Sa ad Ibraham Sa ad Al Bidna

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Template:Infobox War on Terror detainee

Sa ad Ibraham Sa ad Al Bidna is a citizen of Wikipedia:Saudi Arabia, who was held in Wikipedia:extrajudicial detention in the Wikipedia:United States Wikipedia:Guantanamo Bay detainment camps, in Wikipedia:Cuba. Al Bidna's Guantanamo detainee ID number was 337. The Department of Defense reports that Al Bidna was born in 1978, in Wikipedia:Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Al Bidna was repatriated on June 25, 2006.

Background

During his Guantanamo stay al Bidna described his family as wealthy enough to employ multiple servants. He said his father was a retired teacher. In an interview following his release from Guantanamo al Bidna said that he only went as far as primary school. Wikipedia:Andy Worthington, the author of Wikipedia:The Guantanao Files, noted that in interviews following his release al Bidna acknowledged that he had traveled to Afghanistan for jihad, after being motivated to do so by fatwas issued by radical sheikhs. According to Worthington: “The most complete explanation of the sheikh's role was put forward by 23-year-old Saad al-Bidna.” Al Bidna had denied traveling to Afghanistan, while he was still in Guantanamo. He had claimed he spent the three missing months on a sex, drug and alcohol binge in Mashad, Iran.

Status reviews

Multiple US agencies reviewed al Bidna's status.

Combatant Status Review Tribunal

[[Wikipedia:Image:Trailer where CSR Tribunals were held.jpg|thumb|Wikipedia:Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large Wikipedia:RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor. Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.]] Template:wikisource

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Wikipedia:Geneva Conventions to captives from Wikipedia:the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct Wikipedia:competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of Wikipedia:prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense set up the Wikipedia:Office for the Administrative Review of Detained Enemy Combatants (OARDEC), an independent agency. In late 2004 and January 2005 Wikipedia:Combatant Status Review Tribunals organized by OARDEC reviewed the status of the 558 remaining captives. Al Bidna's review took place in late October or early November of 2004. A Summary of Evidence memo drafted for his CSR Tribunal listed 7 unclassified allegations offered to justify his continued detention.

Transcript

Al Bidna chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal. The Department of Defense published a fifteen page transcript. Al Bidna's Tribunal confirmed he had properly been determined to be an enemy combatant.

2005 Administrative Review Board hearing

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Wikipedia:Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat—or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

A two page Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for his 2005 hearing. The 2005 memo offered 8 "primary factors [that] favor continued detention" and 3 "primary factors [that] favor release or transfer".

Transcript

Al Bidna chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing. The Department of Defense publsihed a nine page transcript.

2006 Administrative Review Board hearing

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Wikipedia:Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat—or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

A three page Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for his 2005 hearing. The 2006 memo offered 13 "primary factors [that] favor continued detention" and 6 "primary factors [that] favor release or transfer".

There is no record al Bidna chose to attend his 2006 review.

Formerly secret JTF-GTMO assessment

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In April 2011 whistleblower organization Wikipedia:WikiLeaks published formerly secret assessments, signed by Guantanamo camp commandants, for almost all the Guantanamo captives. A "Recommendation for Continued Detention under DoD Control" was leaked, dated January 26, 2006, signed by camp commandant Wikipedia:Jay W. Hood. The recommendation was eight pages long, and recommended his continued detention. He was, however, repatriated to Saudi custody just five months later, where he was enrolled in a Wikipedia:Saudi jihadist rehabilitation program. In November 2011, historian Wikipedia:Andy Worthington, author of Wikipedia:The Guantanamo Files, published his analysis of what the formerly secret JTF-GTNO analysis added to the public knowledge of al Bidna's case. Worthington noted that the JTF_GTMO assessment characterized al Bidna's account of himself as "inconsistent". He noted that JTF-GTMO analysts suspected his passport may have been forged

Worthington noted that the JTF-GTMO assessment placed weight on al Bidna`s meeting with Wikipedia:Wa’el al-Jabiri, who they characterized as a facilitator for the charity Wikipedia:Al Wafa -- a charity the Bush administration listed as having suspected ties to terrorism. Worthington noted that an association with al Jafiri was offered as a justification for the continued detention of Wikipedia:Ibrahim al-Nasir

Repatriation

Al Bidna was repatriated with thirteen other men, on June 25, 2006.

Upon his return to Suadi Arabia al Bidna was enrolled in the Wikipedia:Saudi rehabilitation program.

In October 2006, four months after his repatriation, Al Bidna offered an account of his activities in the months leading up to his capture that was at odds with the account he offered while in Guantanamo. In Guantanamo he described living in Wikipedia:Mashad, Wikipedia:Iran, in September, October and November of 2001, indulging in a three month sex, drug and alcohol binge, where he enjoyed a series of brief term marriages with approximately a dozen Iranian women. In Guantanamo he denied entering Afghanistan, and explained his December 2, 2001 capture in Quetta to travel to Pakistan for medical treatment after ruining his digestion through his long binge.

In an October 2006 interview with Wikipedia:al Riyadh magazine he acknowledged traveling to Afghanistan after being influenced by a Wikipedia:fatwa to defend muslims there. However, he described quidkly being disillusioned when he arrived and realized that the conflict was a muslim on muslim conflict.

The [brief] period I spent there did not enable me see the full picture, and I did not have the knowledge to distinguish real jihad from other actions that are [only] called jihad. But I did see that there were devout people there. Some of them were young men who came [to Afghanistan] out of youthful enthusiasm and [due to their] scant religious knowledge, or were influenced by certain fatwas published by various religious scholars, or [were influenced by] by false images, which were not free of exaggeration, of the situation in Afghanistan. This was the kind of thing that prompted me to set out without informing or asking my family, and without considering the concept of legitimate jihad, its conditions and its rules.