Essay by Tessaract2

This article contains content from Wikipedia An article on this subject has been nominated for deletion on Wikipedia: Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/ Science of morality Current versions of the GNU FDL article on WP may contain information useful to the improvement of this article

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Pretty much the opposite of what I think; I believe that science can eventually zero in on all the definitions, where Tesseract2 uses the divisions between what can be currently defined and what cannot to, well, did not read it all yet, but it seems, to discount ethics as unworkable in some ways. Too grand an opus to delete

The science of morality is the idea that morality can be prescribed only with the help of (and perhaps exclusively with) the philosophy of the scientific method. The science of morality also covers the methodological issues that might be involved. This concept was introduced by thinkers like Jeremy Bentham in the early 1800s. Sam Harris, in his 2010 book The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values, argues that "morality should be considered an undeveloped branch of science" examining what contributes to human well-being. He adds that "science" should not be so narrowly defined as to exclude the role of philosophy, or critical thinking about real life events in general. Critics, such as Sean M. Carroll, argue that morality cannot be part of science. Massimo Pigliucci believes that Harris ignores too much philosophy to offer as much to the moral debate as thinkers like Michael Sandel.

The term "science of morality" is also sometimes used for the description of moral systems in different cultures or species. For a description of how moral intuitions have evolved and emerged, see Moral psychology and the Evolution of morality.

A fact-value distinction has been traditionally used to argue that the scientific method cannot address "moral" questions beyond describing the norms of different civilizations. In contrast, Harris argues that the line between values and scientific facts is arbitrary and illusory; scientific moralists suggest that the subject of morality can be re-conceptualized as a young or "budding" science spanning various fields to provide a more reliable guide for society. In time, an emerging discipline of the science of morality could expand the reaches of science along the same lines as the psychology of happiness. There are many methodological issues for a science of morality to address.

History

All sciences start somewhere.

The history of the idea that science could help make moral prescriptions may be relatively new.

Sociologist Maria Ossowska thought that sociology was inextricably related to philosophical reflections on morality, including normative ethics. She proposed that a moral science consist of: (a) analysis of existing social norms and their history, (b) the psychology of morality, of the individual's interaction with moral matters, and (c) the sociology of morality.

The ideas of paleontologist and science writer Stephen Jay Gould oppose the science of morality. He argued that science and religion occupy "non-overlapping magisteria". To Gould, science is concerned with questions of fact and theory, but not with meaning and morality - the magisteria of religion. In the same vein, Edward Teller proposed that politics decides what is right, whereas science decides what is true.

The science of morality bears resemblances to philosophically consequentialist systems like utilitarianism (more modern versions of which are advocated by philosophers like Peter Singer). Utilitarian Jeremy Bentham, in his book "Deontology, or The Science of Morality" (published in 1834, after his death) discusses some of the ways moral investigations are a science. He criticizes deontological ethics for failing to recognize that it needed to make the same presumptions as his science of morality to really work - and yet it pursued rules that were to be obeyed in every situation (something that worried Bentham).

Positivism and pragmatism are also philosophies related to the science. Dewey, a pragmatist, maintains that overly theoretical moral systems are not useful in real life. He believes that moral considerations should not be oversimplified, but must instead make use of facts about everything from what we desire, what others desire, the nature of people, and even data about likely outcomes of behaviours..

Philosophical movements like eliminative and Revisionary materialism warn that science may need to redefine or eliminate concepts associated with flourishing as research progresses. In other words, the science of morality may never provide an immutable definition of the "flourishing" (i.e. "well-being") or good that it pursues, because it must adapt to new scientific knowledge. Still, Harris' use of the the term flourishing is far from meaningless; modern scientific understanding offers some insights beyond intuition (see positive psychology).

Some controversies over the science of morality also relate to value pluralism, ethical naturalism, empiricism and the philosophy of science in general.

Controversy

David Hume wrote about an "is–ought problem"; he was skeptical that one could deduce their way from claims about what is to claims about what ought to be. Hume's is-ought problem supports a fact-value distinction, the idea that the definition of values cannot rely on facts about reality. This idea was defended more explicitly by philosopher G.E. Moore in his open question argument. That is, more denied that one can satisfactorily define "good" in terms of natural facts, and commits a Naturalistic fallacy in trying (actually, he denied that one can define it in a reducible way at all- and considered "good" to be Sui generis).

The promoters of a "science of morality" (and ethical naturalists in general) reject that there is a fact-value distinction, or a naturalistic fallacy. This is to simply deny that the "is-ought problem" is relevant. Philosopher Russell Blackford criticizes Harris for occasionally making it sound like the science has "solved" the is-ought problem. That is, the science of morality does not deduce "oughts" from what "is".

Patricia Churchland offers that, accepting Hume's is-ought problem, the use of induction from premises and definitions remains a perfectly valid way of reasoning in life and science. At very least, "science can determine human values" only if morality and values are defined. Utilitarian John Stewart Mill made this point, explaining that one does not "prove" a definition of good. Thus, if one rejects the science's premise that "the morally good goal is to increase the flourishing of all conscious creatures", one would likely disagree that this science is making prescriptions that are "moral" in nature (also see the Criticisms section).

Theory

Summary

The scientific search for empirical facts requires operationalization. In other words, investigators do need to agree to define terms to some extent. Bentham believes this is part of how scientists can begin to debate moral facts; they must first define key terms like 'moral'. The challenge is that definitions, especially in science, are sometimes a little fuzzy (allowing for grey areas) and often require revison or elimination as knowledge progresses. For instance, in neuroscience, what was once one area may soon be more meaningfully described as three areas. Science thus applies a working taxonomy, but at the same time expects that the meaning of terms may evolve.

With these issues in mind, supporters of the moral science propose that researchers have a reasonably intuitive, and more than adequate working definition of what makes something 'moral': it is something that concerns the flourishing (wellbeing) of conscious creatures. Something that is morally good is that which increases flourishing, and morally bad that which decreases flourishing. Philosopher Elizabeth Anderson describes John Dewey's view that "We test scientific hypotheses by bringing about their antecedents and seeing if the results are as they predicted. Similarly, we test value judgments by acting on them and seeing if we value the consequences in the way the judgment predicted" Bentham was equally critical of philosophers who respected only classical texts, rather than scientific methods, to understand and improve their moral systems.

If it does not, in any way, concern conscious creatures, then it is devoid of morality these definitions. A universe full of nothing but rocks and dirt, for example, would be one without anything that can be meaningfully called "moral issues". This definition also gives meaning to the difference between a "general ought" and a "moral ought". That is, once researchers have agreed to terms, there is a difference between arguing that "he ought to use more poison on his victim, since he wants to be a good murderer" versus "he morally ought to use no poison at all, since he wants to be a morally good person".

Threatening violence against those who do not wish to wear burkas, or alternatively, empowering the freedom to choose, are unlikely to be equally effective ways of fostering well-being

Scientific moralists believe that science needs to begin pursuing and debating 'moral facts'- and that it is always possible (in theory) to be wrong about how to maximize flourishing in a situation. Someone may well be mistaken about how to optimize "flourishing" in humans (and other animals), a topic of ever increasing scientific understanding. Even though flourishing remains a rather fuzzy term, it is far from meaningless. A case in point: it is unclear whether stealing someone's pencil or stealing their eraser would be the less moral action. Yet is likely that, in the majority of cases, forcing one class of people to cover themselves at all times in burkas under threats of violence is less moral than empowering the freedom to choose. Moral scientists argue that to argue otherwise is to ignore what we know about humans, as well as all the moral strides that various societies have made against sexism, racism, etc.

Perhaps most importantly, Harris says that understanding morality through the lens of science will make the nature of our moral confusion more clear; we may never be absolutely certain of how best to pursue flourishing, or know all there is to know about what "flourishing" is, but the confusion now moves away from whether or not the flourishing of everyone would be a "morally good" thing. Scientific moralists say the flourishing of every conscious creature would of course be a morally good thing.

Harris also proposes that the science will empower critical thinkers to pass important "moral" judgement on the quality of fellow citizens' and societies' behaviors. In it's weakest form, the science of morality is the idea that we do not need divine authority to be critical of any so-called 'moral system' that causes unreasonable suffering. More strongly, it may mean that, once we accept the premises that are necessary for any empirical, secular, and philosophical discussion, we can define "morality" in a relevant way. Presumably, we can then use the aforementioned methods (which Harris says are all parts of science- broadly defined) to provide some of the best answers to now defined moral questions. Namely, which values (e.g. free speech or government censorship) are more likely to maximize the well-being of all conscious creatures?

Defining "morality"

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An emotion has both objective and subjective elements

The first step for the so-called science of morality may not be a revelation or discovery, but rather to establish early working definitions (that will evolve with time). Operationally defining terms is an important part of science, as demonstrated by the attempts of positive psychology to address topics about which many are opinionated. In such areas of science that overlap with philosophy or religion, arguments over the supposed essence of a word sometimes stand in the way of progress. That is, discussions risk becoming arguments over what the definition of a word should be, rather than simply agreeing on other working definitions in order to facilitate communication.

In psychology in general, it is granted that subjective experiences very often correspond to objective facts (e.g. about the brain). For instance, clinical depression certainly has a subjective component (when feelings of depression are experienced by an individual) but it has also been operationally defined and objectively studied (e.g. described in terms of physical characteristics of the brain, resulting in a biology of depression).

As Michael Shermer explains, this is where the science of morality begins. "The first principle is the well-being of conscious creatures, from which we can build a science-based system of moral values by quantifying whether or not X increases or decreases well-being". Activities like lying or stealing, and even certain cultural values, for example, will be more morally "wrong" because they tend to cause more suffering than alternative group practices. The science of morality, then, is also a social morality; it must mediate between the varied needs and desires of many individuals.

Empirical investigation into physics would not be distracted if a pseudoscience adopted and misused the term "center of gravity"

What one ought to do to be moral depends on there being definition of what constitutes a 'moral' goal in the first place. A case in point: it seems one ought not to infect themselves with various diseases and eat rotten foods if one has a goal of being healthy. But there is no meaningfully 'healthier choice' (any more than there is a 'moral choice') unless we define these terms. As mentioned above, modern psychology suggests there are facts about the way that brain activity results in well-being or suffering. This includes facts about which patterns of thought, policies or actions tend to promote such neural events. Harris describes how societies at least try to maximize people's well-being as best they understand it, and that they often call these 'moral' discussions.

John Dewey described how part of the moral process can sometimes mean shifting one's values according to how well they satisfy some more primitive, even partially unconscious values or desires. He provides the example of the connoisseur; one may be better able to discern the relevant factors of a meal which make it more or less enjoyable. The connoisseur is thus better able to select such higher order values. Dewey also believes that understanding the means to an end is an important part of understanding the ends themselves. The relative weightings of qualities of a suit, for example, are not fixed for the shopper, but rather established throughout the process of considering possible uses for the suit (e.g. "Ok, so they come in different colours, and now that I think of it, my Boss likes Blue- so I want blue"). Values, to Dewey, are thus determined and modified to some extent based even on facts of the moment.

Now with formal definitions of morality, discussions that have no bearing on "the flourishing of conscious creatures" would so simply not be moral discussions. Of course, operationalizing terms related to morality or physics does not prevent alternative use outside the scientific community.

Disputed terms in science

There may be some disagreement over the exact definitions of happiness and suffering, concepts of great importance to the science of morality, but Harris says that these disagreements should not be taken too seriously. He mentions that even a lack of firm agreement in the scientific community over terms like "life" or "health" has not prevented researchers from making progress. Furthermore, it is even less likely that a community's use of the term "healthy" in an unjustified manner would have any effect on the progress of scientists.

In practice, this is thanks to the fact that researchers often establish and agree on other clear working definitions (the focus is to avoid debating words beyond necessity). Moreover, the usefulness of these scientific constructs can be subjected to tests of construct validity. This is one sense in which some definitions can be better than others. For instance, just as scientists have generally agreed on practical grounds of sorting "Earth's atmosphere" into 5 categories (i.e. layers), so too might they decide to sort "flourishing" practically into a number of categories (e.g. positive psychology is exploring the possibility that happiness comes in generally 3 varieties).

The scientific community does not take every dissenter seriously, and could reject 'personal sciences of morality' just as it does personal physics

Harris also warns that the precise definition of "flourishing", like "health", may also change over time. Ancient civilizations, where life expectancies were around 25 years old, may not have expected we could some day consider healthy an individual living comfortably to over 80 years old. Likewise, humans are continuing to make strides in moral development, attaining new heights of cooperation and empathy, and discovering new horizons in the use of the word "flourishing" - the same way we have for the word "healthy". Jeremy Rifkin describes such key moral revolutions throughout human history in The Empathic Civilization, and predicts a new revolution in which we overcome our tribe focused empathy and extend it to others we may never meet.

Scientists frequently exclude individuals for not conforming to agreed-upon terms of discourse (e. g. young earth creationists). Harris says they are right to do so, and proposes that it is even more important that scientists exclude from empirical moral discussions those who are not interested in a society's flourishing (e. g. psychopaths like Ted Bundy - see left). If scientists were to accept these terms of moral discourse, for example, any individual who opts to define "moral" as "that which pleases Leprechauns" would have no place in scientific discussions - since they would be rejecting scientific nomenclature. Another way of putting it: such an individual is using the same words, but referring or talking about different things.

Bentham was opinionated regarding the purpose of what he called "morality". He says "To detect the fallacies which lie hid under the surface, to prevent the aberrations of sympathy and antipathy, to bring to view and to call into activity those springs of action whose operation leads to an undoubted balance of happiness, is the important part of moral science."

"Moral facts"

Harris argues that there may be multiple peaks on the moral landscape of optimized human societies, but even more ways for a society not to be on a peak

Michael Shermer opines that "It doesn't take rocket science- or religion" to deem acid throwing to be wrong. Evolutionary biologist David Sloan Wilson also describes how, even though philosophers often highlight and discuss some of the most challenging moral situations, there are still many more "moral no brainers". Such extreme cases could even be more important to deal with than the grey areas. Furthermore, there are still objective facts about things that are relative (i.e. relational facts). For example, it might be a fact (not subject to anyone's opinion) that Alex would like to play a musical instrument more than would Jamie. Alex would flourish given the opportunity, but Jamie would not (unless Jamie's preferences change). It may therefore be a fact that it is more morally good to give the instrument to Alex than to Jamie precisely because the two people value different things; the moral fact does not depend on whether the individuals care about what would maximize flourishing, nor whether one ultimately decides to exploit the other (see above).

It may also be the case that a science of morality leads us to multiple "moral peaks", optimal ethical systems. Harris believes this would be a success. This is because identifying moral peaks would necessarily mean identifying the more obviously sub-optimal ethical systems (and maybe some frequent components of flourishing societies). Some religious intuitions about what is right may be vindicated by science; this can happen whether or not the beliefs were held for "justified" reasons in the first place.

Physicist Lawrence M. Krauss goes further; not only can science tell us what is right and wrong, but he says that to reject science is to reject moral knowledge. Krauss argues that knowing something is moral entails knowing various facts about reality. Furthermore, he says that science has already shown us that the world is very often not what we expected (e.g. made of atoms). He concludes that knowing those facts which are most relevant to moral appraisals is impossible without science's systematic empirical investigation. Krauss uses the example of Embryonic stem cell research, and suggests that various morally relevant facts have been discovered by science, and would not have otherwise been known.

As with all sciences, various philosophical, religious and intuitive moral views will be validated (and others rejected)

It is unlikely that humans will create a machine that can answer all moral questions; the complexity of situations where flourishing is at stake does not lend itself to simple, unconditional rules. Dewey refuses to provide supreme principles or laws of morality because he believes real life is too dynamic. The science might tentatively advocate general values (like high degrees of Free speech) and rules of thumb (like the Golden rule). Yet even a rule like "never cut open a child's stomach against their will" may find exception in certain cases of emergency appendectomy. Likewise, it may sometimes be as practically impossible to determine the more moral route as it is to determine the number of birds in flight around the earth. Certainty is not required for the existence of Truths, however.

Dewey offers that certain habits (of thought or action) promote more satisfaction than others. A case in point, those habits which themselves make habits more flexible are extremely important. This is because context is important to moral considerations, and the rules that work in one situation or society may not work as well in others. He nevertheless mentions independent thought, critical inquiry, experimentation, imagination, and sympathy for others as generally reliable rules of thumb. Dewey is also extremely critical of any supposed moral system which emphasizes uncritical obedience- because this only damages people's ability to learn better values.

Moral traditions which focus on "will" may also be obsolete. Dewey called it "magical thinking" to believe that a desire to control immoral habits is enough to actually control them. He advocates the use of various methods to make it easier for people to do the right thing, and recognizes that some situations make it more challenging than others. These issue of moral responsibility are especially relevant in light of modern science, including the Neuroscience of free will.

To the extent that there are moral facts, individuals or groups can be mistaken about these facts (the illusion of introspection) and others may be moral experts (e.g. the Dalai Lama). For instance, over-emphasizing a value like submission might lead to more suffering than other values. Thus some groups or individuals, like the Taliban, may have as little a place in serious discussions about morality as they do in discussions about string theory. Harris argues, "just as there is no such thing as Christian physics or Muslim algebra, there can be no Christian or Muslim morality." Harris also adds a caveat: believing that some moral scientists are approaching truths does not imply an "orwellian future" with "scientists at every door". Instead, Harris imagines data about normative moral issues being shared the same way every other science (e.g. peer-reviewed journals).

Personism argues that we must include non-humans, to some extent, in any conception of a moral society.

Research

See also: Positive psychology

The science of morality should identify basic components required for human flourishing, drawing heavily on findings from positive psychology. In a proto-scientific example, Abraham Maslow suggested a hierarchy of needs: basic physical survival, then social and self esteem needs, and lastly philosophical and self-actualization. In contemporary positive psychology, three years of research resulted in a systematic classification and measurement of universal strengths and virtues, Martin E. P. Seligman and Christopher Peterson's Character Strengths and Virtues.

Research looking for optimal ethical systems can draw on all the methods of science, especially those used by positive psychology. While this might include obvious methods like asking people to self-report what they think they need to flourish in life - psychology has shown that people are often surprisingly incorrect on these matters (particularly when it comes to making predictions and recollections). Some cases in point: having too many varieties of consumer goods actually creates consumer choice anxiety; when it comes to removing bandages, Dan Ariely's research suggests that "getting it over with as quickly as possible" may cause more negative memories than if one went slowly (with breaks) while being careful never to reach a 'peak' in pain; stress is not always harmful (such stress is called Eustress). While very careful use of self-report can still be illuminating (e.g. bogus pipeline techniques), in the end, unconscious methods of inquiry seem to be more promising. Some unconscious methods of data collection include implicit association tests (IAT) and neuroimaging. In these ways, science can further our understanding of what humans need to flourish, and what ways of organizing society provide the greatest hope for flourishing.

Science has already begun connecting concepts like sadness with physical structures in the brain

Nobel prize winner Eric Kandel and researcher Cynthia Fu describe their findings that depression can be diagnosed very accurately just by looking at fMRI brain scans. This is because researchers have made strides identifying neural correlates for, among other things, emotions. A doctor's second opinion would still be used, they explain. But the two researchers suggest that mental illnesses may someday be diagnosable by looking at such brain scans alone.

Extensive study of cooperation has shed some light on the objective (and subjective) advantages of teamwork and empathy.

Egalitarians point out the various adverse effects of the trickle up effect (when money flows from the poor to the rich) when it causes Economic inequality. Psychologist Daniel Gilbert also explains, in his book Stumbling on Happiness, why excessive luxury goods (over and above having basic needs met) does not lead as reliably to happiness as a good job and social network.

Implications

Philosopher Paul Kurtz coined the term "Eupraxophy" to refer to a type of scientific and philosophical approach to normative ethics. Kurtz believes that the careful, secular pursuit of normative rules is vital to society.

Answering the question of why so many people hate so strongly, former president George Bush explained to a group of school children that "there is evil in the world. But we can overcome evil. We're good". Physicist David Deutsch explains that, although secularists may wince at Bush's use of the word "good",

"...civilisation will survive the miscellaneous evils that one finds in a mature, Western religion — such as Bush's opposition to abortion, and the like. But it would not, pace Richard Dawkins, survive the typical non-believer's (pre-September-11) take on the nature of morality. We non-believers have failed too. What comes next is that we must correct that failure, by incorporating into the Western tradition of critical rationalism an objective conception of right and wrong."

To Deutsch, this means defending (as peacefully as possible, but ultimately by any means necessary) values including tolerance, openness, reason, respect for others. He adds that such a moral framework allows an alternative to war only if both sides embrace it.

Sean M. Carroll maintains that, although we would like it to be, morality is not a scientific domain.

The science of morality engages questions of flourishing (using the scientific method) regardless of whether God exists

Some philosophersTemplate:specify worry that morality must be understood in relation to some sort of God in order to justify moral responsibility. That is, they question the validity of any secular ethics that conceive of morality without religion or God.

Utilitarian philosopher Peter Singer argued in his book, The Life You Can Save, that it is important for all conscious creatures for nations to have "cultures of giving".

Critics have suggested that a belief that some cultures are "wrong" or somehow less optimal could lead to paternalism. As a result, one nation may force their own culture upon another - particularly because moral realists risk becoming dogmatic in their decisions about what is "bad". On the other hand, if it is agreed that a culture is suffering unduly - it may be a good thing if the other cultures save them from themselves. Besides, this need not require force, as persuasion and example can be far more effective.

Criticism

To the extent that utilitarianism is a sort of science of morality, some criticsTemplate:citation needed have suggested that the two will share many of the same challenges.

It does not motivate people

CriticsTemplate:citation needed might propose that the science of morality fails to answer the question "even having defined good, why do it?", a prerequisite of any moral system. One response is to argue along the same lines as Albert Einstein when he said "Science has therefore been charged with undermining morality, but the charge is unjust. A man's ethical behavior should be based effectually on sympathy, education, and social ties and needs; no religious basis is necessary. Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear of punishment and hopes of reward after death." That is, humans possess abilities to appreciate suffering in others, and this empathy can be further developed by nurturing and practice. Thus, rather than necessarily making decisions based on egotism, a human may certainly be most motivated to altruistically focus on those drives that lead to improvements in the situations of others.

Undesirable pursuits of flourishing

Many criticisms of the science of morality revolve around the implications of calling "good" what allows a society to flourish.

An obvious criticism is the claim that a science of morality might produce an ethical system where everyone hedonistically pursues merely their own interests. The scientific moralist might respond that such a system is not "good" as defined above, since it is not optimal for the flourishing of everyone in society. Moreover, there may be relativity in which pursuits cause flourishing and when (e.g. the same meal that disgusts one person could please another, the same meal that pleases that person could disgust them in another context, etc.) but this relativity obeys natural facts which science can attempt to understand in its consideration of all conscious creatures.

A more contemporary worry is that birth rates go down as education goes up. Detractors of a moral science propose that living humans may some day decide that they would not flourish by raising children, dooming the human race without moral grounds to continue the species. Scientific moralists might appeal to reasons it may be advantageous for the living to have children. Others would grant that this would mean the end of the human race but that, if this unlikely situation obtained, it would clearly not be a "bad" thing.

It is highly possible that ignorance is bliss. Even if the ignorant are, to some extent, blissful, scientific moralists would again have grounds to doubt that it is "morally good" since it carries very real risks to the individual, but even more to the flourishing of others.

Moral relativity or subjectivism

Harris engages various issues he thinks might be raised by relativist (see above). Moral relativists point out that different cultures, and even individuals, use 'morality' to mean different things. They may argue that scientists' defining "morality" as "maximizing people's flourishing" still amounts to just one culture's view (i.e. a different culture may value service to nature above people's lives). The idea is that simply defining 'morality' grants no additional sort of authority to power - or more strongly, that there is no such authority at all when one group rejects the norms of the other.

The disagreement, then, may be a practical one. That is, why does the definition of morality matter if nothing has changed: there may well be facts about what tends to promote human flourishing (complete with exceptions to the rules), and it will still be the case that many are ignorant or in denial about such facts. At very least, this seems to be a case for abandoning the word "morality", which has metaphysical connotations to many, and adopting new language (e.g. from law, defining what it means to be a "good citizen")Template:Citation needed.

On the other hand, Sam Harris does not seek some divine authority. Nor does he imply that, once we define morality, everyone will feel some metaphysical urge to be moral - or have their metaphysical being punished for going against it. Instead, he seeks to show how "morality" can be meaningfully understood through science. Harris says, about morality, science, and even rationality in general: "A person can always play the trump card, "What is that to me?" -- and if we don't find it compelling elsewhere, I don't see why it must have special force on questions of good and evil". A person can always question or reject the terms of discourse (even in science). Harris maintains, however, that we can talk about morality as scientifically as anything else. He further argues that, in terms of public relations, we should not refrain from criticizing other groups or societies that cause their people to suffer unduly, or risk our own flourishing. Ronald Lindsay, President of the Center for Inquiry, made a similar point, and argued that scientists and skeptics should use the word "morality", because of the important connotations it still has with many people when it comes to motivating action.

Other Proponents

Prominent contemporary ethical naturalists include Peter Railton, Frank Jackson, and the so-called Cornell Realists: Nicholas Sturgeon, David O. Brink, and Richard Boyd.

A legislature discusses what is best for their society.

Ronald A. Lindsay is a bioethicist, lawyer, and chief executive officer and senior research fellow of the Center for Inquiry. He likens discussions of morality, like discussions of the theory of evolution, to consist of arguments about details that are too often confused as arguments over basic tenets. In these moral discussions, he says, we often fail to go deeper than mere slogans. Lindsay says that morality is the practical enterprise of pursuing peace and happiness. He places great emphasis on the methodology of analyzing morality, and suggests that we: (a) gather the foundations on which we all agree, (b) identify the more culturally relative and relevant norms, and (c) analyze and create our moral system according to facts provided by science.

Richard Dawkins had openly stated that science has little to say directly about morality. He has since said, about the science of morality as friend and colleague Harris presents it in The Moral Landscape, that it "changed all that for me" . In a an online interview, Dawkins again says that he believes that Sam Harris makes relevant points, and that, once one defines the moral goal as maximizing the wellbeing of creatures, science has much to say about what is actually morally good.

Patricia Churchland is a philosopher who supports eliminative materialism. To Churchland, the ideas of philosophers should be grounded in science, making them more like "theoretical" scientists. She cites known facts about early visual processing, explaining that valence is assigned to stimulus subconsciously; this process is seen in children and may have a large biological component. Churchland uses this an example of science limiting the scope of relevant philosophical theories. Churchland does, however, warn that we must not take a science of morality to mean that academics will always be right, nor should we assume that it is always right to intervene in the lives of others. Doubt, she says, is most important for facts about morality - because the mistaken belief that one has the moral high ground has lead to great suffering throughout history.

Steven Pinker says that science, broadly enough defined to consist of general reason and evidence based belief, is certainly how we learn what is right and wrong. On the other hand, Pinker says that "science" is often understood as separate from philosophy and other necessary components of good moral thinking, which would make science necessary but insufficient. Asked whether science can tell us what is right and wrong, Pinker says "Yes and No", depending on how broadly or narrowly a science is being discussed. In debate, Peter Singer expressed the same contingent agreement with the idea of a science of morality (i.e. he agrees that broadly defined, science can tell us what is right and wrong). Sam Harris explained that he is appealing to the broad use of 'science' which he says means more than lab coated researchers in laboratories - it includes secular philosophizing and scientific theory.

The capability approach to economics, which takes seriously the measurement of human wellbeing, has a great deal in common with the science of morality. It has been explored by philosophers Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum.

Other relevant domains

Biology

Evolutionary biology, The Evolution of Cooperation, Evolutionary ethics, Evolution of morality

Economics

Pareto efficiency, Welfare economics

Law

The Oakes Test

Mathematics

Game theory

Philosophy

Philosophy of Law, Morality, Utilitarianism

Psychology

Positive psychology

See also

• Altruism in animals
• Moral psychology
• Value (personal and cultural)
• Moral skepticism
• Moral nihilism
• Ethical calculus
• Felicific calculus
• Jonathan Haidt
• Max Scheler

Further reading

• Kohlberg's stages of moral development
• The Science of Good and Evil, a book by Michael Shermer