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− | + | Since the 1970s, the CIA has engaged in multiple operations in Afghanistan. | |
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− | + | ==Afghanistan 1979== | |
+ | {{see|Operation Cyclone}} | ||
+ | ===Intelligence analysis=== | ||
+ | The CIA National Foreign Assessment Center completed work on a report entitled "Afghanistan: Ethnic Divergence and Dissidence" in May 1979, although it was not formally published until March 1980. It is not known if the information was readily available to policymakers at the time of the December 1979 invasion.<ref name=NSAEBB57-01>{{citation | ||
+ | | author = National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency | ||
+ | | contribution = Afghanistan: Ethnic Diversity and Dissidence | ||
+ | | date = 1 March 1980 | ||
+ | | url =http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/us1.pdf | ||
+ | | volume = George Washington University National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 57 | ||
+ | | title = September 11 Sourcebooks, Volume II, Afghanistan: Lessons of the Last War. U.S. Analysis of the Soviet War in Afghanistan: Declassified | ||
+ | }}</ref> | ||
− | + | Tribal [[insurgency]], according to this report, began in 1978, with the installation of a pro-Soviet government. Even though the government tilted toward the Soviet Union, the analysis said that many tribal groups, especially [[Uzbeks|Uzbek]], saw the government as ethnically [[Pashtun people|Pashtun]], with hostility on ethnic and political grounds. | |
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− | + | ===Covert action=== | |
+ | A 2002 article by [[Michael Rubin]] stated that in the wake of the [[Iranian Revolution]], the United States sought rapprochement with the Afghan government—a prospect that the USSR found unacceptable due to the weakening Soviet leverage over the regime. Thus, the Soviets intervened to preserve their influence in the country.<ref>Rubin, Michael, "Who is Responsible for the Taliban?", Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2002). http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2002/issue1/mrubin.pdf</ref> According to Vance's close aide Marshall Shulman "the State Department worked hard to dissuade the Soviets from invading."<ref name="thenation.com">{{cite web|first=Eric |last=Alterman |url=http://www.thenation.com/article/blowback-prequel |title='Blowback,' the Prequel |publisher=The Nation |date=October 25, 2001 |accessdate=December 30, 2010}}</ref> In February 1979, U.S. Ambassador [[Adolph Dubs|Adolph "Spike" Dubs]] was murdered in Kabul after Afghan security forces burst in on his kidnappers. The U.S. then reduced bilateral assistance and terminated a small military training program. All remaining assistance agreements were ended after the [[Soviet invasion of Afghanistan]]. Following the Soviet invasion, the United States supported diplomatic efforts to achieve a Soviet withdrawal. In addition, generous U.S. contributions to the refugee program in Pakistan played a major part in efforts to assist [[Afghan refugees]]. | ||
− | + | US National Security Advisor [[Zbigniew Brzezinski]], known for his hardline policies on the Soviet Union, initiated in 1979 a campaign supporting [[mujaheddin]] in Pakistan and [[Afghanistan]], which was run by [[Inter-Services Intelligence|Pakistani security services]] with financial support from the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] and Britain's [[MI6]].<ref>[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-17/brzezinski1.html Interview with Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski-(13/6/97).]</ref> This policy had the explicit aim of promoting radical [[Islamist]] and [[anti-Communist]] forces. [[Bob Gates]], in his book ''Out Of The Shadows'', wrote that Pakistan had been pressuring the United States for arms to aid the rebels for years, but that the Carter administration refused in the hope of finding a diplomatic solution to avoid war. Brzezinski seemed to have been in favor of the provision of arms to the rebels, while [[Cyrus Vance]]'s State Department, seeking a peaceful settlement, publicly accused Brzezinski of seeking to "revive" the [[Cold War]]. Brzezinski has stated that the United States provided communications equipment and limited financial aid to the mujahideen prior to the "formal" invasion, but only in response to the Soviet deployment of forces to Afghanistan and the 1978 coup, and with the intention of preventing further Soviet encroachment in the region.<ref name="“&rdquo">{{cite web|author=“” |url=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RGjAsQJh7OM&feature=channel |title=Brzezinski and the Afghan War Pt2 |publisher=YouTube |accessdate=July 10, 2010}}</ref> | |
+ | |||
+ | Years later, in a 1997 [[CNN]]/[[National Security Archive]] interview, Brzezinski detailed the strategy taken by the Carter administration against the Soviets in 1979: | ||
<blockquote> | <blockquote> | ||
− | + | We immediately launched a twofold process when we heard that the Soviets had entered Afghanistan. The first involved direct reactions and [[International sanctions|sanctions]] focused on the Soviet Union, and both the State Department and the National Security Council prepared long lists of sanctions to be adopted, of steps to be taken to increase the international costs to the Soviet Union of their actions. And the second course of action led to my going to [[Pakistan]] a month or so after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, for the purpose of coordinating with the Pakistanis a joint response, the purpose of which would be to make the Soviets bleed for as much and as long as is possible; and we engaged in that effort in a collaborative sense with the [[Saudi Arabia|Saudis]], the [[Egypt]]ians, the British, the Chinese, and we started providing weapons to the Mujaheddin, from various sources again – for example, some Soviet arms from the Egyptians and the Chinese. We even got Soviet arms from the [[Czechoslovakia|Czechoslovak]] communist government, since it was obviously susceptible to material incentives; and at some point we started buying arms for the Mujaheddin from the Soviet army in Afghanistan, because that army was increasingly corrupt.<ref>[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-17/brzezinski1.html Full Text of Interview]</ref> | |
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</blockquote> | </blockquote> | ||
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− | + | [[Milt Bearden]] wrote in ''[[The Main Enemy]]''<!-- (p. 219)--> that Brzezinski, in 1980, secured an agreement from King [[Khalid of Saudi Arabia]] to match U.S. contributions to the Afghan effort dollar for dollar and that [[Bill Casey]] would keep that agreement going through the Reagan administration.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2006/01/21/the_cia_on_did_the_cia_create/ |title=The CIA on 'Did the CIA create Bin Laden?' |publisher=TPM Cafe |date=January 21, 2006 |first=John Stuart |last=Blackton |accessdate=January 27, 2012}}</ref> | |
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− | + | The Soviet invasion and occupation resulted in the deaths of as many as 2 million Afghans.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat2.htm#Afghanistan |first=Matthew |last=White |title=Death Tolls for the Major Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century |publisher=Users.erols.com |month=November |year=2010 |accessdate=December 31, 2010}}</ref> In 2010, Brzezinski defended the arming of the rebels in response, saying that it "was quite important in hastening the end of the conflict," thereby saving the lives of thousands of Afghans, but "not in deciding the conflict, because....even though we helped the mujaheddin, they would have continued fighting without our help, because they were also getting a lot of money from the Persian Gulf and the Arab states, and they weren't going to quit. They didn't decide to fight because we urged them to. They're fighters, and they prefer to be independent. They just happen to have a curious complex: they don't like foreigners with guns in their country. And they were going to fight the Soviets. Giving them weapons was a very important forward step in defeating the Soviets, and that's all to the good as far as I'm concerned." When he was asked if he thought it was the right decision in retrospect (given the Taliban's subsequent rise to power), he said: "Which decision? For the Soviets to go in? The decision was the Soviets', and they went in. The Afghans would have resisted anyway, and they were resisting. I just told you: in my view, the Afghans would have prevailed in the end anyway, 'cause they had access to money, they had access to weapons, and they had the will to fight."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.activistmagazine.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1110&Itemid=143 |first=Paul |last=Jay |title=The Afghan War and 'The Grand Chessboard' |publisher=The ACTivist magazine |date=January 13, 2010 |accessdate=December 31, 2010}}</ref> Likewise; [[Charles Wilson (Texas politician)|Charlie Wilson]] said: "The U.S. had nothing whatsoever to do with these people's decision to fight ... but we'll be damned by history if we let them fight with stones."<ref>Crile, 259–62.</ref> | |
− | |accessdate=2008- | + | |
− | | | + | The supplying of billions of dollars in arms to the Afghan mujahideen militants was one of the CIA's longest and most expensive covert operations.<ref name="time.com">Time Magazine, May 13, 2003, "The Oily Americans," http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,450997-2,00.html</ref> The CIA provided assistance to the fundamentalist insurgents through the [[Pakistan]]i secret services, [[Inter-Services Intelligence]] (ISI), in a program called [[Operation Cyclone]]. At least 3 billion in [[U.S. dollars]] were funneled into the country to train and equip troops with weapons. Together with similar programs by Saudi Arabia, Britain's [[MI6]] and [[Special Air Service|SAS]], Egypt, Iran, and the People's Republic of China,<ref>[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-17/brzezinski2.html Interview with Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski] – (13/6/97). Part 2.] Episode 17. Good Guys, Bad Guys. June 13, 1997.</ref> the arms included [[Stinger missiles]], shoulder-fired, antiaircraft weapons that they used against Soviet helicopters. Pakistan's secret service, [[Inter-Services Intelligence]] (ISI), was used as an intermediary for most of these activities to disguise the sources of support for the resistance. |
− | | | + | |
− | | | + | No Americans trained or had direct contact with the mujahideen.<ref>Bergen, Peter. Holy War, Inc. New York: Free Press, 2001. Pg.66</ref> The skittish CIA had fewer than 10 operatives in the region because it "feared it would be blamed, like in [[1954 Guatemalan coup d’état |Guatemala]]."<ref>The New Republic, "TRB FROM WASHINGTON, Back to Front" by Peter Beinart, October 8, 2001.</ref> Civilian personnel from the [[U.S. Department of State]] and the CIA frequently visited the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area during this time. |
− | | | + | |
− | | | + | With U.S. and other funding, the ISI armed and trained over 100,000 insurgents. On July 20, 1987, the [[Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan|withdrawal of Soviet troops]] from the country was announced pursuant to the negotiations that led to the [[Geneva Accords (1988)|Geneva Accords of 1988]],<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/ungomap/background.html |title=United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan – Background |publisher=United Nations |accessdate=November 21, 2008}}</ref> with the last Soviets leaving on February 15, 1989. |
+ | |||
+ | The early foundations of [[al-Qaida]] were allegedly built in part on relationships and weaponry that came from the billions of dollars in U.S. support for the Afghan mujahadin during the war to expel Soviet forces from that country.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.tompaine.com/articles/2006/10/27/we_arm_the_world.php |title=We Arm The World |work=TomPaine.com |date=October 27, 2006 |first=William D. |last=Hartung |accessdate=January 27, 2012 }}</ref> However, scholars such as [[Jason Burke]], [[Steve Coll]], [[Peter Bergen]], [[Christopher Andrew]], and [[Vasily Mitrokhin]] have argued that Bin Laden was "outside of CIA eyesight" and that there is "no support" in any "reliable source" for "the claim that the CIA funded bin Laden or any of the other Arab volunteers who came to support the mujahideen."<ref>Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda (Penguin, 2003), p59.</ref><ref>Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB and the World (Penguin, 2006), p579n48.</ref><ref>Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden (Penguin, 2004), p87.</ref><ref>Peter Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know (Free Press, 2006), pp60-1.</ref> | ||
+ | |||
+ | ==Afghanistan 1980== | ||
+ | ===Intelligence analysis=== | ||
+ | A memorandum spoke of continued tribal rivalries as adding to the resistance to the Soviets.<ref name=NSAEBB57-02>{{citation | ||
+ | | author = Office of Political Analysis, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency | ||
+ | | contribution = The Soviets and the Tribes of Southwest Asia | ||
+ | | date = 23 September 1980 | ||
+ | | url =http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/us2.pdf | ||
+ | | volume = George Washington University National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 57 | ||
+ | | title = September 11 Sourcebooks, Volume II, Afghanistan: Lessons of the Last War. U.S. Analysis of the Soviet War in Afghanistan: Declassified | ||
}}</ref> | }}</ref> | ||
− | + | ==Afghanistan 1985== | |
− | | | + | While the actual document has not been declassified, National Security Decision Directive 166 of 27 March 1985, "US Policy, Programs and Strategy in Afghanistan" defined a US policy of using established the US goal of driving Soviet forces from Afghanistan "by all means available", including the provision of [[FIM-92 Stinger|Stinger]] missiles.<ref name=Sullivan>{{citation |
− | | | + | | url = http://www12.georgetown.edu/students/organizations/nscs/capitalscholar/Fall2006/Soviet%20Union%20and%20Stinger%20Missiles.htm |
− | | | + | | title = What were policymakers' and intelligence services' respective roles in the decision to deploy Stinger Missiles to the anticommunist Afghan mujahedin during the rebels' struggle with the Soviet Union? |
− | | | + | | first1 = Tim | last1 = Sullivan |
− | | | + | | first2 = Matt | last2 = Singer |
− | + | | first3 = Jessica | last3 = Rawson | |
+ | | publisher = Georgetown University}}</ref> | ||
− | + | Initially, this involved close cooperation with [[Pakistan]]'s [[Inter-Services Intelligence]] to assist mujahideen groups and in planning operations inside Afghanistan. This cooperation was already in place in 1984, prior to NSDD-166. Indeed, it was evident to residents in Islamabad and Peshawar in the 1980s that large numbers of Americans were present.{{citation needed|date=June 2012}} | |
+ | ===Covert action=== | ||
+ | {{see also|Reagan Doctrine}} | ||
+ | However, one of the main features of NSDD-166 was to allow CIA to enter Afghanistan directly and establish its own separate and secret relationships with Afghan fighters.<ref name=Coll>{{Citation | ||
+ | | author = Coll,Steve | ||
+ | | title = Ghost Wars | ||
+ | | publisher = Penguin | ||
+ | | year = 2005 | ||
+ | | pages= 125–128 | ||
+ | }}</ref> The funding by ISI and CIA of Afghan anti-Soviet fighters created linkages among Muslim fighters worldwide.<ref name=PugNSDD166>{{citation | ||
+ | | url = http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pac/53/hoodbhoy.htm | ||
+ | | title = 53rd Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs: Advancing Human Security: The Role of Technology and Politics | ||
+ | | contribution = Afghanistan and the Genesis of Global Jihad | ||
+ | | date=17–21 July 2003 | ||
+ | | author = Pervez Hoodbhoy | ||
+ | | format = {{dead link|date=May 2009}} | ||
+ | }}</ref> | ||
− | + | At first, the US supported the effort cautiously, concerned that the Soviet Union would act against Pakistan. | |
− | + | ||
− | + | ==Afghanistan 1987== | |
+ | On July 20, 1987, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country was announced pursuant to the negotiations that led to the Geneva Accords of 1988.<ref name=UNGOM>{{Citation | ||
+ | | url =http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/ungomap/background.html | ||
+ | | title = Afghanistan / Pakistan - UNGOMAP - Background United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan}}</ref> | ||
− | + | ==Afghanistan 1989== | |
+ | {{see also|Civil war in Afghanistan (1989-1992)}} | ||
− | The | + | ===Intelligence analysis=== |
+ | A Special National Intelligence Estimate, "Afghanistan: the War in Perspective",<ref name=SNIE37-89>{{citation | ||
+ | | title = Special National Intelligence Estimate 37-89, "Afghanistan: the War in Perspective" | ||
+ | | url = https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/at-cold-wars-end-us-intelligence-on-the-soviet-union-and-eastern-europe-1989-1991/16526pdffiles/SNIE11-37-89.pdf | ||
+ | | date = November 1989 | ||
+ | | author = Director of Central Intelligence | ||
+ | }}</ref> estimated that Najibullah government was "weak, unpopular, and factionalized", but would probably remain in power, with the war at a near impasse. It drew key judgments including: | ||
+ | :*The mujahedin hold the military initiative, as long as they stay in the countryside, where government troops do not hinder them and they choose when and where to fight. As long as Soviet supplies continue, they will remain a guerilla force unable to seize major garrisons. | ||
+ | :*As an insurgency, regime fragility, mujahedin disunity, and local tribal factors are as important to the outcome as strictly military aspects. | ||
+ | :*While there is extensive popular support, the resistance will remain highly factionalized. | ||
+ | :*The Afghan Interim Government and most major commanders will refuse direct negotiations with Najibullah, but indirect negotiations are possible. | ||
+ | Pakistan and the USSR remain the most important external powers. Pakistan will continue to support the resistance regardless of who is in power. The Soviets will seek a political settlement while providing massive support. Gorbachev would like to resolve the issue before the US summit next year. | ||
− | + | Any of a number of changes in foreign support could break the impasse: | |
+ | :*Cessation of US support to the resistance | ||
+ | :*Cessation of Soviet support to the government | ||
+ | :*Mutual cuts by the US and USSR would be more harmful to the government | ||
− | + | Aid cuts, however, will not stop the fighting. | |
− | + | ===Covert action=== | |
+ | After the withdrawal of Soviet troops, CIA's objective was to topple the government of [[Mohammad Najibullah]], which had been formed under the Soviet occupation, according to author Steve Coll.<ref>{{Citation | ||
+ | | author = Coll,Steve | ||
+ | | title = Ghost Wars | ||
+ | | publisher = Penguin | ||
+ | | year = 2005 | ||
+ | | pages= 190–199 | ||
+ | }}</ref> Among others, the two main factions that CIA was supporting were: | ||
+ | *[[Ahmed Shah Massoud]], unilaterally. | ||
+ | *[[Gulbadin Hekmatyar]], through the [[Inter-Services Intelligence|ISI]]. | ||
+ | *[[Jalaluddin Haqqani]], through the [[Inter-Services Intelligence|ISI]]. | ||
+ | According to Coll, during this period of time, there was disagreement between CIA and the U.S. State Department regarding which Afghan factions to support. [[United States Department of State|U.S. State Department]] Special Envoy to Afghanistan [[Edmund McWilliams]], after numerous tours of the interior of Pakistan, found that Afghan people were unhappy with the [[Wahhabist]]-leaning and anti-American Hekmatyar contingent, and recommended pulling back support for fighting in favor of a political settlement involving more of the ex-pat Afghan professional class. In this McWilliams was supported by British Intelligence. CIA station chief [[Milton Bearden]] felt that McWilliams was misreading U.S. policy. Bearden did not want to get involved in Afghanistan internal politics, trusted the ISI to establish a stable regime in Afghanistan which was favorable to Pakistan, felt that Afghanistan was historically divided from Pakistan only by a line drawn by the British, and felt that the British didn't know what they were talking about, since they had lost two wars in Afghanistan already. The argument between Bearden and McWilliams in [[Islamabad]] was curtailed when Bearden cabled the State Department a "request for curtailment" of duty tour on McWilliams behalf, and McWilliams found himself called away. | ||
− | == | + | ==Afghanistan 1990== |
− | + | The policy dispute between CIA's Near East Division and the U.S. State Department, regarding political settlement versus continued fighting in Afghanistan, which was initiated between McWilliams and Bearden in 1989, continues with new protagonists, CIA's [[Thomas Tweeten]] and State's new special envoy to the Afghan resistance, [[United States Ambassador to Afghanistan|Peter Tomsen]].<ref>[http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2003/TomsenTestimony031016.pdf "Statement on Afghanistan: In Pursuit of Security and Democracy" by Peter Tomsen, statement to U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 16, 2003]</ref> | |
+ | |||
+ | Civil war develops as the [[Inter-Services Intelligence]] (ISI) and CIA-supported [[Gulbadin Hekmatyar]] seeks to violently eliminate all rivals, including the CIA-supported [[Ahmed Shah Massoud]]. In spite of this internecine warfare, ISI and CIA formulate a plan to topple the [[Mohammad Najibullah|Najibullah]] government in a winter offensive on [[Kabul]]. As part of this offensive, CIA pays Massoud $500,000, over and above his monthly stipend of $200,000, to close the [[Kotal-e Salang|Salang Highway]]. Massoud fails to do so, and in consequence, his allowance is reduced to $50,000 per month. | ||
+ | |||
+ | In Spring of 1990, ISI hopes to install [[Gulbadin Hekmatyar]] contingent on defeating the Najibullah government. Hekmatyar also acquires millions of dollars in additional funding from [[Osama bin Laden]], thus placing ISI, CIA and bin Laden in joint venture. On March 7, 1990, [[Gulbadin Hekmatyar]] and [[Shahnawaz Tanai]] attempts a coup, with Tanai, a member of [[Mohammad Najibullah|Najibullah]]'s government, orchestrating an attack using Najibullah's own forces against Najibullah's palace, with Hekmatyar's forces to follow up from outside Kabul. The money to buy the loyalty of Najibullah's troops comes in part from [[Osama bin Laden]]. This attempt fails. | ||
+ | |||
+ | At the same time, ISI asks "bin Laden for money to bribe legislators to throw [[Benazir Bhutto]] out of office". "That winter, then, bin Laden worked with Pakistani intelligence against both Najibullah and Bhutto, the perceived twin enemies of Islam they saw holding power in Kabul and Islamabad", according to author Steve Coll. Regarding the issue of whether bin Laden was acting alone or as an agent of [[Al Mukhabarat Al A'amah|Saudi intelligence]], Coll writes (see the concept of [[plausible deniability]]): | ||
+ | <blockquote> | ||
+ | "Did bin Laden work on the Tanai coup attempt on his own or as a semi-official liaison for Saudi intelligence? The evidence seems thin and inconclusive. Bin Laden was still in good graces with the Saudi government at the time of the Tanai coup attempt; his first explicit break with [[Turki bin Faisal Al Saud|Prince Turki]] and the royal family lay months in the future. While the CIA's Afghan informants named bin Laden as a funder of the Hekmatyar-Tanai coup, other accounts named Saudi intelligence as the source of funds. Were these separate funding tracks or the same? None of the reports then or later were firm or definitive. | ||
+ | |||
+ | "It was the beginning of a pattern for American intelligence analysts: Whenever bin Laden interacted with his own Saudi government, he seemed to do so inside a shroud." | ||
+ | </blockquote> | ||
+ | Note that, in a grand historical coincidence, in the investigation following the [[assassination of Benazir Bhutto]] on December 27, 2007, Pakistan's Interior Minisry has laid the blame on "[[Baitullah Mehsud]], a [[Taliban]] commander who holds sway across a large part of [[South Waziristan]]",<ref>[http://www.guardian.co.uk/pakistan/Story/0,,2244145,00.html "Bhutto's party rejects youth's assassination confession" by Declan Walsh, The Guardian, January 21, 2008]</ref> i.e. on an [[Al Queda]]-linked group, while Bhutto herself, in a letter she wrote prior to her death and subsequent to two prior attempts, laid the blame at the ISI's doorstep. In light of the above, perhaps both assertions are correct. | ||
− | + | ==Afghanistan 1991== | |
+ | According to [[Human Rights Watch]],<ref name=HRW-Afg-1991>{{citation | ||
+ | | url = http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92/ASW-01.htm#P105_37202 | ||
+ | | author = Human Rights Watch | ||
+ | | title = Afghanistan: Human Rights Watch | ||
+ | | year = 1991 | ||
+ | }}</ref> there was a dispute, inside the US government, with the [[United States Department of State|State Department]] on one side, and the CIA and its Pakistani counterpart, ISI, on the other. HRW said ''The New York Times'', in January 1991, said [[Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs]] [[Robert Kimmitt]] had "battled with [CIA] officials who would like to unleash the guerrillas in Afghanistan in one last effort," while [[United States Secretary of State]] [[James Baker]] worked to "coax the rebels and the Najibullah regime into democratic elections." In the interview, Kimmitt complained that agency officials were "just bucking policy." In February, as negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union remained stalled, ''[[The New York Times]]'' reported that "the [CIA], in a long policy dispute with the State Department that it now appears to be winning, has been arguing that negotiations cannot end the war and that Washington should step up its efforts to help the guerrillas win a military victory."{{citation needed|date=June 2012}} | ||
− | + | In the early 1980s, according to HRW, the ISI and CIA used their control over the arms pipeline to run the war and favor abusive mujahedin parties, particularly [[Gulbuddin Hekmatyar]]'s faction, which used U.S.- and Saudi-financed weapons to launch indiscriminate attacks on Afghan cities, killing countless civilians. | |
− | In | + | |
− | + | ==Afghanistan 1992== | |
− | + | {{see also|Civil war in Afghanistan (1992-1996)|Civil war in Afghanistan (1996-2001)}} | |
− | == | + | ==Afghanistan 2001== |
− | {{ | + | {{see also|War in Afghanistan (2001–present)|Timeline of the War in Afghanistan (2001-present)}} |
− | + | ==Afghanistan 2006== | |
+ | ===Intelligence analysis=== | ||
+ | Speaking to the Senate Intelligence Committee in early 2005, [[Porter Goss]]<ref name=Goss2005-02-16>{{citation | ||
+ | | first = Porter | last = Goss | ||
+ | | authorlink = Porter Goss | ||
+ | | date = 16 Februarytr 2006 | ||
+ | | title = Global Intelligence Challenges 2005 | ||
+ | | url = http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0503/doc09.htm}}</ref> said Afghanistan is on the "road to recovery after decades of instability and civil war. [[Hamid Karzai]]'s election to the presidency was a major milestone. Elections for a new National Assembly and local district councils—tentatively scheduled for this spring—will complete the process of electing representatives. President Karzai still faces a low-level insurgency aimed at destabilizing the country, raising the cost of reconstruction and ultimately forcing Coalition forces to leave. | ||
− | + | "The development of the Afghan National Army and a national police force is going well, although neither can yet stand on its own. | |
− | === Afghanistan | + | === Afghanistan 2009 === |
− | + | ==== Forward Operating Base Chapman attack ==== | |
− | + | {{see also|Forward Operating Base Chapman attack}} | |
− | + | On December 30, 2009, a suicide attack occurred at Forward Operating Base Chapman, a major CIA base in the province of [[Khost]], [[Afghanistan]]. Seven CIA officers, including the chief of the base, were killed and six others seriously wounded in the attack. The attack was the second most deadliest carried out against the CIA, after the [[1983 United States Embassy bombing]] in Beirut, Lebanon, and was a major setback for the intelligence agency's operations. | |
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− | == | + | ==References== |
− | + | {{reflist | 2}} | |
− | + | {{CIA activities in the Near East, North Africa, South and Southwest Asia}} | |
− | + | {{Central Intelligence Agency}} | |
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− | [[ | + | [[Category:Politics of Afghanistan]] |
− | [[ | + | [[Category:CIA activities in the Near East, North Africa, South and Southwest Asia]] |
− | [[ | + | [[Category:Afghanistan–United States relations]] |
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Revision as of 18:24, 11 July 2012
- CIA: SAD and SOG operations from WWII through Viet Nam
- CIA: SAD and SOG operations from 1973-2002
- CIA: SAD and SOG operations in Afghanistan since 2001
- CIA: SAD and SOG operations in Iraq since 2003
- CIA: SAD and SOG operations in Pakistan
- CIA: SAD and SOG operations worldwide since 2001
Since the 1970s, the CIA has engaged in multiple operations in Afghanistan.
Contents
Afghanistan 1979
Intelligence analysis
The CIA National Foreign Assessment Center completed work on a report entitled "Afghanistan: Ethnic Divergence and Dissidence" in May 1979, although it was not formally published until March 1980. It is not known if the information was readily available to policymakers at the time of the December 1979 invasion.[1]
Tribal insurgency, according to this report, began in 1978, with the installation of a pro-Soviet government. Even though the government tilted toward the Soviet Union, the analysis said that many tribal groups, especially Uzbek, saw the government as ethnically Pashtun, with hostility on ethnic and political grounds.
Covert action
A 2002 article by Michael Rubin stated that in the wake of the Iranian Revolution, the United States sought rapprochement with the Afghan government—a prospect that the USSR found unacceptable due to the weakening Soviet leverage over the regime. Thus, the Soviets intervened to preserve their influence in the country.[2] According to Vance's close aide Marshall Shulman "the State Department worked hard to dissuade the Soviets from invading."[3] In February 1979, U.S. Ambassador Adolph "Spike" Dubs was murdered in Kabul after Afghan security forces burst in on his kidnappers. The U.S. then reduced bilateral assistance and terminated a small military training program. All remaining assistance agreements were ended after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Following the Soviet invasion, the United States supported diplomatic efforts to achieve a Soviet withdrawal. In addition, generous U.S. contributions to the refugee program in Pakistan played a major part in efforts to assist Afghan refugees.
US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, known for his hardline policies on the Soviet Union, initiated in 1979 a campaign supporting mujaheddin in Pakistan and Afghanistan, which was run by Pakistani security services with financial support from the Central Intelligence Agency and Britain's MI6.[4] This policy had the explicit aim of promoting radical Islamist and anti-Communist forces. Bob Gates, in his book Out Of The Shadows, wrote that Pakistan had been pressuring the United States for arms to aid the rebels for years, but that the Carter administration refused in the hope of finding a diplomatic solution to avoid war. Brzezinski seemed to have been in favor of the provision of arms to the rebels, while Cyrus Vance's State Department, seeking a peaceful settlement, publicly accused Brzezinski of seeking to "revive" the Cold War. Brzezinski has stated that the United States provided communications equipment and limited financial aid to the mujahideen prior to the "formal" invasion, but only in response to the Soviet deployment of forces to Afghanistan and the 1978 coup, and with the intention of preventing further Soviet encroachment in the region.[5]
Years later, in a 1997 CNN/National Security Archive interview, Brzezinski detailed the strategy taken by the Carter administration against the Soviets in 1979:
We immediately launched a twofold process when we heard that the Soviets had entered Afghanistan. The first involved direct reactions and sanctions focused on the Soviet Union, and both the State Department and the National Security Council prepared long lists of sanctions to be adopted, of steps to be taken to increase the international costs to the Soviet Union of their actions. And the second course of action led to my going to Pakistan a month or so after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, for the purpose of coordinating with the Pakistanis a joint response, the purpose of which would be to make the Soviets bleed for as much and as long as is possible; and we engaged in that effort in a collaborative sense with the Saudis, the Egyptians, the British, the Chinese, and we started providing weapons to the Mujaheddin, from various sources again – for example, some Soviet arms from the Egyptians and the Chinese. We even got Soviet arms from the Czechoslovak communist government, since it was obviously susceptible to material incentives; and at some point we started buying arms for the Mujaheddin from the Soviet army in Afghanistan, because that army was increasingly corrupt.[6]
Milt Bearden wrote in The Main Enemy that Brzezinski, in 1980, secured an agreement from King Khalid of Saudi Arabia to match U.S. contributions to the Afghan effort dollar for dollar and that Bill Casey would keep that agreement going through the Reagan administration.[7]
The Soviet invasion and occupation resulted in the deaths of as many as 2 million Afghans.[8] In 2010, Brzezinski defended the arming of the rebels in response, saying that it "was quite important in hastening the end of the conflict," thereby saving the lives of thousands of Afghans, but "not in deciding the conflict, because....even though we helped the mujaheddin, they would have continued fighting without our help, because they were also getting a lot of money from the Persian Gulf and the Arab states, and they weren't going to quit. They didn't decide to fight because we urged them to. They're fighters, and they prefer to be independent. They just happen to have a curious complex: they don't like foreigners with guns in their country. And they were going to fight the Soviets. Giving them weapons was a very important forward step in defeating the Soviets, and that's all to the good as far as I'm concerned." When he was asked if he thought it was the right decision in retrospect (given the Taliban's subsequent rise to power), he said: "Which decision? For the Soviets to go in? The decision was the Soviets', and they went in. The Afghans would have resisted anyway, and they were resisting. I just told you: in my view, the Afghans would have prevailed in the end anyway, 'cause they had access to money, they had access to weapons, and they had the will to fight."[9] Likewise; Charlie Wilson said: "The U.S. had nothing whatsoever to do with these people's decision to fight ... but we'll be damned by history if we let them fight with stones."[10]
The supplying of billions of dollars in arms to the Afghan mujahideen militants was one of the CIA's longest and most expensive covert operations.[11] The CIA provided assistance to the fundamentalist insurgents through the Pakistani secret services, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), in a program called Operation Cyclone. At least 3 billion in U.S. dollars were funneled into the country to train and equip troops with weapons. Together with similar programs by Saudi Arabia, Britain's MI6 and SAS, Egypt, Iran, and the People's Republic of China,[12] the arms included Stinger missiles, shoulder-fired, antiaircraft weapons that they used against Soviet helicopters. Pakistan's secret service, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), was used as an intermediary for most of these activities to disguise the sources of support for the resistance.
No Americans trained or had direct contact with the mujahideen.[13] The skittish CIA had fewer than 10 operatives in the region because it "feared it would be blamed, like in Guatemala."[14] Civilian personnel from the U.S. Department of State and the CIA frequently visited the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area during this time.
With U.S. and other funding, the ISI armed and trained over 100,000 insurgents. On July 20, 1987, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country was announced pursuant to the negotiations that led to the Geneva Accords of 1988,[15] with the last Soviets leaving on February 15, 1989.
The early foundations of al-Qaida were allegedly built in part on relationships and weaponry that came from the billions of dollars in U.S. support for the Afghan mujahadin during the war to expel Soviet forces from that country.[16] However, scholars such as Jason Burke, Steve Coll, Peter Bergen, Christopher Andrew, and Vasily Mitrokhin have argued that Bin Laden was "outside of CIA eyesight" and that there is "no support" in any "reliable source" for "the claim that the CIA funded bin Laden or any of the other Arab volunteers who came to support the mujahideen."[17][18][19][20]
Afghanistan 1980
Intelligence analysis
A memorandum spoke of continued tribal rivalries as adding to the resistance to the Soviets.[21]
Afghanistan 1985
While the actual document has not been declassified, National Security Decision Directive 166 of 27 March 1985, "US Policy, Programs and Strategy in Afghanistan" defined a US policy of using established the US goal of driving Soviet forces from Afghanistan "by all means available", including the provision of Stinger missiles.[22]
Initially, this involved close cooperation with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence to assist mujahideen groups and in planning operations inside Afghanistan. This cooperation was already in place in 1984, prior to NSDD-166. Indeed, it was evident to residents in Islamabad and Peshawar in the 1980s that large numbers of Americans were present.Template:citation needed
Covert action
- See also: Reagan Doctrine
However, one of the main features of NSDD-166 was to allow CIA to enter Afghanistan directly and establish its own separate and secret relationships with Afghan fighters.[23] The funding by ISI and CIA of Afghan anti-Soviet fighters created linkages among Muslim fighters worldwide.[24]
At first, the US supported the effort cautiously, concerned that the Soviet Union would act against Pakistan.
Afghanistan 1987
On July 20, 1987, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country was announced pursuant to the negotiations that led to the Geneva Accords of 1988.[25]
Afghanistan 1989
- See also: Civil war in Afghanistan (1989-1992)
Intelligence analysis
A Special National Intelligence Estimate, "Afghanistan: the War in Perspective",[26] estimated that Najibullah government was "weak, unpopular, and factionalized", but would probably remain in power, with the war at a near impasse. It drew key judgments including:
- The mujahedin hold the military initiative, as long as they stay in the countryside, where government troops do not hinder them and they choose when and where to fight. As long as Soviet supplies continue, they will remain a guerilla force unable to seize major garrisons.
- As an insurgency, regime fragility, mujahedin disunity, and local tribal factors are as important to the outcome as strictly military aspects.
- While there is extensive popular support, the resistance will remain highly factionalized.
- The Afghan Interim Government and most major commanders will refuse direct negotiations with Najibullah, but indirect negotiations are possible.
Pakistan and the USSR remain the most important external powers. Pakistan will continue to support the resistance regardless of who is in power. The Soviets will seek a political settlement while providing massive support. Gorbachev would like to resolve the issue before the US summit next year.
Any of a number of changes in foreign support could break the impasse:
- Cessation of US support to the resistance
- Cessation of Soviet support to the government
- Mutual cuts by the US and USSR would be more harmful to the government
Aid cuts, however, will not stop the fighting.
Covert action
After the withdrawal of Soviet troops, CIA's objective was to topple the government of Mohammad Najibullah, which had been formed under the Soviet occupation, according to author Steve Coll.[27] Among others, the two main factions that CIA was supporting were:
- Ahmed Shah Massoud, unilaterally.
- Gulbadin Hekmatyar, through the ISI.
- Jalaluddin Haqqani, through the ISI.
According to Coll, during this period of time, there was disagreement between CIA and the U.S. State Department regarding which Afghan factions to support. U.S. State Department Special Envoy to Afghanistan Edmund McWilliams, after numerous tours of the interior of Pakistan, found that Afghan people were unhappy with the Wahhabist-leaning and anti-American Hekmatyar contingent, and recommended pulling back support for fighting in favor of a political settlement involving more of the ex-pat Afghan professional class. In this McWilliams was supported by British Intelligence. CIA station chief Milton Bearden felt that McWilliams was misreading U.S. policy. Bearden did not want to get involved in Afghanistan internal politics, trusted the ISI to establish a stable regime in Afghanistan which was favorable to Pakistan, felt that Afghanistan was historically divided from Pakistan only by a line drawn by the British, and felt that the British didn't know what they were talking about, since they had lost two wars in Afghanistan already. The argument between Bearden and McWilliams in Islamabad was curtailed when Bearden cabled the State Department a "request for curtailment" of duty tour on McWilliams behalf, and McWilliams found himself called away.
Afghanistan 1990
The policy dispute between CIA's Near East Division and the U.S. State Department, regarding political settlement versus continued fighting in Afghanistan, which was initiated between McWilliams and Bearden in 1989, continues with new protagonists, CIA's Thomas Tweeten and State's new special envoy to the Afghan resistance, Peter Tomsen.[28]
Civil war develops as the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and CIA-supported Gulbadin Hekmatyar seeks to violently eliminate all rivals, including the CIA-supported Ahmed Shah Massoud. In spite of this internecine warfare, ISI and CIA formulate a plan to topple the Najibullah government in a winter offensive on Kabul. As part of this offensive, CIA pays Massoud $500,000, over and above his monthly stipend of $200,000, to close the Salang Highway. Massoud fails to do so, and in consequence, his allowance is reduced to $50,000 per month.
In Spring of 1990, ISI hopes to install Gulbadin Hekmatyar contingent on defeating the Najibullah government. Hekmatyar also acquires millions of dollars in additional funding from Osama bin Laden, thus placing ISI, CIA and bin Laden in joint venture. On March 7, 1990, Gulbadin Hekmatyar and Shahnawaz Tanai attempts a coup, with Tanai, a member of Najibullah's government, orchestrating an attack using Najibullah's own forces against Najibullah's palace, with Hekmatyar's forces to follow up from outside Kabul. The money to buy the loyalty of Najibullah's troops comes in part from Osama bin Laden. This attempt fails.
At the same time, ISI asks "bin Laden for money to bribe legislators to throw Benazir Bhutto out of office". "That winter, then, bin Laden worked with Pakistani intelligence against both Najibullah and Bhutto, the perceived twin enemies of Islam they saw holding power in Kabul and Islamabad", according to author Steve Coll. Regarding the issue of whether bin Laden was acting alone or as an agent of Saudi intelligence, Coll writes (see the concept of plausible deniability):
"Did bin Laden work on the Tanai coup attempt on his own or as a semi-official liaison for Saudi intelligence? The evidence seems thin and inconclusive. Bin Laden was still in good graces with the Saudi government at the time of the Tanai coup attempt; his first explicit break with Prince Turki and the royal family lay months in the future. While the CIA's Afghan informants named bin Laden as a funder of the Hekmatyar-Tanai coup, other accounts named Saudi intelligence as the source of funds. Were these separate funding tracks or the same? None of the reports then or later were firm or definitive.
"It was the beginning of a pattern for American intelligence analysts: Whenever bin Laden interacted with his own Saudi government, he seemed to do so inside a shroud."
Note that, in a grand historical coincidence, in the investigation following the assassination of Benazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007, Pakistan's Interior Minisry has laid the blame on "Baitullah Mehsud, a Taliban commander who holds sway across a large part of South Waziristan",[29] i.e. on an Al Queda-linked group, while Bhutto herself, in a letter she wrote prior to her death and subsequent to two prior attempts, laid the blame at the ISI's doorstep. In light of the above, perhaps both assertions are correct.
Afghanistan 1991
According to Human Rights Watch,[30] there was a dispute, inside the US government, with the State Department on one side, and the CIA and its Pakistani counterpart, ISI, on the other. HRW said The New York Times, in January 1991, said Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Robert Kimmitt had "battled with [CIA] officials who would like to unleash the guerrillas in Afghanistan in one last effort," while United States Secretary of State James Baker worked to "coax the rebels and the Najibullah regime into democratic elections." In the interview, Kimmitt complained that agency officials were "just bucking policy." In February, as negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union remained stalled, The New York Times reported that "the [CIA], in a long policy dispute with the State Department that it now appears to be winning, has been arguing that negotiations cannot end the war and that Washington should step up its efforts to help the guerrillas win a military victory."Template:citation needed
In the early 1980s, according to HRW, the ISI and CIA used their control over the arms pipeline to run the war and favor abusive mujahedin parties, particularly Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's faction, which used U.S.- and Saudi-financed weapons to launch indiscriminate attacks on Afghan cities, killing countless civilians.
Afghanistan 1992
- See also: Civil war in Afghanistan (1992-1996)
Afghanistan 2001
- See also: War in Afghanistan (2001–present)
Afghanistan 2006
Intelligence analysis
Speaking to the Senate Intelligence Committee in early 2005, Porter Goss[31] said Afghanistan is on the "road to recovery after decades of instability and civil war. Hamid Karzai's election to the presidency was a major milestone. Elections for a new National Assembly and local district councils—tentatively scheduled for this spring—will complete the process of electing representatives. President Karzai still faces a low-level insurgency aimed at destabilizing the country, raising the cost of reconstruction and ultimately forcing Coalition forces to leave.
"The development of the Afghan National Army and a national police force is going well, although neither can yet stand on its own.
Afghanistan 2009
Forward Operating Base Chapman attack
- See also: Forward Operating Base Chapman attack
On December 30, 2009, a suicide attack occurred at Forward Operating Base Chapman, a major CIA base in the province of Khost, Afghanistan. Seven CIA officers, including the chief of the base, were killed and six others seriously wounded in the attack. The attack was the second most deadliest carried out against the CIA, after the 1983 United States Embassy bombing in Beirut, Lebanon, and was a major setback for the intelligence agency's operations.
References
- ↑ National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency, {{{first}}} (1 March 1980). September 11 Sourcebooks, Volume II, Afghanistan: Lessons of the Last War. U.S. Analysis of the Soviet War in Afghanistan: Declassified, . {{{publisher}}}.
- ↑ Rubin, Michael, "Who is Responsible for the Taliban?", Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2002). http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2002/issue1/mrubin.pdf
- ↑ Alterman, Eric 'Blowback,' the Prequel. The Nation. URL accessed on December 30, 2010.
- ↑ Interview with Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski-(13/6/97).
- ↑ “”. Brzezinski and the Afghan War Pt2. YouTube. URL accessed on July 10, 2010.
- ↑ Full Text of Interview
- ↑ Blackton, John Stuart The CIA on 'Did the CIA create Bin Laden?'. TPM Cafe. URL accessed on January 27, 2012.
- ↑ White, Matthew (2010). Death Tolls for the Major Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century. Users.erols.com. URL accessed on December 31, 2010.
- ↑ Jay, Paul The Afghan War and 'The Grand Chessboard'. The ACTivist magazine. URL accessed on December 31, 2010.
- ↑ Crile, 259–62.
- ↑ Time Magazine, May 13, 2003, "The Oily Americans," http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,450997-2,00.html
- ↑ Interview with Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski – (13/6/97). Part 2.] Episode 17. Good Guys, Bad Guys. June 13, 1997.
- ↑ Bergen, Peter. Holy War, Inc. New York: Free Press, 2001. Pg.66
- ↑ The New Republic, "TRB FROM WASHINGTON, Back to Front" by Peter Beinart, October 8, 2001.
- ↑ United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan – Background. United Nations. URL accessed on November 21, 2008.
- ↑ Hartung, William D. We Arm The World. TomPaine.com. URL accessed on January 27, 2012.
- ↑ Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda (Penguin, 2003), p59.
- ↑ Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB and the World (Penguin, 2006), p579n48.
- ↑ Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden (Penguin, 2004), p87.
- ↑ Peter Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know (Free Press, 2006), pp60-1.
- ↑ Office of Political Analysis, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, {{{first}}} (23 September 1980). September 11 Sourcebooks, Volume II, Afghanistan: Lessons of the Last War. U.S. Analysis of the Soviet War in Afghanistan: Declassified, . {{{publisher}}}.
- ↑ Sullivan, {{{first}}} ({{{date}}}). What were policymakers' and intelligence services' respective roles in the decision to deploy Stinger Missiles to the anticommunist Afghan mujahedin during the rebels' struggle with the Soviet Union?, . Georgetown University.
- ↑ Coll,Steve (2005), Ghost Wars, Penguin, pp. 125–128
</li>
- ↑ Pervez Hoodbhoy, {{{first}}} (17–21 July 2003). 53rd Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs: Advancing Human Security: The Role of Technology and Politics, . {{{publisher}}}.
- ↑ Afghanistan / Pakistan - UNGOMAP - Background United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/ungomap/background.html </li>
- ↑ Director of Central Intelligence, {{{first}}} (November 1989). Special National Intelligence Estimate 37-89, "Afghanistan: the War in Perspective", . {{{publisher}}}.
- ↑ Coll,Steve (2005), Ghost Wars, Penguin, pp. 190–199 </li>
- ↑ "Statement on Afghanistan: In Pursuit of Security and Democracy" by Peter Tomsen, statement to U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 16, 2003
- ↑ "Bhutto's party rejects youth's assassination confession" by Declan Walsh, The Guardian, January 21, 2008
- ↑ Human Rights Watch, {{{first}}} (1991). Afghanistan: Human Rights Watch, . {{{publisher}}}.
- ↑ Goss, Porter (16 Februarytr 2006). Global Intelligence Challenges 2005, . {{{publisher}}}.
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