee said that any comments made earlier would have been mistranslated.

Transcript

Al Anazi chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing. In the Spring of 2006, in response to a court order from Jed Rakoff the Department of Defense published a twelve page summarized transcript from his Administrative Review Board.

Opening statement

Al Anazi told his Board that he had been tortured and humiliated.

Al Anazi assured his board that he was totally innocent.

Al Anazi explained that he believed that he was being held due to false denunciations other detainees had made in order to gain privileges or in order to secure their own release.

Al Anazi recanted any confessions he may have made while he was being tortured by American interrogators in Afghanistan.

Testimony

In answer to questioning from his Board's officers:

• Al Anazi explained that he traveled by car to Bahrain because airline tickets were cheaper there.
• Al Anazi explained that Saudi Arabia was very conservative, so young people liked to travel to have fun. Some young people tried to get girlfriends during their overseas travel.
• Al Anazi clarified that he had never said there should be a jihad against America. He didn't believe that.
• Al Anazi clarified that he did not plan to join the Saudi military.
• When asked what he thought about the attacks on America on September 11, 2001 he said:

"As I stated before, I do not support [or] agree with this event at all. The one who did that doesn't have the right to do this because they were innocent, they were children, they were elderly and they don't have a reason to do it. That's all."

Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Sultan Sari Sayel Al Anazi's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 23 July 2006. The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

The following primary factors favor continued detention

a. Commitment The detainee went to Afghanistan for training, but all of the camps were closed when he arrives. In 2001, about four months before Ramada, the detainee decided to depart Saudi Arabia. The detainee traveled to Pakistan because he wanted to try something different. The detainee did not tell his family exatly where he was going because he did not know where he would end up. The detainee traveled from Saudi Arabia, to Bahrain, to Karchni, Pakistan, to Quetta, Pakistan, to Kandahar, Afghanistan, to Jalalabad, Afghanistan and finally to Kabul Afghanistan. The detainee met a member of the Islamic based organization, Jamaat al Tabligh, who convinced him to travel to Afghanistan. The Jamaat al Tabligh, a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization is being used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorist including members of al Qaida. b. Connections/Associations The detainee was identifed among a translated list of al Qaida Mujahedin. The contents of their trust accounts were found on file recovered from various computer media seized during raids against al Qaida associated safe houses. The detainee stated that the person he met while traveling to Karachi, Pakistan was a member of the Islamic based organization, Jamaat al Tabligh. c. Other Relevant Data The detainee telephoned his family from a market in Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee's family was not happy about him being in Afghanistan. The detainee heard about the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, from televions and radio announcements. The detainee knew that Osama bin Laden was a key suspect in the 11 September 2001 attacks. The detainee decided to leave Afghanistan after 11 September 2001. For two months the detainee tried to depart Afghanistan. The Afghanistan / Pakistan border was closed and the detainee could not leave. The advancing Northern Alliance forced the detainee to leave Kandahar, Afghanistan for the Tora Bora Mountains of Afghanistan. The leader of the detainees group, who had ties to Jamaat al Tabligh, was killed in the air striked they encountered while the detainee was surrendering from the Tora Bora Mountains of Afghanistan. The detainee surrendered after twenty-eight days in the Tora Bora Mountains of Afghanistan. The detainee was wounded during an air strike. The detainee was taken to an Afghan village for medical attention and recovery. Afghan Forces pladed the detainee in Baghram Prison, Afghanistan after he recovered from his wounds. Following detention in Baghram Prison, Afghanistan the detainee was moved to a prison in Kandahar, Afghanistan with a final prison destination of Camp Delta, Guantanamo Bay Cuba

The following primary factors favor release or transfer

a.	The detainee stated that any comments he made regarding a Moslem's duty to Jihad and the desire to kill nonbelievers and Americans had been mistranslated. The detainee had simply repeated an Islamic hadith stating that Moslems should seek to rid the world of infidels and kill Jews. The detainee never advocated violence and would only kill Americans in self-defense. (FN16)
b.	The detainee wishes no ill will to Americans as they want peace all over the world.
c.	The detainee stated that the killing of innocent people, especially women and children, is against the teachings of Islam. The detainee stated that if you have an enemy you fight the enemy and not make war against civilians.

Enemy COmbatant election form

The Enemy COmbatant election form filled out during his pre-hearing interviews, on 26 July 2006 stated:

"The detainee was very cooperative, attentive, and cordial throughout the interview."

Response to the factors and to Board questioning

His Presiding Officer referred to him as "Sultan".

• Al Anazi denied traveling to Afghanistan for jihad. He denied every traveling to Afghanistan at all. He confirmed he had traveled to Pakistan. But he didn't go there in order to then enter Afghanistan. He said he traveled to Pakistan for medical treatment and tourism.
• Al Anazi clarified: "It was not a medical treatment. It was something like magic, something about magic."

When I went to Pakistan, it wasn't for something different. It was just magic. It was like a treatment; that's what they call it. It's like learning how to do magic."

• Al Anazi disputed that he didn't tell his family his travel plans. He stated he had told them he was going to Pakistan for medical treatment, and he stated: "I didn't leave until they agreed and gave me permission to leave."
• Al Anazi confirmed that he left Saudi Arabia, through Baghram Template:sic and Abo Template:sic Dabbi Template:sic, on his way to Karachi, Pakistan -- because it was cheaper that way. He disputed that he then traveled from Pakistan to Kandahar, or Jalalabad, or to Kabul, or anywhere in Afghanistan.
• Al Anazi disputed that he met a member of Jamaat al Tabligh who convinced him to travel to Afghanistan.
• Al Anazi confirmed that he had heard, however, of Jamaat al Tabligh.
• Al Anazi disputed that his name could be on an al Qaida list of bank accounts. He disputed having a bank account. He suggested that there was a problem with someone whose name was similar to his.
• Al Anazi disputed that he called his family from a market in Kabul, and repeated that he had never entered Afghanistan. He confirmed he had called his family from Pakistan.
• When his Presiding Officer was curious as to why the allegations against him contained so many references to his presence in Afghanistan, and asked Al Anazi if he could explain that, he responded:

Yes I will. When the United Stated got attacked the United States advertised that, if any Arab person is caught and handed over, there would be a reward of about $5,000 to do so. Aft the same time, I was kidnapped by either an Afghani or a Pakistani. They thought they hit the jackpot when they sold me as an Arab person because they were poor people. They kidnapped and took me to Afghanistan and entered Afghanistan with me. When I entered Afghanistan, they put me in jail for about a month. There were some other prisoners in that prison. Some of the prisoners were Pakistani and others were Arabs. The Afghanis hit me many times and asked me to say and admit that I was with the prisoners there in that prison and that we were from Tora Bora. The tortures there were so big. We were tortured during the day, in the evening, and in the afternoon. You almost have to say that you are Usama bin Laden so they would stop torturing you.

• Al Anazi said he believed his torturers were Afghanis. Some wore civilian clothes and some wore police uniforms.
• Al Anazi was asked why, when he was handed over to the American in Bagram, he didn't simply tell them the truth. He replied that he did tell them the truth, but that they didn't believe him, and that they too tortured him in order to get him to repeat the story his Afghani captors had coached him to repeat.
• Al Anazi confirmed that, in Guantanamo he had never repeated the story that he traveled to Afghanistan for jihad, that he had always told his interrogators the true story.
• Al Anazi confirmed that was aware of the attacks of September 11, 2001, from TV and radio, and was aware that Usama bin Laden was a key suspect.
• Al Anazi said he saw the attacks on TV the day after it happened, and his kidnapping was just a short time after that.
• Al Anazi disputed that he had ever been turned over to Pakistani forces. He disputed he was captured in a group. He was alone when he was kidnapped.
• Al Anazi estimated the gang who kidnapped him turned over about 20 captives to the Americans at the same time they turned him over.

Board Member	Sultan, what was the illness for which you were receiving medical treatment?
Detainee	I told the interrogators, during interrogation, that I was receiving more of a magic treatment. They performed magic on me.
Board Member	What was the purpose for performing magic on you? You seem like a perfectly healthy guy just by looking at you.
Detainee	This magic that they perform are more for preventing you from getting married. They performed this magic to prevent me from getting married for the rest of my life.

• Al Anazi confirmed that he had not been wounded, and that he never received any treatment for a wound, or a wound-like ailment.
• Al Anazi confirmed that he had heard about al Qaida. He said he heard about it, for the first time, from his initial kidnappers. However, he knew nothing about al Qaida.
• Al Anazi confirmed that he did not like bloodshed. He disputed that he ever said he would kill Americans, even in self-defense.
• Al Anazi repeated that he believes that he does not hold any ill will to America, because he believes they want peace and security all over the world.
• Al Anazi confirmed that he believes killing innocent people is against the teaching of Islam.

Closing statement

I just have one thing. I don't have any ill will in my heart for the Americans. I've been told that I'm from al Qaida. I deny all allegations that were said against me. If I had anything against the Americans Template:sic, the Americans were close to me in Saudi Arabia. I had a good reputation in Saudi Arabi. I have never been in prison in Saudi Arabia. This is just for your own information. Thank you.

Board recommendations

In early September 2007 the Department of Defense released two heavily redacted memos, from his Board, to Gordon England, the Designated Civilian Official. The Board's recommendation was unanimous The Board's recommendation was redacted. England authorized his transfer on August 14 2006.

On unredacted paragraph in the memos stated:

The Board reviewed and considered the associated SCI material for this case and considered it relevant but redundant. This information is being forwarded separately via JWICS to the Director, OARDEC.

Repatriation

According to The Saudi Repatriates Report Al Anazi was one of sixteen men repatriated on December 14 2006.

References

Abdullah Muhammed Abdel Aziz

• Wikipedia:Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Abdullah Muhammed Abdel Aziz

Abdullah Muhammed Abdel Aziz is a citizen of Saudi Arabia held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detention camps, in Cuba. His Guantanamo Internee Security Number is 206. Joint Task Force Guantanamo counter-terrorism analysts report that he was born on September 8 1967, in Al Medina Menawa, Saudi Arabia.

Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor. Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.Template:POV-section

Initially the Bush Presidency asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush Presidency's definition of an enemy combatant.

Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Abdullah Muhammed Abdel Aziz's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 4 October 2004. The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. The detainee is associated with al Qaida and the Taliban:

1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan to receive weapons training in the summer of 2001.
2. The detainee received weapons training on the Kalishnikov rifle and PG machine gun Template:sic at a training camp outside Kabul, Afghanistan.
3. The detainee lived in a rest house used for billeting fighters in Kabul, Afghanistan.

b. The detainee supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces:

1. The detainee traveled to the frontlines near Konduz, Afghanistan.
2. The detainee was issued a Kalishnikov Template:sic rifle and ammunition.
3. The detainee traveled with Taliban fighters in a Taliban convoy to Mazar-E-Sharif.

Transcript

There is no record that chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

Administrative Review Board hearing

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Abdullah Muhammed Abdel Aziz's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 15 March 2005. The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

Transcript

Abdullah Muhammed Abdel Aziz attended this Board hearing. The Department of Defense released a five page summarized transcript.

Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Abdullah Muhammed Abdel Aziz's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 3 March 2006. The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

Board recommendations

In early September 2007 the Department of Defense released two heavily redacted memos, from his Board, to Gordon England, the Designated Civilian Official. The Board's recommendation was unanimous The Board's recommendation was redacted. England authorized transfer on August 14 2006.

References