Bahtiyar Mahnut

This article contains content from Wikipedia An article on this subject has been nominated for deletion on Wikipedia: Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/ Bahtiyar Mahnut Current versions of the GNU FDL article on WP may contain information useful to the improvement of this article

WP+ NO DEL

Bahtiyar Mahnut (born January 18, 1976) is an Uyghur refugee best known for the seven and a half years he spent in the United States Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, in Cuba. His Guantanamo Internment Serial Number was 277. The Department of Defense reports that Mahnut was born on January 18, 1976, in Ghulja, China.

Until his transfer to Switzerland on March 23, 2010 Bahtiyar Mahnut had been confined in the Guantanamo detention camps for more than seven and a half years despite it becoming clear as early as 2003 that he like the other Uyghurs in Guantanamo were innocent.

He won his habeas corpus in 2008. Judge Ricardo Urbina declared his detention as unlawful and ordered to set him free in the United States.

Until his transfer to Switzerland on March 23, 2010 Bahtiyar Mahnut had been confined in the Guantanamo detention camps for more than seven and a half years despite it became clear as early as 2003 that he like the other Uyghurs in Guantanamo were innocent.

This article may contain material from Wikipedia An article on this subject has been redirected to another page on WP: Bahtiyar Mahnut Current versions of the GNU FDL article on Wikipedia may contain information useful to the improvement of this article

WP R E D

Combatant Status Review

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in small trailer, the same width, but shorter, than a mobile home. The Tribunal's President sat in the big chair. The detainee sat with their hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor in the white, plastic garden chair. A one way mirror behind the Tribunal President allowed observers to observe clandestinely. In theory the open sessions of the Tribunals were open to the press; three chairs were reserved for members of the press. In practice, most Tribunals went unobserved; the Tribunal only intermittently told the press that Tribunals were being held, and when they did they kept the detainee's identities secret. Only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed Navy photo by Photographer’s Mate 1st Class Christopher Mobley

Originally the Bush (WP) Presidency asserted that captives apprehended in the wars for capitalism and oil, known as the "war on terror" were not covered by the Geneva Conventions, and could be held indefinitely, without charge, and without an open and transparent review of the justifications for their detention. They were not offered the protections afforded by criminal law either, leaving them in a legal limbo through years of detention. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligations, and to keep the Geneva Conventions at arms' length, the concept of competent tribunals was invented, tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

The Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (WP). The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants, again to avoid the Geneva Conventions standards -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant, further attempting to institutionalize a standard that stood against the consensus of international law.

Critics mounted legal challenges to this policy. Justice James Robertson ruled that the United States was obliged under article 5 of the Wikipedia:third Geneva Conventionthird Geneva Convention to treat all prisoners as lawful combatants, who would be entitled to prisoner of war status, unless a "competent tribunal" had determined that they were not lawful combatants.

The policies of the tribunals themselves were also challenged by the Judicial branch. In 2004 the United States Supreme Court ruled, in Rasul v. Bush, that Guantanamo captives were entitled to being informed of the allegations justifying their detention, and were entitled to try to refute them.

The released prisoners are arrogantly, even absurdly called "No longer enemy combatants" (WP); an attempt to make numerous issues, including illegal arrest and holding without trial, disappear in plain sight.

Mahnut was among the 60% of prisoners who chose to participate in tribunal hearings.

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Mahnut Bahtiyar's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 29 September 2004.

a Detainee is a member of Al Qaida.

1. detainee was in a Uighur training camp in Tora Bora from June 2001 to November 2001, and left the camp after the United States air campaign began.
2. Detainee was trained on the Kalashnikov rifle and tactics.
3. Detainee is a member of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM).
4. The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement is an Islamic extremist movement linked to Al Qaeda.
5. Detainee was arrested with Arabs as a Pakistan mosque.

Transcript

Mahnut participated in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal. His Tribunal convened on 23 October 2004 and 27 October 2004.

On March 3, 2006, in response to a court order from Jed Rakoff the Department of Defense published an eighteen page summarized transcript from his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

Witness requests

According to the study entitled, No-hearing hearings, Mahnut was an example of a captive whose witness rrequests were arbitrarily denied:

"For example, ISN 277 requested 17 witnesses, and the Tribunal President decided that he could only

have two of them, because he determined that 'all of the witnesses would probably testify similarly, if not identically.' No basis is given for the belief that the witnesses would testify similarly or identically, and, as ISN 277’s personal representative pointed out to the Tribunal, there is no basis in the CSRT procedures for denying a witness based on redundancy."

Mahnut's two witnesses were Saidullah Khalik and Hajiakbar Abdulghupur.

Personal Representative's comments on ISN 277's Tribunal

Personal Representative were asked if they wanted to comment on their captives' Tribunals. Mahnut's Personal Representative was one of the very few who did comment.

He or she was critical of the President of Tribunal panel 12 for refusing to hear all of his witnesses, and for cutting off the testimony of one of the witnesses they had allowed.

The President justified cutting off the witness based on the assertion that the witnesses were never allowed to make unsolicited comments.

Commander Karen M Gibbs, the military lawyer who provided a legal sufficiency review, noted that the Tribunal President had not offered a justification for refusing to allow the testiomny of Mahnut's witnesses. But, in the end, Commander Gibbs concluded that the witnesses would not have made a difference to the conclusion the Tribunal drew.

Bahtiyar Mahnut is a 28-year-old Chinese citizen who is an ethnic Uighur from Ghalga province of China. Mahnut left China in May 2001 with the goal of reaching a western democracy (America) to live a better life. He was last interviewed at the end of 2002. He had disciplinary action on 4 March 2003 for participating in a riot in which he threw water, milk, food, body fluids, and feces on guards. Sabit Template:Sic is suspected as being a probable member of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). He is suspected of having received training in an ETIM training camp in Afghanistan.

The information paper also identified him as "Sadir Sabit".

Bahtiyar Mahnut v. George W. Bush

A writ of habeas corpus, Bahtiyar Mahnut v. George W. Bush, was submitted on Bahtiyar Mahnut's behalf. In response, on 20 September 2005 the Department of Defense released 39 pages of unclassified documents related to his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

He appeared before Tribunal panel 12. His Tribunal President disputed that he had denied Mahnut due process.

Summary of Evidence memo

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".

Following the Supreme Court's ruling that prisoners the Department of Defense set up the Office for the Administrative Review of Detained Enemy Combatants. Gul attended his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board (WP) hearings. The US government, careful to avoid the standards of international law, made a point of declaring that Administrative Review Boards were not authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, as this would have invoked the Geneva Convention standards. They further distanced the ARB boards from international consideration by distancing the ARB boards from the CSRT and the government's own definition of "enemy combatant", by not authorizing the ARB boards to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were set on a purely opportunistic venture to assess the government's self interest, in the manner of the villain holding a gun to a hostage's head and saying, "don't make me do this". "If we do the right thing and release these prisoners, the board asked, "will we be inconveniencing ourselves?" And so they considered whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Bahtiyar Mahnut's Administrative Review Board, on 23 August 2005. The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

The following primary factors favor continued detention

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stayed in a Uighur guesthouse in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
2. The detainee, along with a group of Uighurs and Arabs, fled Afghanistan when the United States began bombing the Tora Bora Mountain area.

b. Training

The detainee received military training on the Kalishnikov rifle at a Uighur training camp in the Tora Bora Mountains of Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee attended a camp run by the Eastern Turkestan Organization (ETO).
2. Hassan Mashum, the leader of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party, visited the detainee's training camp in Afghanistan while the detainee was there. While at the camp, Mashum lead prayer and gave a speech about the conditions of the Uighurs in China and the lack of funding at the training camp.
3. Maksud aligned his organization with Usama Bin Laden (UBL) and it is now considered part of al Qaida. Since 2000, its core has been located at an al Qaida camp near Tora Bora. The fighters, under the authority of UBL, are considered a combat sub-unit of the Taliban.
4. The Secretary of State has designated The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement ETIM as Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). ETIM is a small Islamic extremist group based in China's western Xinjiang Province. ETIM is one of the most militant of the ethnic Uighur separatist groups pursuing an independent "Eastern Turkistan." ETIM is suspected of having received training and financial assistance from al Qaida.
5. ETIM reportedly has financial support and direction from Usama Bin Laden, recruiting within Eastern China and shipping recruits to training camps in Afghanistan. These recruits then return to China to conduct terrorist activities and extend their influence. Training includes religious extremist theory, terrorism, explosives, and assassination. Some training camps also include the manufacturing of weapons, ammunitions, and explosive devices.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. Pakistani authorities apprehended the detainee in late December 2001. At the time, he identified himself as an Afghan named Sadir Sabit, born in 1975 in Mazar-e-Sharif. He was detained with a Kalishnikove and 1,000 Pakistani rupees. He was serving with the Taliban in Mazar-e-Sharif until forced out by the Northern Alliance. He fled to Kabul, then Jalalabad, then Tora Bora, and finally Pakistan.
2. The detainee is wanted by the Chinese police.
3. The detainee has requested political asylum in the United States, and is certain that if returned to China, or any country influenced by China, he will be tortured and most likely executed.

The following primary factors favor release or transfer

a. The detainee stated he never fired a weapon at any person or aircraft while at the Tora Bora training camp.

b. According to the detainee, the Uighurs consider themselves an ally of the United States, and would not associate with terrorist organizations, especially those that target the United States.

c. The detainee asserted that ETO has no financial, logistical, operational, or philosophical connection to al Qaida, the Taliban, or any other Muslim extremist group.

d. The detainee stated that he had never heard of al Qaida until he heard of it from the Americans.

e. The detainee has no plans to return to Afghanistan or China to reunite with groups involved in fighting or to commit terrorist acts. He added that he has never fought against the United States and has no plans to fight against the United States in the future.

Identity

Captive 277 was identified inconsistently on official Department of Defense documents:

• Captive 277 was identified as Mahnut Bahtiyar on the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 29 September 2004.
• Captive 277 was identified as Sadir Sabit in the "Information paper: Uighur Detainee Population at JTF-GTMO".
• Captive 277 was identified as Bahtiyar Mahnut on the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his Administrative Review Board, on 23 August 2005.

Template:CSRT-Yes The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a Detainee is a member of Al Qaida.

1. detainee was in a Uighur training camp in Tora Bora from June 2001 to November 2001, and left the camp after the United States air campaign began.
2. Detainee was trained on the Kalashnikov rifle and tactics.
3. Detainee is a member of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM).
4. The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement is an Islamic extremist movement linked to Al Qaeda.
5. Detainee was arrested with Arabs as a Pakistan mosque.

Administrative Review Board hearing

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".

Following the Supreme Court's ruling that prisoners the Department of Defense set up the Office for the Administrative Review of Detained Enemy Combatants. Gul attended his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board (WP) hearings. The US government, careful to avoid the standards of international law, made a point of declaring that Administrative Review Boards were not authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, as this would have invoked the Geneva Convention standards. They further distanced the ARB boards from international consideration by distancing the ARB boards from the CSRT and the government's own definition of "enemy combatant", by not authorizing the ARB boards to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were set on a purely opportunistic venture to assess the government's self interest, in the manner of the villain holding a gun to a hostage's head and saying, "don't make me do this". "If we do the right thing and release these prisoners, the board asked, "will we be inconveniencing ourselves?" And so they considered whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

Transcript

Mahnut chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing. In the Spring of 2006, in response to a court order from Jed Rakoff the Department of Defense published a thirteen page summarized transcript from his Administrative Review Board.

Enemy Combatant election form

Mahnut's Assisting Military Officer met with him for a pre-hearing interview for 79 minutes on 25 August 2005, and again on 29 August 2005. He opted out of attending his Board hearing during the first interview, but changed his mind and chose to attend during his second. His Assisting Military Officer recorded on his Enemy Combatant election form that "The detainee remained polite and attentive throughout the interview." During the 25 August 2005 the form recorded:

"The detainee said that since he had been in American custody he had been honest and forthright with the interrogators. He did not hide anything. He participated in the Combatant Status Review Tribunal, even providing additional information to the tribunal."

The form recorded he changed his mind about attending his hearing, after thinking about it, because he was innocent of being an enemy combatant. He was also concerned that he wasn't getting any mail from home, and that camp authorities were not allowing him to have a cell near his brother.

Response to the factors

• Mahnut described the guesthouse as "just a little room...a little house, and that he stayed there just one night."
• Mahnut described chaos after the USA's unexpected bombing of their construction camp. He described wandering in the mountain passes for a month, and then seeing a group of Arab refugees, with an Afghan guide, and decided to follow them.
• Mahnut confirmed that Hassan Maksum visited the camp once, while he was there. He confirmed that Maksum was a leader in a Uyghur independence movement. He disputed that the group Maksum lead was the East Turkistan Islamic Movement. He said Maksum was the leader of the Freedom Movement Party.
• Mahnut was very skeptical that Maksum would have ties to al Qaeda because the Uyghurs were counting on American support for their independence movement.
• Mahnut said he didn't understand why Osama bin Laden was opposed to the USA.
• Mahnut speculated that the Uyghur independence groups were listed on the State Department's list of Terrorist organizations because officials had mistakenly taken Chinese allegations about the organizations at face value.
• Mahnut explained that the allegation that he had been in Mazari Sharif, and fought in Mazari Sharif was due to his initially telling the Pakistani authorities he was an Afghan, from Mazari Sharif. He and his companions were sure that Pakistani authorities would return them to China if they knew they were Chinese citizens. He clarified that not only hadn't he fought in Mazari Sharif, he had never been to Mazari Sharif.
• Mahnut confirmed that the Uyghur organization that ran the camp had no financial, logistical, operational, or philosophical connection to al Qaida, the Taliban, or any other Muslim extremist group.
• Mahnut confirmed he first heard about al Qaeda during his interrogations.

Response to Board questioning

• Mahnut said he left China hoping to eventually immigrate to a freer country.
• Mahnut said he saw his brother in Kandahar. He said he learned during one brief meeting they were allowed that his brother had traveled to Afghanistan to look for him.
• Mahnut indicated that his brother was also present in Guantanamo, in camp two.
• Mahnut clarified that he and his fellow Uyghurs had not been able to have any conversations with the Arab refugees they followed, because none of them spoke Arabic.

Board recommendations

In early September 2007 the Department of Defense released two heavily redacted memos, from his Board, to Gordon England, the Designated Civilian Official. The Board's recommendation was unanimous The Board's recommendation was redacted. England authorized his transfer on 27 December 2005.

His Board considered intelligence assessments prepared by the CIA, the FBI, the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs, and the Department of State. ` Where the "Index to Transfer and Release Decision for Guantanamo Detainees" said the first page of the seven page "Classified Record of Proceedings and basis of Administrative Review Board recommendation for ISN 277" should have begun contained a duplicate of the first page for Guantanamo captive 246. The first half of the first page of these memos was generally the only unredacted portion, and thus gave the only clues to why the Board made its recommendation.

Refused to be sent to Palau

The Washington Post reported that Palau had offered him asylum, but had not offered asylum to his brother Arkin Mahmud. According to Del Quentin Wilber, writing in the Washington Post, Arkin developed mental health problems at Guantanamo so serious that he was the only captive not invited to stay in Palau.

According to the Washington Post, Abubakkir Qasim, one of the fellow Uyghurs, who was transferred to Albania in 2006, described the brother's situation as a "difficult and sad."

"This is just very difficult and sad. Bahtiyar is turning away freedom for his brother. His brother is only there because of Bahtiyar. I feel sorry for both of them."

Arkin had traveled to Afghanistan after younger brother Bahtiyar had phoned from the Uyghur construction camp—a call that left the rest of their family worried about him. They met at the camp, shortly before the 9-11. Although the men were captured in 2001, they were not allowed to see one another in the camp until 2003, when Bahtiyar asked to be moved from the camp for more compliant captives to the camp where Arkin was being held. From 2005 until the remaining Uyghurs were cleared of suspicion in September 2008 Arkin was held in isolation because guards reported infractions of the camp's rules.

Granted asylum in Switzerland

Switzerland granted political asylum to Arkin Mahmud and Bahtiyar Mahnut on February 4, 2010. Swiss authorities helped them settle in Canton of Jura.

External links

• From Guantánamo to the United States: The Story of the Wrongly Imprisoned Uighurs Andy Worthington October 9, 2008
• Judge Ricardo Urbina’s unclassified opinion (redacted version)
• MOTIONS/STATUS HEARING - UIGHURS CASES BEFORE THE HONORABLE RICARDO M. URBINA
• Taking On Guantánamo Connecticut Law Tribune, May 10, 2010
• Human Rights First; Habeas Works: Federal Courts’ Proven Capacity to Handle Guantánamo Cases (2010)

Template:Infobox War on Terror detainee