Difference between revisions of "Omar Rajab Amin"

Latest revision as of 20:50, 22 August 2012

Omar Rajab Amin is a Kuwaiti who was captured and detained at the United States Guantanamo Bay detention camps, in Cuba.^[1] Amin's Guantanamo Internment Serial Number was 65.^[2] The Department of Defense reports that Amin was born on June 14, 1967, in Kuwait City, Kuwait.

Amin graduated from the University of Nebraska in 1992.^[3]

Combatant Status Review[edit]

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in small trailer, the same width, but shorter, than a mobile home. The Tribunal's President sat in the big chair. The detainee sat with their hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor in the white, plastic garden chair.^[4][5] A one way mirror behind the Tribunal President allowed observers to observe clandestinely. In theory the open sessions of the Tribunals were open to the press; three chairs were reserved for members of the press.^[6] In practice, most Tribunals went unobserved; the Tribunal only intermittently told the press that Tribunals were being held, and when they did they kept the detainee's identities secret. Only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed^[6][4][5][6] Navy photo by Photographer’s Mate 1st Class Christopher Mobley

Main article: Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Originally the Bush (WP) Presidency asserted that captives apprehended in the wars for capitalism and oil, known as the "war on terror" were not covered by the Geneva Conventions, and could be held indefinitely, without charge, and without an open and transparent review of the justifications for their detention.^[7] They were not offered the protections afforded by criminal law either, leaving them in a legal limbo through years of detention. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligations, and to keep the Geneva Conventions at arms' length, the concept of competent tribunals was invented, tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

The Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (WP). The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants, again to avoid the Geneva Conventions standards -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant, further attempting to institutionalize a standard that stood against the consensus of international law.

Critics mounted legal challenges to this policy. Justice James Robertson ruled that the United States was obliged under article 5 of the Wikipedia:third Geneva Conventionthird Geneva Convention to treat all prisoners as lawful combatants, who would be entitled to prisoner of war status, unless a "competent tribunal" had determined that they were not lawful combatants.

The policies of the tribunals themselves were also challenged by the Judicial branch. In 2004 the United States Supreme Court ruled, in Rasul v. Bush, that Guantanamo captives were entitled to being informed of the allegations justifying their detention, and were entitled to try to refute them.

The released prisoners are arrogantly, even absurdly called "No longer enemy combatants" (WP); an attempt to make numerous issues, including illegal arrest and holding without trial, disappear in plain sight.

Amin agreed to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.^[1]

Amin was among the 60% of prisoners who participated in the tribunal hearings.^[8] A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for the tribunal of each detainee. The memo for his hearing lists the following allegations:^[1]:^[1]

a The detainee is an al Qaida and/or Taliban supporter:

1. The detainee traveled from Kuwait, through the United Arab Emirates to Bahrain, to Iran, and finally to Kabul, Afghanistan on 2 October 01.
2. The detainee is a member of the non-governmental organization, (NGO) Kuwaiti Joint Relief Committee.
3. The Kuwaiti Joint Relief Committee is suspected of providing funding and travel document for mujahidin. Possible links to al-Qaida.
4. The detainee admits raising $10,000 (USD) and transporting it to Afghanistan.
5. The detainee admitted fleeing with others due to the "opposition" (Northern Alliance) taking over the city.
6. The detainee was listed on a document recovered in safehouse raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi Pakistan.
7. During the raid on the Karachi safehouses; armed gunmen fought with police; firearms and grenades were seized; and police and security forces were injured by gunfire.
8. The detainee was listed on a document as being a member of the Mujahidin Brigade in Bosnia.

Opening statement[edit]

Amin asked: "Is it possible to see this evidence, in order to refute it?"

His Tribunal's President claimed "The classified information cannot be made available to you for reasons of national security. You may see the unclassified evidence."

Amin then said he was concerned about other information, which was not taken from his own interrogations. He was concerned about false denunciation of him because he was from a country he believed other detainees were prejudiced against.

Response to the "Summary of Evidence"[edit]

Amin completely denied that he was an al Qaeda and/or Taliban supporter. He said he had been opposed to the Taliban's actions, like implement Sharia law and destroying the Buddhist statues. He said he was very surprised to discover this was one of the allegation against him.

Amin asserted he was a charity worker. He asserted he had never traveled to Afghanistan, Iran or Pakistan. And he said: "I never transferred even one dollar into the accounts of any of these people."

Amin said his name was not on any American "black lists".

Amin specifically denied that he had traveled to Kabul on October 2, 2001. Iran had been his final destinations, and he had not traveled through Bahrain.

Amin said he was concerned by the 3 million Afghan refugees who were trying to flee, or who had succeeded in fleeing Afghanistan for Iran and Pakistan. He had worked with refugees for one and a half in Croatia and six years in Bosnia. His trip to Iran was a fact finding one to determine the best way his charity could help the refugees. He said they had learned it was better not to count on media reports, but rather to have someone trusted see for themselves.

Amin said he was carrying $10,000 that he planned to distribute on this particular trip. One third of these funds were his, and the remainder from other members of his family.

Amin said his interrogators had asked him why he had entered Afghanistan when he should have known that the Americans were about to invade. He said he had not realized that the American were about to invade, and that if he had realized this he certainly would not have crossed the border to continue his fact-finding trip. "Also, if I had known that they were not going to apply the Geneva Convention, Template:Sic especially to people working in charity organizations, I would not have gone in."

Amin said he always repeated to his interrogators a statement from the Secretary of Defense:

"He who thinks we will fire a couple of cruise missiles to Afghanistan is mistaken. This was is going to be a political war, an economical war, and information war and an intelligence war."

He pointed out that the Secretary of Defense's statement, which had been "repeated by all American officials" -- did not say it was going to be a military effort. The Secretary of Defense said this was going to be an unconventional war.

He said he thought: "The Americans were not stupid. They were not going to commit all their troops to go into Afghanistan to die, like the Russians and the British.

Amin confirmed that he was a member of the [[Kuwaiti Joint Relief Committee from 1993 to 1999—1993-94 in Croatia, 1995-99 in Bosnia. But he didn't go to Afghanistan on behalf of the Kuwaiti Joint Relief Committee.

In response to the suspicion that the Kuwait Joint Relief Committee was suspected of providing funding and travel documents for Mujahidin, Amin pointed out that the Americans were also in Bosnia, from 1995, and:"No one ever gave this committee any trouble or said anything about their activities in Bosnia. On the contrary, the Americans would come and meet with us and with the head of the committee. We were given many thanks from the Bosnian government, the American government and the Croatian government, for the work this Joint Relief Committee was doing in Bosnia.

"No one ever voiced any opposition against what we were doing until September 11th. Only after September 11th is this point being brought up.

"If you look at the wording of this statement it says "suspected" or "possible." Nothing concrete. It's all speculation. Only after September 11th did it become like this. It's not normal."

Amin acknowledged fleeing with others due to the Norther Alliance taking over the city. He did flee, but because residents of the city were killing Arabs. Amin said it was thanks to his local interpreter that he had a heads-up that the city was no longer safe for him.

Amin said that the allegation that his name was listed on a document recovered in safehouse raids was a new one to him. It had never been brought up during any of his interrogations. He said the allegation didn't make sense because: "I know the interrogators make it a point to talk about ever little or big thing that comes to their attention."

In response to the allegation that he was listed as being a member of Mujahadin Brigade in Bosnia Amin said that his interrogators kept asking him about this for three years.

"One time, the interrogator had a document in his hand and was reading from it and said that I was a member of Mujahadin Brigade in the Bosnian Army from either 1992 to 1993 or 1993 to 1994.

"I answered him by asking him if he knew where I was in the year 1992. I told him I was in Nebraska and I was graduating. From 1992 to 1993, I was in Kuwait, working for the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research.

Amin then offered the Tribunal the same explanation he offered his interrogator as to why a Bosnian document would state he was in Bosnia, when he wasn't. He suggested it was due to his marriage to a Bosnian woman he loved in 1994:

"When we got married it was a religious ceremony. It was a legitimate marriage but I didn't have a Bosnian citizenship at that time, so we weren't able to register the marriage with the Bosnian government. I was living in Kuwait, so I was not concerned with getting a Bosnian citizenship.

"The problem was that my wife got pregnant during the war. At that time, if your wife was pregnant and you did not have a Bosnian citizenship, the child would not be legitimate. They would register the child in the mother's name, not the father's. To me, this was important.

"At the same time, how could I go to Kuwait at that time to register my wife and son there? I did not have any documents or paperwork with me. The only way to register my son, legitimately with my last name, was for me to become a citizen. Now, I had to obtain a Bosnian citizenship, and I had the right to do this because I was living in Bosnia, married to a Bosnian citizen.

So, Amin started the process of becoming a Bosnian citizen, had a second, civil Bosnian marriage, so his child would be legitimate, and moved his wife and child to Kuwait. Then, in 1996, when he was working as an aid worker in Bosnia, the Police asked him to meet with them. The war was over. They told him he had the right to complete the process of becoming a Bosnian citizen. Amin said he didn't take it very seriously. He agreed. "I took the paper and registered, but unfortunately they gave me the citizenship through the Bosnian Army.

Amin said that this would be easy to verify. The American government and the Bosnian government formed a committee to investigate some Bosnian citizenship officials who had finalized the paperwork of new Bosnian citizens as if they were entitled to their citizenship for service in the Bosnian Army. These officials had charged citizenship applicants the normal 1500 Deutschmarks citizenship fee, and then pocketed it. Applicants for citizenship who had served in the Bosnian Army didn't have to pay the citizenship fee.

Concerning the allegation that there was a shootout during a raid on the Karachi safehouse Amin pointed out that he had never been to Pakistan. His capture was at the Pakistan border. He didn't actually enter Pakistan.

Amin asked about one of the unclassified documents the Recorder had gathered and submitted to the Tribunal—a document from the White House that listed individuals and organizations that the US Treasury said were believed to be tied to terrorism. Amin's name wasn't on it. Neither was the name of the Kuwaiti Joint Relief Committee. A single individual's name was highlighted on the list, a Mr. Yasin Al Qadi. Amin said:

"I don't know him He never worked with us and he's not even the head of the department. I gave you the

names of the Kuwaiti government. When they came here, they brought a list of the names of the people working, and that's not one."

Amin was asked why he described the Northern Alliance as the "opposition". Amin explained it was natural, when living in a city ruled by one party to describe those attacking the city as the "opposition" -- it did not indicate that he had taken sides.

First annual Administrative Review Board[edit]

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".^[9]

Following the Supreme Court's ruling that prisoners the Department of Defense set up the Office for the Administrative Review of Detained Enemy Combatants.^[7] Gul attended his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.^[10]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board (WP) hearings.^[11] The US government, careful to avoid the standards of international law, made a point of declaring that Administrative Review Boards were not authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, as this would have invoked the Geneva Convention standards. They further distanced the ARB boards from international consideration by distancing the ARB boards from the CSRT and the government's own definition of "enemy combatant", by not authorizing the ARB boards to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were set on a purely opportunistic venture to assess the government's self interest, in the manner of the villain holding a gun to a hostage's head and saying, "don't make me do this". "If we do the right thing and release these prisoners, the board asked, "will we be inconveniencing ourselves?" And so they considered whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.^[12]
A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Omar Rajab Amin's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 17 May 2005.^[13] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

The following primary factors favor continued detention

a. Commitment

1. The detainee testified he raised $10,000 before he went to Afghanistan.
2. The detainee traveled to Iran and Afghanistan unofficially because he knew he would not receive permission to travel to do charitable work for refugees.
3. The detainee said on September 28, 2001, he began his travel by air from Kuwait to Dubai, United Arab Emirates, on to Bahrain, then to Meshut, Iran. He then traveled by taxi from Meshut to the Afghanistan border. He crossed through using his Kuwaiti passport then took another taxi to Herat, Afghanistan. He took a plane from Herat to Kabul, Afghanistan.
4. The detainee said he did not travel through Bahrain enroute to Afghanistan.
5. The detainee claimed that not one day in his life had he traveled to Afghanistan, Iran or Pakistan.
6. The detainee claimed he told his wife, mother and sisters that he was going to Afghanistan. He said he contacted his family from Herat and Kabul.
7. The detainee's family said the detainee did not mention that he was going to Afghanistan. He told them he was going to the Pakistan/Afghanistan border and he called them from Pakistan.
8. In Kabul the detainee met with a Taliban secretary to arrange a meeting with the official in charge of refugees.
9. The detainee said he was in Afghanistan for 30 to 45 days before the bombing began. During that time he gave money to orphans.
10. The detainee said he had been in Afghanistan for two days before the bombing began. After about one month he traveled alone and without his passport toward the Pakistan border. He met two Arabs along the way and continued on with them. All three were arrested by Pakistani authorities upon reaching the border.
11. The detainee said he paid an Afghani to bring him to the Pakistan border. That Afghani brought the detainee to the Pakistan Army who turned him over to the United States.

b. Connection/Associations

1. After graduating from a college in Nebraska the detainee worked for the Kuwaiti Joint Relief Committee. He accompanied another Kuwaiti Joint Relief Committee official to Zagreb, Croatia.
2. That official facilitated another detainee's travel to Afghanistan.
3. The detainee said he was associated with Al Haramayan and it was recognized by the Kuwaiti Ministry of Social Affairs.
4. The Kuwaiti Joint Relief Committee and Al Haramayan provided financial support to former Arab Mujahadeen in Bosnia.
5. The detainee was listed as a suspected member of Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyah in Italy.
6. According to the United States Department of Homeland Security, Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya is designated as a foreign terrorist organization.
7. The detainee's name appeared on a foreign government service list of members of the Mujahadeen Brigade in Bosnia. The document showed he joined the Brigade in 1993.
8. The detainee said he joined the Mujahadeen Brigade (which required paying money) so he could automatically become a citizen of Bosnia.
9. The detainee was seen several times at the home of a Kuwaiti who facilitated other Kuwaitis travel to Afghanistan.
10. This Kuwaiti facilitator is a terrorist financier. He traveled to Afghanistan in 1999 and 2001 to meet with Usama bin Laden to give him large amounts of money.
11. The detainee's name was on a listing of 324 Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.
12. According to a foreign government service, the detainee is associated with the "official spokesman for al Qaida organization".
13. The detainee was seen at the Hamza guesthouse in Kabul, Afghanistan. Others who stayed at this guesthouse had advance knowledge of the September 11 attacks on the United States.

c. Intent

The detainee traveled to Afghanistan at the beginning of the war to become a member of the forces of Usama Bin Laden.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was one of three men arrested at the scene for the murder of a fourth man. All four men were former members of El-Mujahid Brigade which fought with Bosnian Muslim forces.
2. The detainee said he worked for the Kuwaiti Joint Relief Committee in Zagreb, Croatia from 1993 to 1994. He worked for the same organization in Sarejevo, Bosnia, from 1994 until 1999. He then returned to Kuwait and was employed by the Kuwaiti Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor until 2001.
3. The detainee said he returned from Zagreb, Croatia in mid 1995 to work for the Kuwaiti government.
4. The detainee has provided conflicting information on the dates and locations of his employment.
5. The Kuwaiti government documents that the detainee began to work for them on 18 March 1996 as an agricultural supervisor in the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor delegated the detainee to the Islamic International Charitable Organization on September 9, 1997, for one year.

The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee said if he is released, he just wants to go back to Kuwait and be with his family. He is angry about his situation, but it would not be appropriate for him to go out and express his anger.

b. The detainee said he is not Mujahadeen and he never went to Kosovo or Chechnya.

c. The detainee denied he was armed or involved in any military action or training while in Afghanistan.

d. The detainee stated he had no plans to fight against United States forces and has never fought against United States forces.

e. The detainee denies being an al Qaida and/or Taliban supporter.

Enemy Combatant Election Form[edit]

According to the Enemy Combatant Election Form filled out by Omar Rajab Amin's Assisting Military Officer he did not choose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.^[14] His Assisting Military Officer told his Board that the translator who accompanied him told him that he confirmed he spoke the same language as Omar Rajab Amin. Omar Rajab Amin's transcript does not record his Assisting Military Officer commenting on his demeanor.

Second annual Administrative Review Board[edit]

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Omar Rajab Amin's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 15 March 2006.^[15] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

The following primary factors favor continued detention

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he wanted to try and help orphans and refugees in Afghanistan. The detainee decided to travel to Afghanistan for two months. The detainee raised approximately 7,000 United States Dollars from friends and family and received a 3,000 United States Dollars donation from a Kuwait City mosque.
2. On 28 September 2001 the detainee traveled from Kuwait to Dubai. He stayed in Dubai for almost two days. The detainee then traveled from Dubai to Bahrain and stayed for two days. The detainee then traveled from Bahrain to Meshut Iran. From Meshut the detainee traveled to the Afghanistan border and crossed the border using his Kuwaiti passport. On 2 October 2001 the detainee traveled to Herat, Afghanistan. The detainee then traveled from Herat to Kabul, Afghanistan.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated he was the deputy director for the Kuwaiti Joint Refugee Committee in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
2. The detainee said that the charity with which he was associated, al Haramayan, was recognized by the Kuwaiti Ministry of Social Affairs.
3. The Kuwaiti Joint Relief Committee and al Haramayan allegedly provided financial support to former Arab Mujahedin in Bosnia.
4. The detainee's name appeared on a foreign government service list of members of the Mujahedin Brigade in Bosnia. The document showed the detainee joined the Brigade in 1993.
5. The detainee said the reason he would be listed as a member of the Mujahedin Brigade was because he bought the citizenship. The detainee said the person he worked with probably provided false documents, showing that the detainee was part of the military in 1993, in order to get the detainee citizenship.
6. The detainee was identified as a close friend of a Mujahedin fighter and leader in Bosnia.
7. A foreign government service stated that this Mujahedin fighter has possible involvement in war crimes in Bosnia.
8. The detainee was seen several times at the home of a Kuwaiti who facilitated other Kuwaitis' travel to Afghanistan.
9. This Kuwaiti facilitator is a terrorist financier. He traveled to Afghanistan in 1999 and 2001 to meet with Usama bin Laden to give him large amounts of money.
10. A source said the detainee looks like an Afghan individual he saw in the abu Hamza guest house] in Kabul.
11. The abu Hamza guest house was a safe house for Saudi Arabians and Yemeni al Qaida members.
12. An al Wafa member said that he was visited by a Kuwaiti group headed by the detainee at the end of September 2001.
13. The al Wafa member was a leader of Mujahedin fighters in Afghanistan.
14. Al Wafa has been placed on the terrorism exclusion list. An organization can be placed on the terrorism exclusion list if the Secretary of State finds that the organization commits or incites to commit, under circumstances indicating an intention to cause deaths or serious bodily injury, a terrorist activity; prepares or plans a terrorist activity; gathers information on potential targets for terrorist activity; or provides material support to further terrorist activity.
15. A source stated that he met the detainee at the Saudi Ambassador's guest house.
16. The source also stated that he (the source) was in Afghanistan in charge of the al Wafa office in Kabul, Afghanistan.
17. The manager of the Saudi Ambassador's guest house used to take people to and from the front lines.
18. The manager of the Saudi Ambassador's guest house has been in Afghanistan for close to 15 years and he has traveled to Bosnia and Chechnya for jihad. The manager is one of Usama bin Laden's most trusted people and reported directly to Usama bin Laden.
19. An al Haramayan delegation member saw two people, including the detainee, passing by and asked them to take him with them. The delegation member states that he stayed with these two individuals for one month and six days.
20. The detainee's name was on a listing of 324 Arabic names, aliases and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee said that in response to the killing of an Arab male, the Bosnian police rounded up a group of Arabic males indiscriminately and began questioning them. The detainee said he was detained for about twenty-four hours and then released without being charged.
2. The detainee met with a Taliban secretary and told him he wanted to meet the official in charge of refugees. The detainee was told the official was not there so the detainee scheduled a meeting in three days.
3. According to a source, the three travelers, including the detainee, met with a Pakistani National. They requested this individual take them to their respective consular officers. The individual agreed to do this for a fee of 100 United States Dollars. After a short period of time, the Pakistani police arrived and apprehended the three.
4. The detainee stated that he turned himself over to the Pakistan Army and that he wanted to go to the Kuwaiti Embassy.
5. The detainee was transferred to United States custody on 27 December 2001 from Peshawar, Pakistan.

The following primary factors favor release or transfer

a. The detainee said he is happy that the United States helped his country (Kuwait) protect itself from Iraq. The detainee said he never had the intention to harm Americans.

b. The detainee said he had never fired a gun except for a very small gun. He said it was the type of gun to kill a mouse.

c. The detainne denied being involved with the Mujahedin Brigade of the Bosnian Army and has no association or knowledge of the Mujahedin Brigade.

d. The detainee said he had never served in the Kuwaiti military as has never associated with Mujahedin.

e. The detainee denies visiting the offices of al Haramayan. The detainee also denies attending meetings of lectures of al Haramayan, or attending any meetings of lectures at which al Haramayan representatives were present. The detainee is unaware of any ties between al Haramayan and any extremist or terrorist organizations or individuals.

f. The detainee said he was in Kuwait on 11 September 2001. When asked for his reaction to the bombings in New York and at the Pentagon, he felt they had placed Islam in danger.

g. The detainee claims he has no knowledge of the activities of his traveling companions while in Afghanistan.

h. The detainee stated that he never talked to a Taliban government official.

i. The detainee said that he had never been to the Saudi Ambassador's guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan.

j. A source stated that the detainee said he was coming from Kabul and that the detainee was there to help poor people.

k. The detainee denied that he had any weapons training or was in any training camps while in Afghanistan.

l. The detainee stated that he never fought against the Northern Alliance or the United States military.

m. The detainee denied any association with Usama bin Laden.

n. The detainee denied ever having been a member of al Qaida.

o. The detainee did not believe in following Usama bin Laden.

p. The detainee stated he had no plans to fight against United States FOrces.

q. The detainee wishes to return home to Kuwait upon leaving Cuba.

Board recommendations[edit]

In early September 2007 the Department of Defense released two heavily redacted memos, from his Board, to Gordon England, the Designated Civilian Official.^[16][17] The Board's recommendation was unanimous The Board's recommendation was redacted. The memos regarding Omar Rajab Amin's transfer were thirteen pages long. England authorized his transfer on June 26, 2006.

Template:Al-Odah

Return to Kuwait[edit]

The Washington Post reported that Amin would be returned to Kuwait.^[18]Template:dead link^[19] The Emir of Kuwait requested release of the two Kuwaiti prisoners, Amin and Abdullah Kamel Al Kandari.

Acquittal confirmed[edit]

On May 29, 2007 the Miami Herald reported that a Kuwaiti appeals court had upheld the acquittals of Amin and Al Kandari.^[20]Template:dead link

References[edit]

External links[edit]

• ORAL ARGUMENT SCHEDULED FOR DECEMBER 2, 2002 Nos. 02-5251, 02-5284 ..., ACLU

Template:WoTPrisoners

Template:Infobox War on Terror detainee