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=== Administrative Review Board ===
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Detainees whose [[Combatant Status Review Tribunal]] labeled them "enemy combatants" were scheduled for annual [[Administrative Review Board]] hearings.  These hearings were designed to assess the threat a detainee might pose if released or transferred, and whether there were other factors that warranted his continued detention.<ref>
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{{cite web
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  | url = http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3902
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  | title = Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials
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  | date = March 6, 2007
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  | accessdate = November 12, 2010
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A [[Summary of Evidence (ARB)|Summary of Evidence memo]] was prepared for Abdul Bagi first annual Administrative Review Board  on  
 
A [[Summary of Evidence (ARB)|Summary of Evidence memo]] was prepared for Abdul Bagi first annual Administrative Review Board  on  
 
August 6, 2004.<ref name=Arb1MemoAbdulBagi>
 
August 6, 2004.<ref name=Arb1MemoAbdulBagi>

Revision as of 23:16, 28 April 2012

Abdul Ghafour

There are multiple individuals named Abdul Ghaffar.

<div/> Haji Abdul Ghafour was identified during Guantanamo detainee Juma Din's Administrative Review Board hearing as a senior Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin leader. Juma Din was alleged to have served as Ghafour's bodyguard.

There were two, or possibly three, other Guantanamo detainees named Abdul Ghafour. The US Department of Defense released what they described as a full official list of all the detainees captured during the war on terror, who had been held in Guantanamo, in military custody.[1] That list has entries for an Abdul Ghaffar, reported to have been born in Kandahar in 1958, and an Abdul Ghafour, reported to have been born in Pattia Province in 1962.[2][3]

There are press reports of a third Guantanamo detainee named Abdul Ghafour -- Maulvi Abdul Ghafour.[4][5][6] The press reports assert that this Adbul Ghafour convinced his interrogators that he was an innocuous illiterate villager, and was one of the first detainees to be released. The Press reports assert that he was one of the detainees who "returned to the battlefield", assuming a leadership position within the Taliban, and subsequently being killed in combat.

Another Abdul Ghafoour, a Haji Abdul Ghafour is described during Juma Din's Administrative Review Board hearing.[7] Juma Din was alleged to have been a bodyguard for an Abdul Ghafour, who was described as a senior leader in the Hezb-E-Islami Gulbuddin.

Many militia groups fought to liberate Afghanistan from Soviet occupation. When the Communists were driven out the militia groups entered into alliances, and fought civil wars, with one another. The Hezb-E-Islami Gulbuddin and the Taliban were rival groups during the civil war.

References

  1. list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
  2. [[[:Template:DoD detainees ARB]] Summarized transcripts (.pdf)], from Abdul Ghaffar'sCombatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 25-32
  3. [[[:Template:DoD detainees ARB]] Summarized transcripts (.pdf)], from Abdul Ghafour'sCombatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 91-99
  4. Gitmo Detainees Return To Terror, CBS News, October 17, 2004
  5. Released Detainees Join Fight, LA Times, October 22, 2004
  6. Cheney defends Guantanamo as essential to war: VP says that if freed, prisoners would return to battlefield, San Francisco Chronicle, June 14, 2005
  7. [[[:Template:DoD detainees ARB]] Summarized transcript (.pdf)], from Juma Din's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 261


Ghulam Nabi

Ghulam Nabi was a Pakistani militant involved with the Taliban and had fought against the pro-American Northern Alliance in Afghanistan during the US-led war in Afghanistan.

A video obtained by the Associated Press on 20 April 2007 shows a young boy, looking to be around 12 years of age, viciously beheading a man identified as Nabi. According to the AP report, "A continuous 2½-minute shot then shows the victim lying on his side on a patch of rubble-strewn ground. A man holds Nabi by his beard while the boy, wearing a camouflage military jacket and oversized white sneakers, cuts into the throat. Other men and boys call out "Allahu akbar!" — "God is great!" — as blood spurts from the wound. The film, overlain with nasheeds, then shows the boy hacking and slashing at the man's neck until the head is severed."

The beheading was condemned and called a "new low" by Sam Zarifi of Human Rights Watch, and also condemned by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan.

External links

Warning: Default sort key "Nabi, Ghulam" overrides earlier default sort key "Abdul Ghafour".

Abdul Bagi

Template:Infobox WoT detainees

Abdul Bagi is a citizen of Afghanistan who was held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detainment camps, in Cuba.[1] His Guantanamo Internment Serial Number was 963. American intelligence analysts estimate he was born in 1972, in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

Abdul Bagi was captured in Afghanistan in February 2003 and transferred to Afghanistan on February 8, 2006.[2]

Combatant Status Review


Bagi was among the 60% of prisoners who chose to participate in tribunal hearings.[3] A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for the tribunal of each detainee.

Bagi's memo accused him of the following:[4]

a. The detainee is a member of the Taliban and participated in military operations against the United States and its coalition partners:
  1. The detainee is a member of the Taliban.
  2. The detainee admitted that he was supposed to participate in an ambush against U.S. forces.
  3. The detainee admitted that he threw his weapon down a well and hid in a hole.
  4. The detainee was captured on the afternoon of 10 February 2003 along with his uncle, by U.S. personnel.


Administrative Review Board

Detainees whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal labeled them "enemy combatants" were scheduled for annual Administrative Review Board hearings. These hearings were designed to assess the threat a detainee might pose if released or transferred, and whether there were other factors that warranted his continued detention.[5]

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Abdul Bagi first annual Administrative Review Board on August 6, 2004.[6]

Bagi chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.[7]

The following primary factors favor continued detention

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee admitted to being part of the attacks (ambush) on United States Forces in the vicinity of Lejay, Afghanistan.
b. Connections/Associations
  1. A known Taliban member identified the detainee as Taliban.
  2. As U.S. elements approached the village of Lejay (Abdul Rais Wahid stronghold) on the morning of 10 February 2003, they were viciously ambushed from the high ground on both sides of the road. The enemy fired from well-prepared ambush positions, and employed a high volume of RPK, PKM, AK, and RPG fire in an effort to kill as many U.S. personnel as possible.
  3. Hajji Raes Abdul Wahed, is the Supreme Commander of a forty-man guerilla unit. He was identified as teaching hand grenade techniques, plastic explosives with detonator cord, and how to blow up cars.
  4. Detainee was captured on 10 February 2003 in a dugout hole 100 meters from the compound.
  5. The detainee was apprehended wearing an Olive Drab (OD) green jacket consistent with the eyewitness accounts of the individual responsible for the attacks.
  6. OD jackets were worn by several men captured, on the same day as the detainee, at a checkpoint on the north side of town in a taxi and on motorcycles. The men all suffered from hearing loss assessed to be from firing activity.
  7. During the Combatant Status Review Tribunal, the detainee called two witnesses other than his uncle, Alif Mohammed and Baridad, that testified for him.
  8. Alik Mohammed is assessed as a security/military commander of Lejay/Wahid compound and it is believed he orchestrated the attack on American Forces.
  9. Baridad was captured on the same day as the detainee. He suffered from hearing loss assessed due to firing activity.


The following factors favor release or transfer

a. The detainee does not know any Taliban members.
b. Detainee believes the Americans have come to bring peace and stability to the people. He feels it is good, the Americans help rebuild roads and water systems and help establish education for the people, he is happy with that.
c. Detainee denied any knowledge/involvement in the attacks on United States Forces.
d. Detainee claims to never having owned or fired any kind of weapon.
e. The detainee admitted growing poppies, however, agreed it was a good thing the American forces and Afghanistan government was stopping farmers from growing poppies.


Guantanamo Medical records

On 16 March 2007 the Department of Defense published medical records for the captives.[8] Abdul Bagi's records indicate he was weighed every month, from January 2004 through December 2005. But unlike every other captive's records, his weights are missing. Three other fields recorded for almost every other captive—his "inprocess date", his height, and his "inprocess weight" -- are also missing.

Repatriation

On November 25, 2009, the Department of Defense published a list of the dates captives were transferred from Guantanamo.[9] According to that list Abdul Bagi was transferred on February 8, 2006.

See also

References

External links

Template:Afghanistan War Template:WoTPrisoners


Warning: Default sort key "Bagi, Abdul" overrides earlier default sort key "Nabi, Ghulam".

Bismullah

Template:Infobox WoT detainees Haji Bismullah is a citizen of Afghanistan who was held in extrajudicial detention in the United States's Guantanamo Bay detention camps, in Cuba.[1] His Guantanamo Internment Serial Number was 968. American intelligence analysts estimate Bismullah was born in 1979 and was from Musa Qala, Afghanistan.

Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror.[2] This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Bismullah's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 26 October 2004. [3] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. The detainee is a member of the Taliban:
  1. The detainee and his wife have been identified as members of the Taliban.
  2. The detainee acted on behalf of leaders of Fidayan Islam.
  3. Fidayan Islam is a terrorist organization in Afghanistan targeting United States and Coalition forces.
  4. The detainee was directed to identify' and kill local Afghanis who were assisting U.S. forces.
  5. The detainee was detained by American forces in Gereshk Village, Baghram District, which is located in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.
b. The detainee directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.
  1. The Detainee provided information concerning movements of U.S. forces in Helmand Province of Afghanistan to insurgent operatives opposed to U.S. forces.


Transcript

Bismullah chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[4] On March 3, 2006, in response to a court order from Jed Rakoff the Department of Defense published a seven page summarized transcript from his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[5]

Administrative Review Board hearing

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".[6]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat—or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Bismullah's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 12 October 2005.[7] The memo listed eighteen factors favoring continued detention. The memo listed three factors favoring release or transfer.

The following primary factors favor continued detention

a. Commitment
The detainee has been a Taliban member for six years.
b. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee was a Deputy Commander for Rozei Khan, a Taliban Commander, during his time of command in combat.
  2. The detainee worked for Abdul Wahed on the terrorist team.
  3. The 40-man unit is part of the Taliban and supported by al Qaida. The supreme commander of the unit is Haji Raes Abdul Wahed.
  4. The detainee provided some tactical information for the 40-man unit and used a short-range radio and long-range satellite telephone to communicate.
  5. In response to United States’ requests for information against Fidayan Islam, Fidayan Islam leaders directed the detainee to find and kill the local Afghans that are helping the Americans.
  6. Fidayan Islam is the combined effort of Hezb-e-Islami and active Taliban.
  7. The detainee traveled the streets of Gereshk at night asking questions about the Americans and those who spoke to them. The detainee was hoping that a show of force would scare people into providing information that would lead to those helping United States Forces.
  8. The detainee was an associate of Dost Mohammed. Dost Mohammed had planned a rocket attack against the United States military base in Deh Rawhud, Afghanistan in mid-August 2002.
c. Other Relevant Data
  1. As Chief of Transportation, the detainee was issued a permit allowing him to carry a driver’s license, use a mobile phone and weapon. The detainee was also given a vehicle and two weapons.
  2. During August 2002, the detainee and two other former Taliban officials traveled to Pakistan with the objective of acquiring a sedan type vehicle for use in a car bomb attack against the United States military base in Deh Rawhud, Afghanistan.
  3. Activity by United States Special Force teams in Gereshk, Afghanistan was monitored by Afghan military on duty at checkpoints throughout the city. United States Special Force activity, no matter how trivial, was immediately reported to the detainee. The detainee then called his insurgent counterparts via radio notifying them that the Americans were coming and warning them that they should hide.
  4. The detainee passed reports of United States Special Forces activity to Sher Mohammed. Mohammed followed similar reporting pattern to that of the detainee, alerting his insurgent counterparts by satellite phone.
  5. The detainee was captured on 12 February 2003 at the Forward Operating Base in Gereshk, Afghanistan near the Afghanistan Department of Transportation Office.
  6. On the morning of the detainee’s capture guards woke him up and told him that someone came by to tell him that the Americans were holding some of the governor’s brother’s people outside for carrying weapons without permits.
  7. The detainee approached the United States soldiers and told them that he knew these people as Dost Mohammed’s soldiers and they were authorized to carry weapons even though they didn’t have their permits with them.
  8. The United States soldiers asked the detainee to come back to base to answer more questions about the alleged Dost Mohammed soldiers.
  9. The American forces took the detainee’s satellite phone and moved him to the detention facility in Kandahar the next morning.


The following primary factors favor release or transfer

a. The detainee did not participate in jihad against the Russians.
b. The detainee has no knowledge of Taliban in his region.
c. The detainee considers himself a friend of the United States and would not do anything to damage this relationship.


Transcript

Bismullah chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.[8] Bismullah’s Board convened on November 3, 2005.

Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Bismullah's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 11 October 2006.[7] The memo listed six factors favoring continued detention. The memo listed six factors favoring release or transfer.

The following primary factors favor continued detention

a. Commitment
  1. A source stated that the 40-man unit is a part of the Taliban and receives money and weapons from al Qaida.
  2. A source stated that the detainee had been a member of the Taliban for six years.
  3. A source stated that the detainee provided some tactical information for the 40-man team and used a short-range radio and a long-range satellite telephone to communicate.
  4. Leaders of a terrorist organization directed the detainee to find the local Afghan that were helping the Americans and kill them. The detainee was augmented with 25 armed personnel and three trucks from a known Taliban supporter. The detainee traveled the streets of a city in Afghanistan at night, asking questions about the Americans and those who spoke to them.
b. Connections/Associations
  1. A source stated that the detainee worked for the Commander of the 40-man assassination group on the terrorist team.
  2. A known Taliban supporter tried to get the detainee released because he had a lot of information on the former Taliban.


The following primary factors favor release or transfer

a. The detainee claims he has never had any association with the Taliban.
b. The detainee denied having any affiliation with the 40-man team and denied knowing the commander of the 40-man team. The detainee stated that the Commander of the 40-man team was his enemy and so was the Taliban.
c. The detianee claimed that he had no knowledge of the Taliban in his region.
d. The detainee claims he has never used his employment to provide any services to the Taliban.
e. The detainee stated that he had no reason to watch Americans or tell anyone what Americans do because he considers the Americans his friends.
f. The detainee claims he has never provided armed guards for any Taliban tasking.


Transcript

Bismullah chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.[9] Bismullah’s Board convened on November 3, 2005.

Affidavit from Haji Mohammed Wali

Attached to his transcript was a covering letter and an affidavit from his brother Haji Mohammed Wali.[10]

Third annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Bismullah's third annual Administrative Review Board.[11]

The following primary factors favor continued detention

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee was identified as part of the 40-man team that conducted operations against American forces.
  2. The 40-man unit was known to be tasked with carrying out several political assassinations.
  3. The 40-man unit was identified as part of the Taliban, and was known to receive money and weapons from al Qaida. The detainee was identified as having been a member of the Taliban for six years.
  4. The detainee was identified as having provided some tactical information for the 40-man team and having used a short-range radio and a long-range satellite telephone to communicate.
  5. The leaders of a terrorist organization were known to have directed the detainee to find the local Afghans that were helping the Coalition Forces and kill them. The detainee was augmented with 25-armed personnel and three trucks from a known Taliban supporter. The detainee traveled the streets of a city in Afghanistan at night, asking questions about Coalition Forces and those who spoke to them.
  6. Afghan Military Forces soldiers on duty at checkpoints throughout the city immediately reported Coalition Forces activity, no matter how trivial, to the detainee. The detainee would then radio his insurgent counterparts to notify them that the Coalition Forces were coming and warn them that they should hide. The detainee would also pass reports of Coalition Forces activity to Sher Mohammed.
b. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee stated he was appointed Director of Transportation for Gereshk, Helmand Province through family connections with the Governor of Helmand Province, Sher Mohammed.
  2. Sher Mohammed headed a communications network that compromised operations by Coalition Forces in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.
  3. Sher Mohammed stated publicly that he was, and always would be, Taliban.
  4. The detainee stated he would die for Sher Mohammed if he had to.
  5. The detainee was known to have worked for the commander of the 40-man unit.
c. Other Relevant Data
  1. The detainee stated he affected the release of six people who were captured with four to five AK-47 rifles and no identification. The detainee stated he was expected to negotiate the release of the captured individuals by virtue of his position in the village and his relationship with Helmand's governor, Sher Mohammed. The detainee states that on the day he was detained, he was visiting Sher Mohammed in Lashkar Gah, Afghanistan and had met some of the Americans who later arrested him. The detainee stated he was captured on 12 February 2003. The detainee stated he was detained while helping the six captured individuals because he had a satellite phone.
  2. The detainee stated he was last in Pakistan in November 2002 to take his mother to a doctor.


The following primary factors favor release or transfer

a. The detainee stated he had no knowledge of Taliban in his region. The detainee stated his satellite phone was used only to report problems within his department to the governor and to talk to friends.
b. The detainee stated he has never heard of Abdul Wahed. The detainee stated he has never conducted night surveillance searching for information relating to Afghanistan citizens assisting United States Armed Forces. The detainee considers himself a friend of the United States and would not do anything to damage this relationship.
c. The detainee denied having any affiliation with the 40-man unit headed by Abdul Wahed and denied knowing Wahed. The detainee stated Wahed was his enemy and so was the Taliban.
d. The detainee stated he never spoke on his satellite telephone with others suspected to be on the 40-Man terrorist unit.
e. The detainee stated he has never had any association with the Taliban. The detainee stated he never used the Department of Transportation to provide any service to the Taliban. The detainee stated he has never provided armed guards for any Taliban tasking.
f. The detainee stated he had no reason to watch Americans or tell anyone what Americans do because he considers the Americans his friends.
g. The detainee stated that before he was arrested, he did not know of any Taliban, al Qaida, or Fidayan Islam members or sympathizers in the area. The detainees stated everyone was happy in the area and there was no anti-coalition activity taking place.


Board recommendations

On January 9, 2009, the Department of Defense released two heavily redacted memos, from his Board, to Gordon England, the Designated Civilian Official.[12][13] The review board convened on December 14, 2007. The Board's recommendation was unanimous. The Board's recommendation was redacted. The Board's recommendation was forwarded to England on January 27, 2008. England authorized continued detention on February 2, 2008.

Bismullah v. Gates

Bismullah had a writ of habeas corpus submitted on his behalf -- Bismullah v. Gates.[14]

On July 20, 2007 a DC Court of Appeals ruled that Bismullah's lawyers, and by extension, all the captive's lawyers, were entitled to access all the classified evidence in their captive's dossiers.[15][16]

Determined not to have been an enemy combatant after all

On January 17, 2009, Carol Rosenberg, writing in the Miami Herald, quoted Guantanamo spokesman Jeffrey Gordon, that a panel of officers had recently reviewed Bismullah's "enemy combatant" status, and determined, "based on new evidence", that he was not an enemy combatant after all.[17] Bismullah was released to Afghanistan on January 17. Five other men, an Algerian and four Iraqis, were repatriated to custody of their home countries.

See also

References

  1. List of Individuals Detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from January 2002 through May 15, 2006. United States Department of Defense. URL accessed on 2006-05-15.
  2. "Q&A: What next for Guantanamo prisoners?". BBC News. 2002-01-21. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1773140.stm. Retrieved 2008-11-24. mirror </li>
  3. OARDEC. Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Bismullah, Haji. United States Department of Defense. URL accessed on 2007-11-22.
  4. OARDEC. [[[:Template:DoD detainees ARB]] Summarized Detainee Transcript]. United States Department of Defense. URL accessed on 2010-04-20.
  5. "US releases Guantanamo files". The Age. April 4, 2006. http://www.theage.com.au/news/World/US-releases-Guantanamo-files/2006/04/04/1143916500334.html. Retrieved 2008-03-15. </li>
  6. (Spc Timothy Book (Friday March 10, 2006). "Review process unprecedented". JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office. pp. 1. http://www.jtfgtmo.southcom.mil/wire/WirePDF/v6/TheWire-v6-i049-10MAR2006.pdf#1. Retrieved 2007-10-10. </li>
  7. 7.0 7.1 OARDEC. Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Bismullah, Haji. United States Department of Defense. URL accessed on 2007-11-22.
  8. OARDEC (November 3, 2005). "Summary of Administrative Review Board Proceedings for ISN 968". United States Department of Defense. pp. pages 83–94. http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/ARB_Transcript_Set_10_21352-21661.pdf#83. Retrieved 2007-11-22. </li>
  9. OARDEC (November 3, 2005). "Summary of Administrative Review Board Proceedings for ISN 968". United States Department of Defense. pp. pages 78–84. http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/ARB_Transcript_2599-2697.pdf#78. Retrieved 2007-11-22. </li>
  10. OARDEC (February 10, 2006). "Declaration of Haji Mohammed Wali". United States Department of Defense. pp. pages 85–95. http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/ARB_Transcript_2599-2697.pdf#78. Retrieved 2007-11-22. </li>
  11. OARDEC. Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Unknown, Bismullah. United States Department of Defense. URL accessed on 2009-01-18.
  12. OARDEC. Administrative Review Board assessment and recommendation ICO ISN 968. United States Department of Defense. URL accessed on 2009-01-18.
  13. OARDEC. Classified Record of Proceedings and basis of Administrative Review Board recommendation for ISN 968. United States Department of Defense. URL accessed on 2009-01-18.
  14. Lyle Denniston (May 10, 2007). "New developments on detainees". Scotusblog. Archived from the original on 2007-09-07. http://web.archive.org/web/20070907031146/http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2007/05/new_development.html. Retrieved 2007-09-18. </li>
  15. Bismullah v. Gates. (PDF) United States Department of Justice. URL accessed on 2007-09-18.
  16. Kristine A Huskey (Fall 2007). "Standards and Procedures for Classifying “Enemy Combatants”: Congress, What Have You Done?". Texas International Law Journal. http://tilj.org/journal/entry/43_41_huskey/. Retrieved 2008-04-29. </li>
  17. Carol Rosenberg (2009-01-17). "Six more detainees freed from Guantánamo". Miami Herald. http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation/story/858981.html. Retrieved 2009-01-18. Template:Dead link mirror </li> </ol>

External links

Template:WoTPrisoners Template:Afghanistan War


Warning: Default sort key "Bismullah, Haji" overrides earlier default sort key "Bagi, Abdul".

Abdul Hafiz

Abdul Hafiz is a citizen of Afghanistan who was held for six and a half years in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detainment camps, in Cuba.[1][2] His Guantanamo Internment Serial Number was 1030. American intelligence analysts estimate he was born in 1961.

According to the Associated Press the allegations against Hafiz, in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal, said he worked for a Taliban militia.[3] They state that when he was captured he had in his possession a satellite phone that was "linked to a slaying".

The detainee claimed that he wasn't Abdul Hafiz at all, that his name was really Abdul Qawi.[3] He said he was given the satellite phone by the real Abdul Hafiz, and didn't even know how to use it.

According to the Associated Press he complained about not being able to view the evidence against him, and told his Tribunal: "In our culture, if someone is accused of something, they are shown the evidence."

Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were usually held in a trailer.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Abdul Hafiz's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 4 October 2005. A copy with some marginal notations, and his name redacted, was released in March 2005. This memo was one of 169 released in 2005, that although redacted, had the captives ISN transcribed on them.[4] Another copy without the marginal notation was released in September 2007.[5] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

  • The detainee is a member of the Taliban and al Qaida.
  1. The detainee was affiliated with the death of two individuals in Kabul, Afghanistan, and worked for the Taliban 40-Man Militia group under a known Taliban commander.
  2. When captured, the detainee was in possession of a personnel phonebook and a satellite telephone.
  3. The detainee’s fingerprints were found on the phone.
  4. The detainee attempted to call an Al Qaida member who is linked to the murder of an International Committee of the Red Cross worker.
  5. The Al Qaida member is identified as a Taliban and Al Qaida commander.
  6. The detainee’s satellite phone has been linked to the International Committee of the Red Cross murder.
  7. The detainee admitted he knew that the phone in his possession contained telephone numbers of individuals who were enemies of the U.S.
  8. When the detainee was queried regarding his knowledge of the International Committee of the Red Cross murder, he stated he did not know where “he” was killed. Detainee was then advised that he was not provided information regarding the International Committee of the Red Cross’ gender.


Transcript

The individual the Guantanamo camp authorities identify as Abdul Hafiz chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[6]

Administrative Review Board hearings

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".[7]

Qawi's Board convened on March 1, 2005.

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat—or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Abdul Hafiz's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 22 February 2005.[8][9] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

The following primary factors favor continued detention

a. Commitment
  1. Detainee was affiliated with the death of two individuals in Kabul, Afghanistan, and worked for the Taliban 40-Man Militia group under a known Taliban commander.
  2. On 22 April 2003, the detainee, a suspect in the murder of an International Red Cross worker in Afghanistan was seized along with his personal phonebook and a Thuraya Satellite phone. All but one phone number listed in the memory of the phone is listed in the personal phonebook found on the detainee.
b. Connection / Association
  1. When captured, the detainee was attempting to call an al Qaida member who is linked to the murder of an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) worker.
  2. Detainee's satellite phone has been linked to the ICRC murder.
  3. When detainee was queried regarding his knowledge of the ICRC murder he stated he did not know where "he" was killed. Detainee was then advised that he was not provided information regarding the ICRC's gender.
  4. The detainee was identified as having been present at the Taliban Military Headquarters in Kandahar.
  5. The detainee participated in a paramilitary band related to Taliban Hezb-e-Islami (HIG).
  6. HIG has long established ties with Bin Ladin and is listed in the DHS Terrorist Organization Reference Guide.
c. Intent
  1. Detainee admitted he knew that the phone in his possession contained telephone numbers of individuals who were enemies of the United States.


The following primary factors favor release or transfer

  • The detainee denied knowing about al Qaida, working for the Taliban, and any association with the murder of the ICRC.
  • The detainee stated he did not use or know how ot use the satellite telephone.
  • The detainee denied all knowledge regarding the murder of the Red Cross worker. He advised that if the U.S. Government had proof that he was involved in the murder, then he should be shown that proof. The detainee said that he should otherwise be sent back to Afghanistan.


Transcript

The man the Guantanamo camp authorities identify as Abdul Hafiz chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.[10]

Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Abdul Hafiz's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 5 July 2006.[11] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention. 5 July 2006

The following primary factors favor continued detention Template:Thuraya

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee was affiliated with the death of two individuals in Kabul, Afghanistan and worked for the Taliban 40-man militia group under a known Taliban commander.
  2. On 22 April 2003, the detainee, a suspect in the murder of an International Committee of the Red Cross worker in Afghanistan, was seized along with his personal phonebook and a Thuraya Satellite phone. All but one phone number listed in the memory of the phone is listed in the personal phonebook found on the detainee.
  3. The detainee's satellite phone has been linked to the International Committee of the Red Cross murder.
b. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee was identified as having been present at the Taliban military headquarters in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
  2. The detainee participated in a paramilitary band related to Taliban Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin.
  3. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has long established ties with Usama bin Laden and is listed in the Department of Homeland Security's Terrorist Organization Reference Guide.
c. Intent
The detainee admitted he knew that the phone in his possession contained telephone numbers of individuals who were enemies of the United States.
d. Other Relevant Data
  1. When the detainee was queried regarding his knowledge of the International Committee of the Red Cross worker's muder he stated he did not know where "he" was killed. The detainee was then advised that he was not provided information regarding the International Committee of the Red Cross worker's gender.
  2. The detainee said that his mental instability and memory gaps may have made his previous statements inconsistent.


The following primary factors favor release or transfer

a. The detainee stated he did not use the satellited phone and he does not know how to use a telephone.
b. The detainee denied all knowledge regarding the murder of the International Committee of the Red Cross worker. The detainee advised that if the United States Government had proof that he was involved in the murder, then he should be shown that proof. The detainee said that he should otherwise be sent back to Afghanistan.


Repatriation

Carol Rosenberg, writing in the Miami Herald reported that Abdul Hafiz was one of twelve men transferred from Guantanamo on December 19, 2009.[12]

The other eleven men were: Ayman Batarfi, Jamal Alawi Mari, Farouq Ali Ahmed, Muhammaed Yasir Ahmed Taher, Fayad Yahya Ahmed al Rami, Riyad Atiq Ali Abdu al Haf, Sharifullah, Mohamed Rahim, Mohammed Hashim and Ismael Arale and Mohamed Suleiman Barre.[12] Sharifullah, Mohamed Rahim and Mohammed Hashim were also Afghans. Asmael Arale was the other Somali. The other six men were Yemenis.

References

  1. list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
  2. The Guantanamo Docket - Abdul Hafiz
  3. 3.0 3.1 Sketches of Guantanamo Detainees-Part I, WTOP, March 15, 2006
  4. OARDEC. Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- redacted'. United States Department of Defense. URL accessed on 2007-11-13.
  5. OARDEC. Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Hafiz, Abdul. United States Department of Defense. URL accessed on 2007-11-13.
  6. Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Abdul Hafiz's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 51-61
  7. Spc Timothy Book (Friday March 10, 2006). "Review process unprecedented". The Wire (JTF-GTMO). pp. page 1. http://www.jtfgtmo.southcom.mil/wire/WirePDF/v6/TheWire-v6-i049-10MAR2006.pdf#1. Retrieved 2007-10-12. </li>
  8. OARDEC (22 February 2005). "Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Hafiz, Abdul". United States Department of Defense. pp. pages 67–68. http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/ARB_Factors_Set_1_944-1045.pdf#67. Retrieved 2006-03-03. </li>
  9. OARDEC. Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Hafiz, Abdul. United States Department of Defense. URL accessed on 2007-11-13.
  10. Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Abdul Hafiz's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 136
  11. OARDEC. Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of. United States Department of Defense. URL accessed on 2007-11-06.
  12. 12.0 12.1 Carol Rosenberg (2009-12-19). "Guantánamo detention census drops to 198". Miami Herald. Archived from the original on 2009-12-20. http://www.webcitation.org/query?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.miamiherald.com%2Fnews%2Fbreaking-news%2Fstory%2F1390584.html&date=2009-12-20. </li> </ol>

External links

Template:WoTPrisoners


Warning: Default sort key "Hafiz, Abdul" overrides earlier default sort key "Bismullah, Haji".

Norullah Noori

Template:Infobox WoT detainees Mullah Norullah Noori is a citizen of Afghanistan held in extrajudicial detention in the United States's Guantanamo Bay detention camps, in Cuba.[1] His Guantanamo Internment Serial Number is 6. Intelligence analysts estimated he was born in 1967 in Shajoie, Afghanistan.

Norullah Noori arrived at Guantanamo on January 11, 2001, and has been held there for Template:For year month day.[2][3][4] The allegations used to justify his detention in Guantanamo assert he was an interim Provincial Governor -- of Jalalabad Template:sic, temporary governor of Mazari Sharif Template:sic and Governor of Balkh Province.[5][6]

Held aboard the USS Bataan

Former Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan Abdul Salam Zaeef described being flown to the United States Navy's amphibious warfare vessel, the USS Bataan, for special interrogation.[7] Zaeef wrote that the cells were located six decks down, were only 1 meter by 2 meters. He wrote that the captives weren't allowed to speak with one another, but that he "eventually saw that Mullahs Fazal, Noori, Burhan, Wasseeq Sahib and Rohani were all among the other prisoners." Historian Andy Worthington, author of the The Guantanamo Files, identified Noori as one of the men Zaeef recognized. He identified Mullah Wasseeq as Abdul-Haq Wasiq, Mullah Rohani as Gholam Ruhani and Mullah Fazal as Mohammed Fazil.

Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a 3 x 5 meter trailer. The captive sat with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor.[8][9] Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.[10]

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror.[11] This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Mullah Norullah Noori's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on August 8, 2004.[12] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. The detainee is a member of the Taliban.
  1. The detainee traveled to Kabul to serve as a security guard for a Taliban official.
  2. He leater worked as a security guard for the governor of Jalalabad carrying a Kalashnikov rifle.
  3. In 2000 the detainee moved to Mazar-E Sharif where he was a member of a 10-12 man team who provided security to the Governor.
  4. He was armed with a Kalashnikov while on guard duty.
  5. The detainee served as the acting governor in Mazar-E Sharif for 8 to 9 months prior to his capture.
b. The detainee participated in military operations against the coalition.
  1. He was fighting on the front lines at Masar-E-Sharif as a Taliban fighter. As the front lines in Masar-E-Sharif fell, he moved with a moajority of the remaining fighters to Kunduz to reestablish the front lines.
  2. He participated in a meeting where Taliban leaders decided to surrender to the Northern Alliance.
  3. He was captured by Northern Alliance forces along with a Taliban leader and five Taliban soldiers.


Transcript

Noori chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[13] On March 3, 2006, in response to a court order from Jed Rakoff the Department of Defense published a five page summarized transcript from his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[14]

Administrative Review Board hearing

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".[15]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat—or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Norullah Noori's first annual Administrative Review Board.[16]

The following primary factors favor continued detention

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee worked as a security guard for the governor of Jalalabad carrying a Kalashnikov rifle.
  2. In 2000 the detainee moved to Mazar-E-Sharif where he was a member of 1 10-12-man team who provided security to the Governor.
  3. The detainee served as the acting governor in Mazar-E-Sharif for 8 or 9 months prior to his capture.
b. Connections/Associations
The detainee traveled to Kabul to serve as a security guard for a Taliban official.
c. Other relevant data
The detainee participated in a meeting where Taliban leaders decided to surrender to the Northern Alliance.


The following primary factors favor release or transfer

a. CSRT
  1. The detainee testified: "I needed to survive, so I did work with the government, which was at the time the Taliban government and I work with them and that's the only mistake I made if you want to call it that, or that's the only thing I did."
b. Exculpatory
  1. The detainee emphasized this was merely a civilian position and he had no real political responsibilities within the Taliban. Additionally, he had no interaction with the leaders in the Taliban.
  2. The detainee admitted his allegiance with the Taliban as he was fearful of standing against the current governing body in Afghanistan.
  3. The detainee does not know any of the al Qaeda members detained at Guantanamo. He cannot interact with the Arabs as he does not speak their language.


Transcript

Noori chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.[17]

Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Norullah Noori's second annual Administrative Review Board.[18]

Third annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Norullah Noori's third annual Administrative Review Board.[19]

The following primary factors favor continued detention

a. Commitment
  1. In September 1995 the detainee fought alongside al Qaida as a Taliban military general, against the Northern Alliance. The detainee was responsible for the line near Murghab, Afghanistan in the vicinity of Herat, Afghanistan.
  2. The detainee claimed he joined the Taliban in 1999. He worked for the governor of Jalalabad, Afghanistan until December 1999. In February 2000 the detainee arrived in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.
  3. The detainee began working for the Taliban government as one of eight assistants to the Governor of Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.
  4. The detainee eventually became the governor of the Balkh Province, Afghanistan as was one of a very few tribal members who could read and write. The detainee held this position for about eight to ten months. The detainee received the title of Mullah due to his education and political position.
  5. The detainee was fighting on the front lines at Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan as a Taliban fighter. As the front lines in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan fell the detainee moved with a majority of the remaining fighters to Kunduz, Afghanistan to reestablish the front lines.
  6. While traveling from Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan to Zabol Province, Afghanistan, the detainee agreed to negotiate with Dostums forces regarding surrender of Taliban forces.
b. Training
The detainee's job required him to stand guard duty, armed with a Kalashnikov, at buildings. The detainee denied ever receiving any training for this position. The detainee stated that he never learned how to take the weapon apart, but he knew how to use it.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee was identified as the Taliban leader in charge of Mazar Bal, Afghanistan.
  2. The detainee's name appears on a list of key Taliban personalities.
  3. The detainee is a close associate of a high-ranking Taliban leader.
  4. The detainee hosted al Qaida commanders.
  5. The detainee held a meeting with the head of the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan, who discussed jihad in Uzbekistan.
  6. While serving as the goveror of Balkh province in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan the detainee met a subordinated of Usama bin Laden to pass a message from the Taliban supreme leader.
d. Intent
  1. As of late July 2003, Taliban leaders close to the detainee were leading efforts in Zabol province, Afghanistan to destablize the Afghan transitional administration.
  2. As of early November 2003, while he as the Taliban zone chief, the detainee provided assistance to a friend who was using profits from the sale of narcotics to provide material support to the Taliban and al Qaida. The detainee had given him money and provided him with a money exchange shop.
  3. A group of individuals, including a Taliban member, continue to work to support the detainee.
e. Other Relevant Data
The detainee was in charge of about 150 combat troops and one helicopter.


The following primary factors favor release or transfer

a. The detainee does not consider himself an enemy of the United States. The detainee has never believed that the United States. The detainee has never believed that the United States is an enemy of Afghanistan. The detainee reiterated that he never fought with or shot a gun at anyone.
b. The detainee advised that he did not know much about Usama bin Laden and had only heard of him on the radio. The detainee has never seen Usamam bin Laden.
c. The detainee said that he is not against the United States in any way. If the detainee were allowed to return home, he would attempt to obtain a position in the new government with the hope of being able to provide for his family. The detainee would hold nothing against the United States and would not give support to anyone who was against the United States.


Board recommendations

In early September 2007 the Department of Defense released two heavily redacted memos, from his Board, to Gordon England, the Designated Civilian Official.[20][21] The review board convened on January 31, 2007. The Board's recommendation was unanimous. The Board's recommendation was redacted. The Board's recommendation was forwarded to England on March 29, 2007. England authorized his continued detention on April 2, 2007.

Writ of habeas corpus

Norullah Noori had a writ of habeas corpus, Civil Action No. 08-cv-1828, filed on his behalf in late 2008, before US District Court Judge Ricardo M. Urbina.[22] On December 17, 2008 Patricia A. Sullivan filed a "status report" on his behalf. She reported that Norullah Noori had a DTA appeal filed on his behalf in 2007.

References

  1. List of Individuals Detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from January 2002 through May 15, 2006. United States Department of Defense. URL accessed on 2006-05-15.
  2. JTF-GTMO. Measurements of Heights and Weights of Individuals Detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Department of Defense. URL accessed on 2008-12-22. mirror
  3. Measurements of Heights and Weights of Individuals Detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (ordered and consolidated version). Center for the Study of Human Rights in the Americas, from DoD data. Archived from source 2009-12-21.
  4. Margot Williams (2008-11-03). "Guantanamo Docket: Mullah Norullah Noori". New York Times. http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/6-mullah-norullah-noor. Retrieved 2010-03-30. </li>
  5. John R. Bolton (2003). "Denied Persons Pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution". United States Federal Registry. http://en.wikisource.org/w/index.php?title=Denied_Persons_Pursuant_to_UN_Security_Council_Resolution. Retrieved 2010-11-03. </li>
  6. Neither Jalalabad or Mazari Sharif is a Province. They are cities.
  7. Abdul Salam Zaeef (2010). "Torture and Abuse on the USS Bataan and in Bagram and Kandahar: An Excerpt from “My Life with the Taliban” by Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef". Archived from the original on 2010-12-16. http://www.webcitation.org/query?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.andyworthington.co.uk%2F2010%2F12%2F12%2Ftorture-and-abuse-on-the-uss-bataan-and-in-bagram-and-kandahar-an-excerpt-from-my-life-with-the-taliban-by-mullah-abdul-salam-zaeef%2F&date=2010-12-16. "We were not permitted to talk to each other, but could see one another while the food was handed to us. I eventually saw that Mullahs Fazal, Noori, Burhan, Wasseeq Sahib and Rohani were all among the other prisoners, but still we could not talk to each other." </li>
  8. Guantánamo Prisoners Getting Their Day, but Hardly in Court, New York Times, November 11, 2004 - mirror
  9. Inside the Guantánamo Bay hearings: Barbarian "Justice" dispensed by KGB-style "military tribunals", Financial Times, December 11, 2004
  10. Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials. United States Department of Defense. URL accessed on 2007-09-22.
  11. "Q&A: What next for Guantanamo prisoners?". BBC News. 2002-01-21. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1773140.stm. Retrieved 2008-11-24. mirror </li>
  12. OARDEC. Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Noori, Mullah Norullah. United States Department of Defense. URL accessed on 2008-03-01.
  13. OARDEC. [[[:Template:DoD detainees ARB]] Summarized Statement]. United States Department of Defense. URL accessed on 2008-04-20.
  14. "US releases Guantanamo files". The Age. April 4, 2006. http://www.theage.com.au/news/World/US-releases-Guantanamo-files/2006/04/04/1143916500334.html. Retrieved 2008-03-15. </li>
  15. Spc Timothy Book (March 10, 2006). "Review process unprecedented". JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office. pp. 1. http://www.jtfgtmo.southcom.mil/wire/WirePDF/v6/TheWire-v6-i049-10MAR2006.pdf#1. Retrieved 2007-10-10. </li>
  16. OARDEC. Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Noori, Mullah Norullah. United States Department of Defense. URL accessed on 2008-09-28.
  17. Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Norullah Noori's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 26
  18. OARDEC. Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Noori, Mullah Norullah. United States Department of Defense. URL accessed on 2009-01-18.
  19. OARDEC. Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Noori, Mullah Norullah A.. United States Department of Defense. URL accessed on 2009-01-18. fast mirror
  20. OARDEC. Administrative Review Board assessment and recommendation ICO ISN 172. United States Department of Defense. URL accessed on 2007-03-29.
  21. OARDEC. Classified Record of Proceedings and basis of Administrative Review Board recommendation for ISN 172. United States Department of Defense. URL accessed on 2007-01-31.
  22. Patricia A. Sullivan. Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation: Doc 1347 -- PETITIONER MULLAH NORULLAH NOORI’S STATUS REPORT. United States Department of Justice. URL accessed on 2009-01-28.
  23. </ol>

External links

Template:Afghanistan War Template:WoTPrisoners


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