Fahmi Salem Said Al Sani

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Fahmi Salem Said Al Sani is a citizen of Wikipedia:Yemen, held in Wikipedia:extrajudicial detention in the Wikipedia:United States Wikipedia:Guantanamo Bay detainment camps, in Wikipedia:Cuba. His Guantanamo Wikipedia:Internment Serial Number is 554. The Department of Defense reports that he was born on May 17, 1977, in Mikala, Yemen.

As of December 3, 2009, Fahmi Salem Said al Sani has been held at Guantanamo for seven years 10 months.

Fahmi Salem Said al Sani arrived at the Guantanamo detention camps on February 15, 2002, and has been held there for Template:For year month day.

Background

According to Wikipedia:Andy Worthington, author of Wikipedia:The Guantanamo Files, al Asani was present at Wikipedia:Tora Bora, Wikipedia:Osama bin Ladens final hideout in Afghanistan, in the fall of 2001. In June 2012 Worthington described Al Sani as one of the captives who remains in Guantanamo, even though he has been cleared for release in 2007. Al Asani was one of the first captives to have his Wikipedia:habeas corpus petition turned down, in February 2010.

In December 2010 Wikipedia:Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a would-be Wikipedia:Nigerian Wikipedia:suicide-bomber, succeeded in boarding a flight to the USA, with his bomb. Abdulmutallab had been trained and equipped for his bomb-run in Yemen. In reaction the Obama administration froze all transfers of captives from Yemen.

Official status reviews

Originally it was the position of the Wikipedia:George W. Bush Presidency that captives were not covered by the Wikipedia:Geneva Conventions, but could nevertheless be held indefinitely, without charge. In 2004, in Wikipedia:Rasul v. Bush, the United States Supreme Court ruled that captives had to be given an opportunity to learn why they were being held.

OARDEC reviews

Following the Wikipedia:Rasul v. Bush ruling the Department of Defense established the Wikipedia:Office for the Administrative Review of Detained Enemy Combatants (OARDEC). Al Asani status was reviewed during a 2004 Combatant Status Review Tribunal in 2004, and three subsequent annual Annual Review Board hearings in 2005, 2006, 2007. He would have had an annual review in 2008 -- except his 2007 review had already recommended he be released.

Scholars at the Wikipedia:Brookings Institute, lead by Wikipedia:Benjamin Wittes, listed the captives still held in Guantanamo in December 2008, according to whether their detention was justified by certain common allegations:

• al Asani was listed as one of the captives who was alleged to have been associated with both the Wikipedia:Taliban and Wikipedia:al Qaeda.
• al Asani was listed as one of the captives who was alleged to have travelled to Afghanistan for jihad.
• al Asani was listed as one of the captives who was alleged to have stayed in Taliban, al Qaeda, or other Wikipedia:guesthouses in Afghanistan.
• al Asani was listed as one of the captives who was alleged to have taken military or terrorist training in Afghanistan]].
• al Asani was listed as one of the captives who was alleged to have been present at Tora Bora.
• al Asani was listed as one of the captives who was alleged to have had his names or aliases were found on material seized in raids on Al Qaeda safehouses and facilities.
• al Asani was listed as one of the captives who was alleged to have been a foreign fighter.
• al Asani was listed as one of the 34 captives who admitted “to some lesser measure of affiliation—like staying in Taliban or Al Qaeda guesthouses or spending time at one of their training camps.”

According to Wittes and his colleagues al Asani was one of the captives who had admitted to “some link with the Taliban or Al Qaeda that is not trivial but is not, in our judgment, sufficient for a CSRT panel to conclude that the detainee is either a member of or an operative on behalf of an enemy force.” He was one of five captives who admitted to a short period of training at an al Qaeda camp “but not to any other activity on Al Qaeda’s behalf.”

Wittes and his colleagues quoted the explanation al Asani offered for traveling to Afghanistan. “I felt it was important in coming of age. I went to Afghanistan for weapons training, not to fight anyone.”

Formerly secret JTF-GTMO assessment

On April 25, 2011 the whistleblower organization Wikipedia:WikiLeaks published formerly secret assessments drafted by Wikipedia:Joint Task Force Guantanamo

Criminal Investigative Task Force review

Al Asani's Joint Task Force Guantanamo review referred to separate reviews conducted by the Wikipedia:Criminal Investigative Task Force. Those reviews remains secret.

Writ of habeas corpus

A habeas corpus petition was initiated in 2005.

Al Asanis habeas petition was amalgamated with several other mens. By the time the Supreme court restored access to habeas to the Guantanamo captives, in its ruling in Wikipedia:Boumediene v. Bush on June 20, 2008, all but one of those other men, Wikipedia:Suleiman Awadh Bin Agil al Nahdi, had been transferred from Guantanamo. Al Nahdi had also been cleared for release by his 2007 annual status review.

Both al Asani and al Nahdi filed appeals of Justice Gladys Kesslers ruling. In commenting on the two men giving up their appeals Wikipedia:Benjamin Wittes, a senior scholar at the Wikipedia:Brookings Institute, noted that the press was focussing on how many of the habeas appeals had been endorsed by the United States District Court Judges who heard them, while ignoring how the more conservative DC Circuit Court of Appeals had overturned or remanded those rulings every time they had been appealed before it. Wittes noted al Asani and al Nahdi

“gave up their appeals entirely—thus acknowledging not merely that the law as developed by the D.C. Circuit makes their cases “hopeless” but that there is insufficient prospect of getting that law altered from on high to even ask the Supreme Court to consider the matter. I think that reflects an altogether rational assessment of where things stand. While the press has focused on the habeas “scorecard” and reported that the government is losing lots of cases, the D.C. Circuit has quietly reoriented the law so fundamentally that detainees are not even pursuing their appeals to the end. It’s quite a change.”

External links

• Who Are the Remaining Prisoners in Guantánamo? Part Two: Captured in Afghanistan (2001) Andy Worthington, September 17, 2010
• Human Rights First; Habeas Works: Federal Courts’ Proven Capacity to Handle Guantánamo Cases (2010)

Wikipedia:Template:Afghanistan War Wikipedia:Template:WoTPrisoners

Combatant Status Review Tribunal

[[Wikipedia:Image:Trailer where CSR Tribunals were held.jpg|thumb|Wikipedia:Combatant Status Review Tribunals were usually held in a trailer.]]

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Wikipedia:Geneva Conventions to captives from Wikipedia:the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct Wikipedia:competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of Wikipedia:prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Wikipedia:Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an Wikipedia:enemy combatant.

Allegations

The Department of Defense complied with a Wikipedia:Freedom of Information Act request, and released memoranda prepared for 507 of the 558 detainees whose classifications were reviewed by Combatant Status Review Tribunals. A memorandum summarizing the allegations Al Sani faced during his Tribunal in March 2005. The allegations Al Sani faced were:

a. The detainee is associated with an Wikipedia:al Qaida and the Wikipedia:Taliban:

1. The detainee departed Yemen for Wikipedia:Afghanistan on 16 July 2002.
2. The detainee was recruited in Yemen for Wikipedia:jihad training in Afghanistan.
3. The detainee along with others received travel documents and instructions from a facilitator in Yemen.
4. The detainee received tickets from a facilitator in Yemen.
5. The detainee along with others were required to leave passport, money, all other forms of identification at a guest house (Wikipedia:Mudafa) in Wikipedia:Kandahar, Afghanistan in return for a receipt of these inventoried items.
6. The detainee's name, alias, along with other personal property information was found on a list recovered during raids against al Qaida associated safe houses.
7. The detainee received training on the Kalashnikov rifle at Wikipedia:al Farouq.
8. The detainee received additional military training at another camp located near Wikipedia:Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

b. The detainee participated in military operations against the United States and its coalition partners.

1. The detainee was assigned to augment Taliban and al Qaida forces already in defensive positions in Wikipedia:Tora Bora.
2. The detainee was armed with a Kalashnikov rifle during the Wikipedia:Tora Bora campaign.
3. The detainee was injured by a United States air strike while retreating to Pakistan with other soldiers.
4. The detainee's group surrendered to Northern Alliance forces.

Testimony

Al Sani chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

Administrative Review Board hearings

thumb|Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".UNIQ--nowiki-0000005F-QINU3UNIQ--nowiki-00000060-QINU

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Wikipedia:Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Fahmi Salem Said Al Sani's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 20 June 2005. The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention. The following primary factors favor continued detention

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was encouraged to go to Afghanistan for training by his friend, Salam. Salam provided the detainee money from the bus trip from his home to Sana, Yemen.
2. The detainee's travel from Sana, Yemen, to Afghanistan was facilitated by Muath.
3. The detainee traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan via Pakistan in August 2001.
4. The detainee was required to leave passport, money, and all other forms of identification at a guesthouse in Wikipedia:Kandahar, Afghanistan, in return for a receipt of those inventoried items.
5. The detainee remained in Afghanistan after hearing about the events of September 11, 2001.
6. The detainee was assigned to augment Taliban and al Qaida forces already in defensive positions in Tora Bora, Afghanistan.
7. The detainee was injured during a U.S. bombing campaign in Tora Bora, Afghanistan, in December 2001.

b. Training

1. The detainee completed military training at Wikipedia:al Farouq.
2. The detainee received additional training at a camp located in a mountainous region very far from Kabul on the road towards Jalalabad.
3. Tje detaomee received training on the Kalashnikov rifle.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee heard a speech from Wikipedia:Usama Bin Laden (UBL) while at the al Farouq training camp.
2. The detainee saw Wikipedia:Ayman Al-Zawahiri, who accompanied UBL on his visit to the al Farouq training camp.
3. Ayman Al-Zawahiri is believed to be UBL's advisor and policy maker.
4. The detainee saw Wikipedia:Abu Gayth, who accompanied UBL on his visit to the al Farouq training camp.
5. Abu Gayth is the official spokesman for al Qaida.

d. Intent

1. The detainee stayed at the Wikipedia:Al-Nibras guesthouse.
2. The Al-Nibras guesthouse is a known collection point for al Qaida recruits.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee's name and information on his alias, nationality, passport, and personal belongings was found on a list of 324 suspected al Qaida members recovered from safehouse raids in Wikipedia:Karachi, Pakistan.

The following primary factors favor release or transfer

a. While at Guantanamo Bay, the detainee has very few citations, primarily for non-aggressive infractions including physical training, prayer, and eating in cell; talking with other detainees; and limited verbal assaults on guards.

b. The detainee stated his intention was to go to Afghanistan for a couple of months of training and then to return home. The detainee cited his inability to receive the mandatory military training in his own country as another reason he desired to receive the training.

Transcript

There is no record that Fahmi Salem Said Al Sani chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.

Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Fahmi Salem Said Al Sani's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 26 March 2006.

The following primary factors favor continued detention

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was encouraged to go to Afghanistan for training by his friend, Salam. Salam provided the detainee money fro the bus trip from his home to Sana, Yemen.
2. The detainee traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan via Pakistan in August 2001.
3. The detainee's travel from Sana, Yemen, to Afghanistan was facilitated by Muath.
4. Muath presented the detainee with a passport for the detainee that had a visa for Pakistan. Muath also provided the detainee and two other men with tickets from Sanaa to Karachi, Pakistan via Dubai.
5. After arriving in Karachi, the detainee and two other men met three other males of similar age who were also traveling with the detainee. They were all traveling to Pakistan to receive training in Afghanistan.
6. The detainee was required to leave his passport, money, and all other forms of identification at a guesthouse in Wikipedia:Kandahar, Afghanistan, in return for a receipt of those inventoried items.
7. The detainee remained in Afghanistan after hearing about the events of September 11, 2001.
8. The detainee traveled with approximately 45 others from the Wikipedia:Mudafa to the al Farouq training camp, Afghanistan where the detainee stayed for approximately two and a half weeks.
9. Training stopped in October 2001 due to United States attacks on Taliban targets.
10. The detainee was assigned to augment Taliban and al Qaida forces already in defensive positions in Tora Bora, Afghanistan.
11. The detainee was injured during a U.S. bombing campaign in Tora Bora, Afghanistan, in December 2001.
12. Near the end of Wikipedia:Ramadan (16 December 2001) United States Forces began bombing the detainee's location. With the assistance of a guide, the detainee and his group withdrew to another unspecified location. At this unspecified location, the detainee was injured in his lower right side by shrapnel from United States bombing.
13. The group subsequently surrendered to Afghan soldiers. The Afghan soldiers took the injured to a hospital in Kandahar, Afghanistan where the detainee spent a month and a half recuperating from his injuries.

b. Training

1. The detainee completed military training at Wikipedia:al Farouq.
2. Tje detaomee received training on the Kalashnikov rifle.
3. Training conducted at al Farouq training camp in September 2001 through October 2001 included three weeks of operation and maintenance of the Kalashnikov rifle.
4. The detainee received additional training at a camp located in a mountainous region very far from Kabul on the road towards Jalalabad.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee heard a speech from Wikipedia:Usama Bin Laden (UBL) while at the al Farouq training camp.
2. The detainee saw Wikipedia:Ayman Al-Zawahiri, who accompanied UBL on his visit to the al Farouq training camp.
3. Ayman Al-Zawahiri is believed to be UBL's advisor and policy maker.
4. The detainee saw Wikipedia:Abu Gayth, who accompanied UBL on his visit to the al Farouq training camp.
5. Abu Gayth is the official spokesman for al Qaida.
6. The detainee stayed at the Wikipedia:Al-Nibras guesthouse.
7. The Al-Nibras guesthouse is a known collection point for al Qaida recruits.
8. The detainee's name and information on his alias, nationality, passport, and personal belongings was found on a list of 324 suspected al Qaida members recovered from safehouse raids in Wikipedia:Karachi, Pakistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee had surgery on his back for wounds sustained in Afghanistan.

The following primary factors favor release or transfer

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee was queried if he knew where Usama bin Laden is, if Usama bin Laden spoke publicly about anti-American feelings, or planned attacks on the United States, with negative results.

b. The detainee was queried about plans to escape Guantanamo Bay or harm the guards, with negative results.

c. The detainee stated his intention was to go to Afghanistan for a couple of months of training and then to return home. The detainee cited his inability to receive the mandatory military training in his own country as another reason he desired to receive the training.

d. The detainee wants to go home. He wants to serve his parents if he ever goes home. The detainee has no specific career aspirations and believes that Allah will find him a job.

See also

• Wikipedia:Mohammed Al-Adahi v. George W. Bush

External Links

• Who Are the Remaining Prisoners in Guantánamo? Part Two: Captured in Afghanistan (2001) Andy Worthington, September 17, 2010
• Human Rights First; Habeas Works: Federal Courts’ Proven Capacity to Handle Guantánamo Cases (2010)